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Abstract

PERSONS AS SELF-CONSCIOUSLY CONCERNED BEINGS
by
BENJAMIN ABELSON

Advisor: Professor John D. Greenwood

This dissertation is an analysis of the concept of a person. According to this analysis, persons are beings
capable of being responsible for their actions, which requires possession of the capacities for selfconsciousness, in the sense of critical awareness of one’s first-order desires and beliefs and concern,
meaning emotional investment in the satisfaction of one’s desires and truth of one’s beliefs. The
persistence of a person over time requires uninterrupted maintenance of those capacities. This view is in
conflict with the more popular account of persistence in terms of the continuity of distinctive psychological
states. Furthermore, this account of personhood has the consequence that contrary to most alternative
conceptions, the possession of rights to life and good treatment and the concern for others are neither
necessary nor sufficient for being a person. In chapter one I explain and argue for my account of
personhood in terms of self-consciousness and concern, illustrating that a being lacking either capacity
would not be capable of responsible action and therefore would not be a person. In chapter two I argue
for the claim that the persistence of a person requires only that those capacities are maintained
uninterruptedly. Chapter three concerns the ontology of persons. There I argue for a Reductionist view of
persons and defuse the objection that such a view necessarily slides into Eliminativism. In chapter four I
draw a distinction between the concepts of ‘person’ and ‘self,’ arguing that the latter is not unique to
persons and is best understood in neuro-cognitive terms. The fifth and final chapter deals with the
implications of my account of personhood for ethics, as regards rights and concern for others.
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Introduction
I.

What is a Person?
The question “What is a person?” might ring oddly in ears unfamiliar with the

philosophical debates surrounding it. Someone who poses such a query is likely to
receive a reaction of puzzlement or even ridicule. Among the more helpful responses to
it is the counter-question, “Isn’t a person just a human being?” This is helpful because
the philosopher asks the former question only when he or she has in mind a distinction
between the concept of a person and that of a human being. To illustrate this distinction,
the philosopher is likely to mention fetuses or individuals in irreversible vegetative
comas, as examples of humans that are non-persons on the one hand, and intelligent
space aliens, artificial intelligences, or superevolved non-human animals, as examples
of non-human persons, on the other. The first hand holds examples of genetically
human creatures that don’t seem to meet the criteria for personhood and the second
hand holds examples of non-humans who do seem to be persons. Now the original
question can be recast in light of these examples: What do the human non-persons
lack and the non-human persons have in common that is essential to being a person?
This question might sound a bit less odd to the layperson, particularly if he or she has
had any exposure to science fiction or the more publicly represented bioethical issues,
such as abortion, euthanasia, and animal rights, or legal issues concerning the status of
corporations. Often one speaks of the qualities of ‘humanity’ when one really has in
mind features that could be possessed by something that is not genetically homo
sapiens. The assignment of ‘human’ to the biological species concept and ‘person’ to
the more abstract metaphysical notion is a matter of philosophical convention, but there
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is a conceptual distinction to be drawn that is not a matter of convention but represents
a genuine difference in meaning between biologically specific humans and transspecific persons. Thereby, I follow the philosophical tradition in stipulating that in the
context of this study, ‘human’ denotes belonging to the biological species homo-sapiens
and ‘person’ denotes belonging to the trans-specific class.
For thinkers at the dawn of modern philosophy and science, particularly
substance dualists such as Rene Descartes, Joseph Butler (1736), and Thomas Reid
(1785), personhood was understood as depending on the possession of an immaterial,
immortal soul. Persons were thought to be the unique possessors of minds, free will,
and morality. According to Descartes, human beings are the only creatures to possess
those characteristics (though he didn’t use the term ‘person’), by virtue of having a soul
that is separate from their physical or mental components and properties, standing
behind those components and properties, and evidenced by their unique capacity for
language. He regarded all non-human creatures as mere mechanisms, without thought,
will, or feeling. For him, only human beings oversee their own bodily mechanisms from
the executive seat of the soul. The strict duality between soul-possessing persons and
mechanical non-persons has since been rejected by most philosophers, and the notion
of a separate soul with a causally undetermined will has been largely abandoned by
philosophers with naturalistic inclinations. Even without such jettisoning, John Locke
(1690), as a kind of proto-functionalist, saw that it didn’t matter what sort of stuff a being
was composed of, but rather how that stuff was organized and what it could do. For a
2

non-physical substance to constitute a personal soul it would have to have the
capacities constitutive of personhood. He says that
‘Person stands for… a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection,
and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and
places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from
thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it. (Locke 1690, II.XXVII.335.10)
So what matters is not that the soul is immaterial or separate, but that it
possesses those person-constituting capacities, i.e. thinking/consciousness,
intelligence, reason and reflection. If it is conceivable that matter could instantiate such
capacities, then there is no reason to insist on the existence of a non-physical soul.
Descartes may have objected that there are qualities of conscious experience that can
only be instantiated in an immaterial substance, but he had no good way of explaining
how those uniquely mental properties could have any relation to the purely mechanical
processes that they appear to cause and be caused by.
If one recognizes the similarities in behavior and shared neurofunctional
architecture between human beings and other creatures, then one should, as Locke
seemed to, regard human persons as on a continuum with other animals rather than
marking a radical ontological break. Moreover, because Locke understood persons in
terms of their characteristic functions, he considered it possible that some other animal
species, e.g. a super-intelligent parrot, could manifest those characteristics and
therefore be rightly regarded as persons. In the Lockean spirit, I will here endeavor to
draw a modest, but principled ontological distinction between persons and non-persons,
though the line may not be in quite the place it has been often supposed to be. Some
3

creatures that are commonly regarded as mere animals, e.g. chimpanzees and
dolphins1 might turn out to be persons. Unfortunately, epistemic constraints may make it
so far impossible to decide with certainty whether or not such creatures possess the
capacities constitutive of personhood, but after deciding what those capacities are,
there will be evidence to suggest that some beings have a higher likelihood than others
of possessing them. Nevertheless, I will make no decisive claims about which beings,
beyond the paradigmatic cases, are, and which are not persons. In some cases it is
likely that there is insufficient evidence to judge either way with any authority. However,
even if one cannot be certain which beings possess the capacities constitutive of
personhood, one can still come to a clear understanding of what those capacities are,
which, if any being realizes them, make that being a person.
To explain the concept of a person in terms of the possession of certain
capacities that distinguish persons from other beings is to understand the concept as a
metaphysical one, one that carves out different categories of being. However, one might
also draw a distinction not only of nature but also of moral status, between persons as
being the sorts of things which bear rights, responsibility, and moral awareness and
non-persons which do not have that status. According to the moral concept of a person,
only persons can be responsible in such a way that they can be reasonably praised and
blamed for their actions. Such responsibility is often taken to be the ground for taking
persons to be of special value, thereby having a unique claim to rights. For this reason,

1

India has already declared that dolphins are legal, non-human, persons.
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individuals who seek to establish protection for the rights of beings as diverse as dogs
(Berns 2013), rivers (Messenger 2012), and human fetuses, have based their claims on
the premise that these beings are persons. Finally, some writers have built a capacity
for moral awareness and empathy into the concept of a person. Susan Wolfe (1987), for
instance, has claimed that “sanity” is a necessary condition for responsibility, and
therefore personhood, where sanity includes a recognition of the moral properties of
situations.
More often than not, these two concepts of personhood, metaphysical and moral,
are assumed to be bound up together. The difference in metaphysical attributes is
supposed to account for the distinction in moral status. In this study (particularly, the
concluding chapter) I will contest this assumption in its strongest forms by offering
reasons for reconsidering the relation between the two concepts of personhood and
arguing that while personhood is inextricably bound to notions of responsibility, much of
the additional moral status commonly attributed and often thought unique to persons
does not, in fact, follow from the metaphysical concept of a person.
Recently, some writers have worried that if the metaphysical concept of a person
is ambiguous, then the moral conception has no clear foundation and the concept of a
person should therefore be removed from the arena of ethical discourse. Gordijn (1999),
for instance, thinks that since disagreement over criteria for personhood is intractable,
its employment in bioethical debates over abortion and euthanasia is inevitably
question-begging and therefore, irresponsible, as each disputant in the debates has his
5

or her own pet conditions of personhood tailored to supporting the ethical conclusions
the disputant is arguing for. I agree with Gordijn that ‘person’ is not particularly useful for
solving bioethical debates, but not for the reasons he supposes. I will argue that
disagreement over the necessary and sufficient conditions of personhood is not as
intractable as Gordijn thinks it is and that once we have sorted out those conditions, it
will become clear that much of the moral status assumed for persons does not follow
from the metaphysical concept, so that the bioethical disputes Gordijn is concerned with
cannot be settled solely by appeal to personhood, but for different reasons than Gordijn
provides.
The characteristics which have been assumed by various writers to be
constitutive of persons do seem to form a rather heterogeneous and possibly
inconsistent set. Gordijn offers the following list, which is representative if not
exhaustive of that set and includes Locke’s aforementioned criteria:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

The capacity to experience pleasure and/or pain;
The capacity to have desires;
The capacity to remember past events;
The capacity to have expectations with respect to future events;
An awareness of the passage of time;
The property of being a continuous, conscious self, or subject of mental
states, construed in a minimal way, as nothing more than a construct of
appropriately related mental states;
7. The property of being a continuous, conscious self, construed as pure ego,
that is, as an entity that is distinct from the experiences and other mental
states that it has;
8. The capacity for self-consciousness, that is to be aware of the fact that one is
a continuing, conscious subject of mental states;
9. The property of having mental states that involve propositional attitudes such
as beliefs and desires;
10. The capacity to have thought episodes, that is, states of consciousness
6

involving intentionality;
11. The capacity to reason;
12. The capacity to solve problems;
13. The property of being autonomous; that is of having the capacity to make
decisions based upon an evaluation of relevant considerations;
14. The capacity to use language;
15. The ability to interact socially with others; (Gordijn 1999, 353)
However, I will attempt to show that most of the items on this list hang together in
rather clear ways and the ones that don’t fit are dismissible for good reasons. After
offering my own account of necessary and sufficient conditions, I will look back at this
list and attempt to demonstrate that the account is inclusive of some of those features
listed above, and in the cases where it is not, argue for why the excluded conditions are
rightfully excluded, for they are not necessary for being a person.

II.

Objections to seeking criteria of personhood
The present study is an attempt to discern the necessary and sufficient

conditions of personhood, in other words, the conditions any being must meet in order
for us to accurately call it a person in a usefully consistent way. Before explicating my
methodology for navigating the conceptual terrain, I must contend with various
objections that have been raised to the very idea of trying to establish necessary and
sufficient conditions of personhood. One sort of objection claims that ‘person’ is best
thought of as an ‘open-textured’ concept, one that does not have exhaustive conditions
of application. Choosing a particular closed set of conditions, the objection continues,
could only be done arbitrarily and no matter where the line was drawn, it would unduly
7

restrict the potential future scientific employment of the term.
Waismann (1945) refers to the “open texture” of concepts as part of a general
critique of verificationism as propounded by Mackinnon (Mackinnon 1945)2. While the
idea of providing necessary and sufficient conditions for personhood is independent of
Mackinnon’s verificationism, Waismann’s point nonetheless poses an important
challenge to it. Waismann explains what he means by “open texture” in several different
ways. I will consider only some of them, because it is not entirely clear that there is a
single notion in play (‘open-texture’ itself may be open-textured) and only some senses
of the term are relevant to the present discussion. To begin with, Waismann claims that
“The failure of the phenomenalist to translate a material object statement into terms of
sense-data is… due... to the ‘open texture’ of most of our empirical concepts.”
(Waismann 1945, 121) He offers as an example the attempt to verify the statement
“There is a cat next door” and wonders what would count as sufficient verification.
I go over to the next room, open the door, look into it and actually see a cat. Is
this enough to prove my statement? Or must I, in addition to it, touch the cat, pat
him, and induce him to purr?... can I then be absolutely certain my statement was
true?... What for instance should I say when that creature later on grew to a
gigantic size? Or… it could be revived from death… Shall I in such a case say
that a new species has come into being?... Have we rules ready for all
imaginable possibilities? The fact that in many cases there is no such thing as a
conclusive verification is connected with the fact that that most of our empirical
concepts are not delineated in all possible directions. (Waismann 1945, 122)
So the fact that there is no exhaustive set of conditions that would allow us to
decide with certainty whether or not a statement is true is supposed to be explained by

2

Mackinnon’s paper was published together with the replies from Waismann and Kneale which
are listed together under ‘M’ in the bibliography.
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the fact that most of our concepts “are not delineated in all possible directions.” If one
thinks that the meaning of a statement can be explicated entirely in terms of the
conditions of its verification then it would make sense to hold the nature of the concepts
themselves at fault for our lack of certainty in when to apply them. This can be seen as
problematic even if we aren’t trying to translate our statements into talk of sense data.
Any attempt at offering exhaustive necessary and sufficient conditions of a concept
must take into account a perhaps inexhaustible number of potential counterexamples. If
faced with rapidly growing or undead things that otherwise resembled cats we would
have to make a choice between recognizing different sorts of cats or saying that these
new things were not cats at all.
Waismann’s problem seems to be that our current way of defining cats in terms
of characteristic physical features, behavior, dna, who they can mate with to produce
fertile offspring, etc., don’t provide us with clear guidelines for how to deal with the weird
possibilities. Any further specification of conditions that create a rule for deciding in
some cases could continually be challenged by further cases, so that “we can never
eliminate the possibility of some unforeseen factor emerging, we can never be quite
sure that we have included in our definition everything that should be included, and thus
the process of defining and refining an idea will go on without ever reaching a final
stage. In other words, every definition stretches into an open horizon.” (Waismann
1945, 125) The problem in the case of persons is that the kind of science fictional
possibilities that the concept must account for may be of endless variety and we might
9

not be able to anticipate some of them in advance. We could then never be sure if our
definition of the concept of a person were inclusive of all possible persons to the
exclusion of all possible non-persons.
However this conclusion need not be unwelcome, if one has a modest vision for
the task of providing necessary and sufficient conditions. If, rather than attempting to
decide all and only the cases in which a concept can be successfully applied, one is
merely describing the way a concept is actually applied while perhaps also suggesting
that its application could be refined for the purpose of greater clarity or precision, then
such possibilities need not be taken as undermining that project. Rather, these sorts of
cases make the project of definition interesting, in that one must attempt to make one’s
definitions responsive to as many odd cases as possible while finding principled
reasons for drawing the lines where one does. In other words, the as yet only possible,
but nevertheless imaginable cases challenge one to provide a definition inclusive of
such cases, but that definition need not be exhaustive of all possible cases that may
arise.
To illustrate Waismann’s claim that many of our empirical concepts are opentextured, Sclafani (1967) points out that the necessity of positing imaginary numbers
could not have been anticipated until the development of the quadratic equation. If our
concept of ‘number’ had been too rigidly defined, then we could not have included these
very helpful entities within it. Another example is the case of motion pictures. The rise of
motion pictures as an art form could not have been anticipated in advance of the
10

invention of the right sort of camera. For that reason, one should think of the concept of
art as open in texture, so as to allow new, as yet unimagined, forms to be included in it.
So, if the concept of a person is similarly open in texture, one may object that
establishing necessary and sufficient conditions may unduly rule out as yet unimagined
variations on what we now consider to be persons. These two examples are instructive
in different ways. In the case of number, Sclafani holds that there was a previously
clearly defined conception of number that was modified in order to include the new
entities, yielding a revised but still clearly defined concept.3 This required a choice extend the definition to include the new entities or refuse to include the new entities and
say that there are two different concepts of number - the old outdated one, and the
newly refined one. In such a case there are various theoretical virtues to be considered.
For mathematicians the utility of considering imaginary numbers as numbers was worth
paying the cost of conceptual mutilation.4 Because of the possibility of such cases we
must only think of our concepts as closed relative to what has so far been anticipated,
but subject to revision should some as yet unanticipated possibility come to light. Once
these possibilities are realized, the prior concepts may be modified to accommodate
them. In other words, the concepts change to accommodate the new phenomena. So I
3

It is likely, however, that this is not the actual truth about the history of imaginary numbers. It
might be a more accurate story to tell about the introduction of irrational numbers following the
discovery by Pythagoras of the incommensurability of the diagonal of a unit square with its
sides, because it forced the Greeks to understand numbers in more theoretical and less
concrete terms. (As explained by Priest 1998) Imaginary numbers, on the other hand, have a
more complicated history of use, acceptance and explanation. Still, the example as stated, is
helpful for illustrating the idea of concept revision.
4
In some places Waismann’s view seems to foreshadow the Quine/Duhem holism thesis, the
latter of which I take to be perfectly compatible with my view of concepts.
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am happy to concede that whatever necessary and sufficient conditions of personhood I
am able to establish, they will only cover the as yet anticipated cases and that these
conditions are revisable in light of any as yet unanticipated possibilities.
However, there need not always be conceptual revision in the light of new as yet
unanticipated possibilities. In the case of art, it seems that the resources for deciding
whether or not film should count as art were already provided by the pre-cinema
concept, which already had to be sufficiently general to include painting, sculpture,
music, photography, etc. The conditions of application of a concept may be general
enough that novel instances fit happily under the old concept. My general response to
the issue of open texture as a challenge to providing necessary and sufficient conditions
of concepts is that we need not understand settling on a definition of a concept as
closing the matter for evermore. New possibilities may arise, even new actualities that
would force us to choose between extending, modifying, or even abandoning our
concepts, but that doesn’t mean the concepts need go undefined in the meantime.
One other way one might challenge the project of defining personhood in terms
of necessary and sufficient conditions is by claiming that it is best treated as a ‘family
resemblance’ concept which is often associated with a ‘prototype theory’ of concepts, in
opposition to the ‘definitional view’. Armstrong, Gleitman, and Gleitman (1999)
characterize the definitional view as follows: “a smallish set of the simple properties are
individually necessary and severally sufficient to pick out all and only, say, the birds,
from everything else in the world. Membership in the class is categorical, for all who
12

partake of the right properties are in virtue of that equally birds; and all who do not, are
not.” (Armstrong, Gleitman, and Gleitman 1999, 227) The definitional view is the general
strategy of the present study, with the caveat that I don’t expect or require that the
criterial properties of persons be ‘simple’ or even decomposable into ‘simples,’ but only
that persons are definable in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient properties or
capacities. Also, while my approach is committed to there being a clear line
demarcating where an individual that meets it is fully a person, I admit there could be
greater or lesser degrees of personhood approaching that limit. Still one might wonder if
‘person’ is really amenable to such a clear-cut definitional strategy. The proposed
alternative is to treat it in terms of family resemblance, where there is no specific set of
properties that are all necessary for inclusion under the concept, but where different
instances of a concept have different combinations of some but not all of the properties
generally associated with the concept. Beginning with Wittgenstein (1958), ‘game’ has
been the typical example of a family resemblance concept. Baseball, solitaire, and ringaround-the-rosy are all games, yet there is no single feature or set of features they all
share in common which distinguish them from all non-games, though all games do
share some features in common with some other game(s). That there are examples of a
concept, some of which are more and some less prototypical, is often taken to be
evidence that the concept is best handled by the family resemblance model. For
example, one might think that baseball is a more prototypical example of a game. The
other games are such insofar as they resemble the prototype, though each does so in
13

respect of different subsets of features to different degrees.
Armstrong et al. cite some empirical data that prototype theorists take to be
evidence for considering something a family resemblance concept. The data cited
shows that for some kind-concepts such as ‘game,’ ‘fruit,’ and ‘bird’ subjects
consistently rank different examples as better or worse instances of the kind in question.
The theory suggests that the examples indicated to be the best are the prototypes, and
the less typical examples are ranked in terms of their resemblance to the prototypes.
However, it is clear that not all concepts that have prototypes are family resemblance
concepts. For instance, ‘odd number’ has perfectly clear criteria of application, and yet,
Armstrong et al point out, respondents display the same ranking behavior for those
concepts as they do for the ones reasonably supposed to be cluster concepts. They
write:
Are there definitonal concepts? Of course. For example, consider the
superordinate concept odd number. This seems to have a clear definition,a
precise description; namely, an integer not divisible by two without remainder. No
integer seems to sit on the fence, undecided as to whether it is quite even, or
perhaps a bit odd. No odd number seems any odder than any other odd number.
But if so, then the experimental paradigms that purport to show bird is prototypic
[and therefore, not definitonal] in structure in virtue of the fact that responses to
‘ostrich’ and ‘robin’ are unequal should fail, on the same reasoning, to yield
differential responses to ‘five’ and ‘seven’ as examples of odd number… [T]he
facts are otherwise. For graded responses are achieved regardless of the
structure of the concept…. [S]ubjects... judged 3 a better odd number than 501.
(Armstrong et al. 1999, 234-237)
That there are commonly recognized prototypes of a concept is often taken to be
evidence that the concept cannot be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient
conditions, and can only be analyzed into relations of family resemblance. However,
14

Armstrong et al.’s findings show that instances being ranked as prototypical or
exemplary of a concept does not imply that the concept is best understood in terms of
family resemblance, nor vice-versa - e.g. actual families may not have prototypical
members. In summary, ranking behavior with regard to a concept is not evidence for it
being a family resemblance one. So just because there are more or less prototypical
persons does not entail that ‘person’ is a family resemblance concept.
Ranking behavior is not the only reason why someone might think a concept is a
family resemblance one and not one with clear necessary and sufficient conditions of
application. One might only point to places in which two different accepted usages
conflict with one another, so that it is just not clear whether or not the concept applies.
In such cases it seems to me that there are not one but two concepts with the same
name, so one must decide which is the primary use of the term and find an alternative
label for the concept which is abstracted from the secondary usage.
Timothy Chappell (2011) offers a different sort of objection to the idea of
establishing criteria for personhood, claiming that our “normal decision procedure” when
choosing whether or not to regard a being as a person is not to check off a list of
criteria. For instance, we treat human children as persons long before they manifest
most of the features usually thought constitutive of personhood. He argues that,
therefore, one should be a “humanist” about persons, holding that being human is
sufficient, though not necessary, for being a person.5 Chappell allows that other

5

Schechtman (2014) makes a similar claim.
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species, space aliens, or “spooky refrigerators” could come to be regarded as persons.
He even concedes that in those cases we may resort to our list of criteria, among other
“factors and reactions, most of them defying explicit articulation” in order to decide on a
particular inclusion, but that “it would be utterly misleading to generalize from thought
experiments about these special and rare cases – almost all of which, to date, are
imaginary – to alleged conclusions about the normal cases” (Chappell 2011, 19).
Chappell’s concern about establishing criteria for personhood is, similarly to
Gordijn’s, a worry about the ethical implications of such an approach. ‘Person’ has
commonly been supposed to denote all and only the members of the “primary moral
constituency, (PMC): some class of creatures who exclusively and equally share in the
highest level of moral rights and privileges” (Chappell 2011, 2). Therefore, Chappell
infers, if one is a criterialist (which I take to be synonymous with definitionalist) about
persons, and includes self-consciousness, rationality, intelligence, etc. to be criteria of
personhood, then many genetically human beings, including the severely cognitively
impaired, infant children, and even normal humans who happen to be asleep at the
moment, do not count as persons, because they do not display any or all of those
properties. He worries that such beings don’t count as persons they may be
discriminated against and mistreated on the grounds that they are not part of the PMC.
In chapter five I will more thoroughly address this worry, by arguing that one can deny
that small children and also the severely cognitively disabled are full-fledged persons
while still granting that as human beings, they are the bearers of all the rights afforded
16

to other human beings that they are capable of enjoying. The objection to seeking a
definition of the metaphysical concept of a person which stems from a worry about the
moral status of children or the cognitively impaired can be defused if it can be shown
that persons are not the unique bearers of rights. But that argument aside, there is less
reason to think that criteria of personhood would rule out as persons many of the human
beings Chappell is concerned for.
For normal human beings who sometimes happen to be unconscious, as most
are prone to be at regular intervals, they can easily be included in a definition of persons
if it is stated it in terms of the capacity for exhibiting or instantiating those properties
rather than the actual exhibiting and instantiating themselves. There is a further
distinction to be drawn in the case of children, by speaking of their potential for such
capacities. I will have more to say about capacities and potential in chapter one, when
discussing my own view of the capacities necessary and sufficient for personhood.
Furthermore, while Chappell may well be right that we treat some beings as
persons before they fully realize those properties characteristic of persons, we don’t just
do this for human children, but also household pets. People scold their dogs and cats as
if they were responsible for their actions just as they do their own children, but that
doesn’t mean that those beings are persons. In the case of human children, we have
good reason for treating them as persons, because there is strong evidence that the
more you treat a child like a person, the more likely it is that it will become a full-fledged
person - that (as demonstrated by the example of feral children) if a child grows up
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without being treated like a person, the person capacities will be impaired.
Moreover, Chappell’s argument generally conflates two different senses of
“criteria.” If one means by that term the properties people actually use for deciding
whether or not someone is a person, then he is right to point out that most people in
actual situations don’t check off a list of criteria in making such decisions, but if by
criteria we mean the features a being must have in order to be a person, independently
of the epistemic access one has to that fact, the point about decision procedure is
irrelevant. In other words Chappell is mixing up the conditions of empirically recognizing
persons with the conditions for being a person. Even if the former are not available on a
particular occasion, the latter may still exist and be explicable.
There are many other objections that I will have to grapple with in the course of
this study. Here I have only listed those which are posed against, to borrow the title of
Chappell’s essay, “the very idea of criteria for personhood.” I hope to have shown that
none of them is fatal to the project, and that it would be highly advantageous to
establish defined criteria for the application of the term ‘person.’ But to return to the
central issue at hand, what does bear on the question of what a person is? How are we
to decide which features are essential to being a person? The following section will be
an explication of my method for this study, which can be summed up as empirically
informed abstraction from primary use.
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III.

Discussion of method
Talk of necessary and sufficient conditions will likely evoke thoughts of the old

style of conceptual analysis which was the hallmark of the ordinary language
philosophers of the mid-20th century, such as Gilbert Ryle, J.L. Austin, and P.F.
Strawson. Jose Luis Bermudez (2005) somewhat deridingly, characterizes conceptual
analyses as
purely a priori. They are neither justifiable nor answerable to any empirical
facts that we might discover about the phenomena in question. They are
obtained by reflecting on the various components of our conceptual
scheme, by trying to identify relations of dependence between particular
concepts and by constructing thought experiments that will test our
intuitions and hence (so the theory goes) provide guidance as to how to
understand particular concepts… constructing sets of necessary and
sufficient conditions that would pick out all and only the situations in which
we would intuitively say that [the concept in question applies].
The complaint against such a method of philosophizing is two-fold. First of all, by
proceeding entirely “from the armchair” as it were, “purely a priori” analysis is supposed
to be isolated from any new empirical information that might shed light on a subject of
inquiry. However it is unclear that there is a definitive line between our pre-theoretical
intuitions of what things are and what we discover about them empirically. Common
sense is related dynamically to scientific discovery in such a way that we should regard
our concepts as revisable in light of new developments. I am sympathetic to this line of
objection and so wish for the account of the concept of a person that I will offer to be
responsive to and continuous with contemporary scientific data. Our so-called “intuitive”
responses to definitional questions are informed to varying degrees by our
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understanding of the science of our time and cannot be thought to emerge out of a
conceptual vacuum. However, once all the available relevant empirical data has been
collected, there is still analytical work to be done.
Secondly, one might object that the attempt to define a concept by appealing to
strange or purely hypothetical situations or thought experiments reaches far beyond the
situations in which our concepts are actually employed, and is, therefore, ill-suited to the
purpose of establishing necessary and sufficient conditions of application for the actual
cases in which we would be warranted in applying a particular concept. As Bermudez
puts it at greater length:
our ordinary conceptual scheme developed to provide a framework for
thinking about the types of objects and situations that we tend to
encounter, and we can expect it to be silent on such questions as whether
or not [for example] to attribute knowledge to someone who finds himself
in a region that he knows to be full of fake barn facades made from papiermâché and correctly identifies the object in front of him as a barn, even
though he has not first checked to rule out the possibility that it might be a
papier mache barn façade. (Bermudez 2005, 7)
Bermudez suggests we relax the constraints on what counts as a successful
conceptual analysis, by restricting our analysis to how a concept is applied in the
situations for which it has been designed, and ignoring the unlikely hypotheticals. To
ask that our account of a concept have clear criteria of application in all conceivable
situations, according to Bermudez, goes beyond the warrant of analysis of our everyday
concepts, and is, rather, “a refinement or sharpening” of them.
However, it is not clear to me that we can draw any kind of principled distinction
between cases for which our “conceptual scheme was developed” and those to which it
20

does not extend. Conditions of “ordinary use” are encountered woven together with
imaginative exercises and scientific revelations in a complex tapestry that is without
discrete boundaries between designs. Therefore, I depart from Bermudez by taking
thought-experimental cases to be legitimate elements for theorizing. While I agree that
we shouldn’t take our so-called intuitions about such cases to be an independent
tribunal whose verdict would then be imposed on a concept in all cases, I do think we
should understand part of the “integrative” task Bermudez speaks of to include making
our concepts as rich as is tenable in the sense of being consistently applicable in the
most conceivable situations.
On the other hand, I recognize along with Bermudez that there will be situations
where we should curtail a concept so as not to risk contradiction in use. For example,
while often in common usage and always for Locke, ‘self’ refers, reflexively, to ‘this
person’, I will argue (in chapter four) that the term ‘self’ be given a distinct analysis from
that of ‘person’ when doing metaphysics, because making such a distinction will be
extremely useful without requiring so great a departure from how the two terms are
commonly employed as to make them unrecognizable. ‘Person’ designates an objective
being, one that can be an object of empirical investigation by others. ‘Self’ designates
the internal, subjective representations that persons (but also animals and other
organized beings) generate to monitor their own internal states which may more or less
accurately represent those states. In persons, the ‘self’ usually includes one’s sense of
social, moral, and narrative identity.
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My general point is that there is need for both art and science in the analysis of
concepts. Science will provide ever new threads that must be appropriated into our
shared conceptual quilt, creating new folds in the fabric to be massaged or snipped by
reflective analysis. The ideal should be level panels and clear, discreet seams, but only
where the texture of the raw material allows.
Given the obstacles to be encountered when trying to weave and trim the
conceptual fabric of personhood, or any other difficult concept, one must prioritize
based on what one takes to be the most important uses to which the concept can be
put. Hence, the method I will employ is abstraction from primary use, which, in the case
of personhood, asks the question: which properties do persons possess such that the
concept serves the purpose for which it is primarily utilized? There are legal purposes,
metaphysical purposes, and moral purposes, with plenty of overlapping aspects
between them. It has become rather common to speak of three distinct concepts of a
person along those lines, though the overlapping makes drawing the lines difficult if not
impossible. The moral notion is ideally supposed to ground how the legal one is defined
and the metaphysical concept is often held to provide a foundation for the moral.
There is a long history of understanding the primary usefulness of ‘person’ to be
for making judgments of responsibility. The concept of a person, in its modern form (i.e.
not for defining angels, explaining the trinity, or demarking theatrical roles6), was given

6

This latter usage is, arguably the actual historical origin of the term. According to Martin &
Barresi (2006, 29): “The Greek word ‘prosopon’ originally meant playing a role in a drama or in a
religious ceremony. However, with the rise and democratization of the Greek city-states, the
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its first thorough explication by John Locke in 1690. He understood it as a ‘forensic’
concept. By ‘forensic’ he meant that its purpose is to track which individuals are
responsible for which actions.7 We hold human beings, the paradigmatic persons,
responsible in ways that we do not hold dogs, cats, bears, lizards, birds, or pigs, and for
good reasons that will be explicated in what follows. Furthermore, if faced with an
antagonistic member of an alien species, we would wonder after capturing it, whether it
is the sort of thing that is responsible for its actions. Our answer to that inquiry would
help us to decide the appropriate way to engage the alien. We can also speculate about
whether an intelligent computer could be responsible for its actions. These
considerations figure in most, if not all situations for which we wonder whether or not
something is a person. They are considerations about what it would take for a being to
be responsible for its actions, what capacities it must possess in order to act in a way
such that it would be reasonable to hold it responsible. Therefore, it is reasonable to
proceed on the supposition that tracking responsibility remains the best candidate for
word began to acquire a wholly secular meaning, which had to do with social and legal roles.
Certain kinds of citizens were recognized as having rights and duties that distinguished them
from others. In earlier Greek thought about people and society, the emphasis was on these
roles. Only slight attention was given to the individuals who occupied the roles. People were
regarded as little more than placeholders. However, when the Greek city-states declined, there
followed a period of pessimism during which the traditional emphasis on harmonious
relationships in the polis among essentially replaceable individuals waned. Cynics and Stoics, in
particular, emphasized inner resources for adaptation to the general malaise. This gave rise to a
new emphasis on individualism. The Latin term ‘persona,’ from which the English term person
derives, acquired its modern meaning from within the context of this latter development.” As I
see it, the “modern meaning”, resulting from the new emphasis on individualism, consists in the
term being primarily employed in forensic contexts.
7

Jessica Gordon-Roth has suggested to me that Locke’s understanding of person as a forensic concept
has been overemphasized and that he had other uses for the term in mind, but it seems to me (and
Gordon-Roth does not necessarily disagree) that the forensic usage is still, for him, the primary one.
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the primary use of ‘person’.
Schechtman (2014) provides a good example of an alternative method in stark
contrast to my method of abstraction from primary use. Rather than fishing out the one
primary use of the term, Schechtman’s project is to develop a conception of personhood
that weaves together all the various practical purposes for which it is commonly utilized.
Drawing on the work of Lindemann (2001 and 2009) she seeks conditions of
personhood that go “beyond the sophisticated forensic concerns that are usually the
focus of practically oriented discussions of personal identity,” because
treating someone as a person does not only involve treating her as a moral or
rational agent, but includes the full range of everyday behaviors that make up the
lives of human persons… taking for granted that persons wear clothes and are
given names rather than numbers, or that they are referred to as ‘who’, rather
than ‘what’. The social recognition that constitutes our identities… goes far
beyond the acknowledgment of rights and responsibilities… To recognize
someone as a person is not to make a particular kind of judgment about her, but
rather to treat her in the myriad ways that this form of life entails, those that
involve moral responsibility and autonomous agency and those that do not.
(Schechtman 2014, 72)
These considerations lead Schechtman to her distinctive position on personhood
and personal identity, which she calls the “Person-Life View” (PLV). According to PLV,
to be a person is to live the characteristic life of a person, which requires the social
recognition that confers personhood upon individuals, according them a place in
“person-space” in addition to possession of the characteristic capacities of persons, i.e.
self-consciousness, rationality, etc. which make them appropriate targets of forensic
practices, because the recognition and possession of capacities are interdependent and
conceptually inextricable -- the “capacities do not develop without the interactions and
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activities that make up a human life” (Schechtman 2014, 116). Because Schechtman
wants a conception of personhood that is sensitive to all the practical contexts and
purposes in which it is actually employed, she is led to a view that is inclusive of all
human beings, who from birth are recognized as persons, and which seems to exclude
many (but not all) other sorts of being that might possess the capacity for responsible
action but have a radically different form of embodiment. Such beings are excluded if
they are unable to interact in ways characteristic of persons (ways that go beyond
forensic practices), and hence cannot be accorded places in human person-space or
else have their own analogous social relations among one another. Schechtman only
allows for a non-human to be a person if one is capable of “living a person-life within the
social infrastructure that defines such a life,” in which case “we cannot but include her in
person-space,” though this does not require that such a person “engage in the
canonical forensic interactions,” as is the case with “humans of atypical developmental
trajectories.” (Schechtman 2014 132) However, I see things the opposite way, where
the particular social infrastructure in which a being finds herself is irrelevant to her
personhood, whereas whether or not she can engage in forensic interactions is
essential. While I agree that as a matter of contingent fact, the capacities constituent of
human personhood develop in the context of typical person-lives, such that outside of
such a context human beings are unlikely to manifest those capacities, I don’t take this
to be a conceptual or necessary truth.
I take my own project to be more about understanding personhood as a
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‘metaphysical’ concept (as opposed to epistemic or honorific) than Schechtman’s,
(though she does not see our projects as differing in this way), in the sense that I
constrain my analysis to the features that all persons intrinsically possess, as opposed
to also taking as essential the ways that we treat them or our ways of socially engaging
with them. Of course our ways of treating them and engaging with them often depend
on the features they intrinsically possess, but, contrary to Schechtman’s view of the
situation, not all such practices consistently track genuine features. I see personhood
not as a status that must be conferred, but a set of a capacities that a being either has
or doesn’t have regardless of whether or not it is recognized by anyone else. The
practices associated with responsibility, I hope to show, do, at least ideally, track
intrinsic features of persons that are essential to their personhood in a potentially
consistent way, whereas the features Schechtman invokes seem to have more to do
with arbitrary or culturally relative traditions. While she does take forensic capacities to
be the “most salient and distinguishing characteristics of persons” she thinks they only
have that importance because “they lead to and guide the development of the social
and cultural infrastructure that characterizes person lives.” (Schechtman 2014, 131)
However, it seems to me that if the same capacities in different environmental
conditions would lead to very different sorts of lives, we would have no less reason to
call them ‘person lives’. Such lives might be radically different from human person lives,
but the whole point of the concept of a person is to delimit the possibilities of persons
that are not human and may be very different from humans in all respects other than
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their personhood. What matters is whether or not these possible lives include the
forensic practices.
For Schechtman:
Intelligent balls of light energy that could not take human form, do not need
sustenance from the environment, and do not reproduce in anything like the way
animals do would undoubtedly have a social organization so different from ours
that it is exceedingly difficult to see how we could understand their form of life or
engage with them in forensic interactions. Here we are no longer talking about
nonhumans with the capacities of persons, but rather about beings with other
kinds of capacities that may be equally or more sophisticated than our own. Such
beings would not be persons according to PLV although they may be highly
intelligent. Lest this seem chauvinistic, we should recall that our goal is to
understand the nature of beings like us and to explicate the conditions of their
individuation. At some point we are no longer talking about “beings like us” and
that is all the denial of personhood amounts to in this context. (Schechtman
2014, 134)
I agree that there are conceivable beings as intelligent, or more intelligent, than
us that would not be persons. I also agree that in some sense when analyzing the
concept of a person the idea is to understand what ‘beings like us’ are. However, the
‘like us’ doesn’t refer to just any similarities. Tool use puts us in a class with crows and
chimpanzees, to the exclusion of cats and dogs, but there is no reason to think that’s a
class of persons. My task is to figure out which features we have that make other beings
‘like us’ in the respect that they are persons, and for that reason I must be selective in
choosing which features are relevant. I hope to have given sufficient reasons for
selecting the forensic capacities as the relevant ones. No doubt, there may be highly
intelligent beings that differ from us so greatly that they aren’t persons, but only insofar
as those differences make them incapable of the kind of responsibility I take to be
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essential to personhood. It may be extremely difficult to imagine how a ball of light
energy could be put on trial. Perhaps we could never include it in our forensic practices.
However, that doesn’t rule out the possibility that there could be balls of light energy that
do have capacity to take responsibility and hold each other responsible for some
actions. In such a case, those beings would be persons. Without such capacities they
would not be so.
However, according to Schechtman, we rightly consider all human beings to be
persons, even if they are disabled in ways that make them incapable of responsibility,
and that this conferral of personhood on those human beings and not on, e.g.
household pets, is non-arbitrary, for it is grounded in our expectations about normal
human beings vs. beings of other species. She writes:
PLV sees humans with atypical development prognosis as persons for much the
same reason that it sees human infants as persons -- because there is a default
expectation that such infants will develop into beings with the full complement of
forensic capacities; an expectation which is over-ridden in the atypical cases but
does not disappear or cease to do work even when we know the expectation will
not be met. (Schechtman 2014, 123)
Because atypical humans are atypical of a kind of being that normally engages in
forensic activities, their inability to perform such activities must be excused or explained,
whereas the inability of one’s dog to engage in such practices need not. This, according
to Schechtman, gives the atypical human a default position in person-space. However, I
fail to see how that is not merely an artifact of our attitudes and particular cultural
practices as opposed to a fact that grounds our attitudes. One can imagine (and
unfortunately may not need to imagine long) a callous society in which cognitive
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disabilities can be diagnosed before birth. If allowed to come to term, beings judged to
be incapable of forensic interactions would be branded and then treated as pets, left
unclothed, fed from a trough and given a litter box or taken for walks to relieve
themselves. What reason, besides our feelings of outrage could we offer such a society
for why they should not treat such individuals in that way? If we say, as Schechtman
seems to suggest, that they are persons because we expect beings genetically like
them to be persons, the reply would likely be that in these cases the expectations
weren’t met and why should unmet expectations determine the way things really are?
Schechtman assumes that if non-humans were to develop the cultural infrastructure
necessary for person-lives, then “individuals among them who fail to possess those
capacities would nevertheless be persons within their own infrastructure,” (Schechtman
2014, 135) but I see no reason why that need be the case. The attitudes toward atypical
species-members and the role accorded them in society could be largely different (and
has been) from that accorded in our own.
Schechtman ends her discussion of developmentally atypical humans by
considering a possible world in which we have the same expectations toward dogs that
we actually do toward cognitively disabled humans and human infants. She thinks that
such a situation is “truly unimaginable” because “it is not evident what would be involved
in having those expectations of ordinary dogs. Would the birth of every dog be viewed
as a kind of surprise? Would there be foundations and research initiatives to determine
what could be done to prevent dogs from being born with only the capacities typical of
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dogs?” (Schechtman 2014, 137) I think I can imagine such a case. I can certainly
imagine (and there may even be such people) who view dogs as abominations and
would set up foundations to see that they are never born. If such measures were in
place, then a dog birth would be a surprise. Moreover, imagine a situation in which most
dogs grew to be super-intelligent, developing forensic capacities, and so were persons
under both Schechtman’s criteria and my own. Regular, non-responsible dogs might
then be seen in very much the same way as developmentally atypical humans (even if
they were still typical dogs). The smart dogs might even campaign for the rights of their
genetic brothers and sisters - that they not be bought and sold and used as servants.
But they might not. They might refuse to give the atypical dogs a place in person-space
or even take them be have morally relevant interests, regarding them as mere pets or
worse. Nothing about the concept of a person tells us what role in society
developmentally atypical members of biological species whose normal members are
paradigmatic persons.
We do often use the terms ‘person’ and more often ‘personal’ or ‘personality’
when talking about whom we clothe and name, but we do not do so in a consistent and
principled way, so that such usage muddies the task of conceptual analysis. If one is, as
Schechtman seems to be, trying to account for all the ways in which the term is actually
employed under a single concept, then such muddying is unavoidable. However, if one
is willing to be somewhat revisionary, holding that that the ambiguities of ordinary
language can be remedied when doing metaphysics by regimenting what falls under
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different terms in minimally mutilating ways, then I think choosing one primary usage,
i.e. responsibility, that appeals to a clear set of intrinsic features, is the thing to be done.
In general, I take metaphysics to be the task of delimiting everyday concepts in such a
way that ambiguity is minimized and scientific prediction and explanation is optimized.
Often this requires deciding, among competing uses of a term, the ones that it is most
useful for and finding other terms to cover the rest. My task is not to figure out what we
call persons in all everyday contexts but to distill from such contexts a single primary
usage that could be applied in many different sorts (e.g. social, biological) of possible
situations.
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Chapter 1: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Personhood
I.

Personhood and Responsibility
The method of abstraction from primary use locates where a concept is most

useful and then abstracts from that use the conditions necessary and sufficient for the
purpose served. For the reasons noted in the introduction I take the primary use of the
concept of a person to be for marking the distinction between those beings that can be
responsible for their actions from those which cannot. It follows then, that necessary
and sufficient conditions of personhood are necessary and sufficient conditions for
being an agent such that an agent is responsible for at least some of its actions.
However, this method of abstraction should not be entirely insulated from empirical data
and so in distinguishing between beings that can be responsible and those which
cannot, it will not do to appeal to any scientifically dubious entities or powers, such as a
self that is separate from any of one’s physical or mental properties, or a mysterious
free will that transcends physical laws of causation. To use a philosophical buzzword,
the notion of responsibility, and therefore personhood, I seek to explicate, is a
naturalistic one – one which must be potentially explicable in the terms of our best
natural science. That’s not to say that I know what is potentially explicable and what
isn’t, but the dubious metaphysical notions I have mentioned are ones that are partially
defined as being outside of the jurisdiction of scientific investigation and therefore a
priori objectionable to a naturalist. So, given that restriction, the only notion of
responsibility available for my task is one that assumes the unreality of an unobservable
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self, and is compatible with the possibility of complete physical determinism. That does
not mean that the account of personhood I end up with will not be consistent with the
possibility of libertarian free will or a transcendent self, but only that it will not require it.
The account may be neutral on the question of the existence of such occult entities or
powers.
One might object that compatibilistic responsibility isn’t really responsibility, or at
least not responsibility in a genuinely moral sense - that it does not account for whether
or not someone truly deserves to be rewarded or punished for what she does, because
it does not answer the question of whether or not it was really “up to her” in an ultimate,
buck-stopping way. I agree that in that sense, the question of responsibility is left
unanswered by the compatibilist. The kind of responsibility accounted for by any
compatibilist analysis is not of the sort that would, for instance, get God off the hook for
the evil in the world or justify purely retributive reward and punishment, but I maintain,
along with the compatibilists, that there is another, more ordinary conception of
responsibility which we employ more or less consistently in our daily lives, particularly in
legal contexts, that allows us to make judgments about which cases someone “was in
control of what she did and understood the consequences” and in which ones she was
not and did not. This sense of responsibility lies between mere causal responsibility of
the sort that even inanimate objects (e.g. a rock being responsible for the breaking of a
window) are capable, on one end of the spectrum, and the buck-stopping ultimate
responsibility on the other.
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The concept of responsibility I have in mind is one that is practically applicable in
the absence of a solution to what we might call, borrowing somewhat from Chalmers
(1996), the “hard” free will problem. It consists in the capacity to take a critical stance
towards one’s own reasons for action and therefore be related to the actions
themselves in a distinctive way substantially different from what most intentional beings
are capable of. This sort of responsibility does not require that one have free will in the
sense that one is the “ultimate cause” of one’s actions. There is a tradition, beginning
with Kant, which assumes that being such an ultimate cause is necessary for
responsibility. As R. Abelson (1988) puts it:
I take it as non-controversial that the concept of a person entails the ability to
perform some actions for which one can be held responsible. I also take it that
responsibility for an effect entails responsibility for its cause, and nonresponsibility for the cause of an effect entails non-responsibility for the effect
itself. More technically, responsibility is ancestrally transitive along natural causal
chains and non-responsibility is hereditarily transitive along natural causal
chains. Now it follows from the principle of ancestral transitivity of responsibility
and hereditary transitivity of non-responsibility that a person cannot be held
responsible for any link in a causal chain unless he or she initiated that chain. (R.
Abelson 1988, 75)
I do not deny that there is a coherent sense of responsibility that is transitive in
the ways above described and of which one might wonder whether it is possessed by
anyone. One might reasonably argue that this sense of responsibility is the only
genuinely moral responsibility, because it is the only sort that accounts for the
justification of retributive reward and punishment. I agree wholeheartedly with the
premise of such an argument but am less certain of the conclusion. This is because I
think there is another sense of responsibility that is not ancestrally or hereditarily
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transitive, and which may have some moral import, though it does not provide a basis
for the justification of retributive reward and punishment. What I have in mind is a notion
that allows us to distinguish between two types of action. Both types of action may be
fully determined by previous causes for which the individual could not have been
responsible in any sense. However, the difference between the two types of action is as
follows: On the one hand, there are actions an individual performs which are caused by
her beliefs and desires, but those beliefs and desires have not been subject to internal
scrutiny by the individual, such that they might have been modified by the consideration
of reasons for and against having them. They are, for that reason no different in
responsibility than reflexes or even the movement of the rock smashing the window. On
the other hand, there are actions that are the result of desires and beliefs that have
been subjected to scrutiny in the way that the first sort are not, as the individual has
considered whether or not those particular desires and beliefs are themselves desirable
or true. Actions one is responsible for in my sense of the term are of the latter sort. They
are ones for which we may ask an individual’s reasons and expect that the being in
question can reflect on those reasons, and therefore, only an individual with the
capacity to so reflect is one that is fit for trial or interrogation. Furthermore, only such an
individual is fit to give consent and make legal commitments. That one is so responsible
for some actions does not by itself entail that one should be rewarded or punished for
such actions, although it might be the case that some rewards and punishments are
only effective on an individual with the capacity for responsibility.
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Furthermore, that an individual is capable of responsible action, in my sense,
implies that the individual is capable of taking responsibility, at least implicitly, for her
actions. I don’t mean that such an individual necessarily “owns up” to actions for which
she is responsible, admitting culpability, promising to redeem herself, etc., but only that
such an individual recognizes (at least to herself) that she is responsible for the action in
question. Such implicit responsibility-taking may be morally relevant in the sense that
one who recognizes her own responsibility has morally committed herself to taking
responsibility in the more explicit sense of “owning up,” whether or not she does actually
make good on that commitment.
One important worry that needs to be addressed here is that there might be
many cases in which an individual’s self-scrutiny is partially or wholly determined by
some alien power, for instance, post-hypnotic or subliminal suggestion or even direct
neural manipulation by a mad scientist. In such a case it might be inappropriate to say
that an individual’s actions, influenced by such ministrations, are ones for which the
individual is responsible. However, while I agree that one may not be responsible for
such actions, this poses no real objection to my analysis of responsibility in terms of
self-scrutiny. An individual capable of self-scrutiny is one with the capacity for
responsible action, but such an individual might fail to be responsible for any particular
action resulting from self-scrutiny if such scrutiny is influenced by an alien force. The
capacity for self-scrutiny is what grounds the treatment of an individual as a responsible
being and hence a person, but does not entail that every action performed by that
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being, even if resulting from self-scrutiny, is an action that being is responsible for.
If after considering the above points, one still thinks it inappropriate to call the
notion I have been describing “responsibility,” then a perhaps more palatable alternative
would be ‘authorship’. There are many beings who can perform actions, but only
persons can be genuine authors of their actions, by acting in a way that results at least
in part from the consideration of reasons. I think ‘authorship’ basically gets the same
point across, but prefer ‘responsibility’ because I think the analogy between performing
reason-sensitive actions and authoring a work of literature is imperfect. On might author
a rhapsodic poem that involved no reflection upon reasons for writing the lines that were
produced. Furthermore, ‘responsibility’ fits more naturally with considerations of
persistence. A person can be “responsible for something done in the past.” An
analogous formulation of that phrase involving authorship would be awkward at best.
Harry Frankfurt (1971) articulates a compatibilist notion of responsibility along the
same lines as the one just sketched, that he also takes to be distinctive of persons.
According to Frankfurt, while there are relatively many kinds of beings that possess
desires, only persons have, in addition to their first-order desires, second-order desires,
the content of which are the first order desires. In other words, not only do persons
want-to x, but they may or may not want-to want-to x. For instance, I may have a firstorder desire to smoke, but because I value my health I may want that I did not have that
desire. Frankfurt writes:
It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures
is to be found in the structure of a person’s will. Human beings are not alone in
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having desires and motives, or in making choices. They share these things with
the members of certain other species, some of whom even appear to engage in
deliberation and to make decisions based on prior thought. It seems to be
peculiarly characteristic of humans [assuming that no member of another species
is in fact a person], however, that they are able to form what I shall call ‘secondorder desires’ or ‘desires of the second order.’ Besides wanting and choosing
and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have)
certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their
preferences and purposes, from what they are. (Frankfurt 1971, 323)
A second-order volition is a second order desire that one or more of one’s first
order desires be effective in one’s actions -- that they constitute one’s ‘will’. The
capacity to form second-order volitions, for Frankfurt is sufficient for the capacity for
responsible action, but for any individual action of a person to be one she is responsible
for requires “harmony” between her second order volitions and the first order desires
that are effective in that action. When you want to have the will that you have, you are
responsible for what you will. For Frankfurt, the capacity for second order volitions
(harmonious or not) marks the difference between persons and mere animals or
‘wantons’ who have no attitudes towards what they do or do not will.
While I take it to be correct in its general outlook, I depart from Frankfurt’s view in
a few ways. First of all, he denies that there is a morally interesting conception of free
will that does require one to be the ultimate cause of one’s actions, whereas I do think
there is such a conception, I just don’t think it corresponds to reality. I agree in general
with compatibilism that there is a sense of responsibility that is compatible with
determinism. However, I disagree that it is the only coherent or interesting sense of
responsibility. The incompatibilist notion of free will is coherent and morally relevant,
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though I think it is false concerning beings in the actual world.
Secondly, Frankfurt’s account of human motivation is rather oversimplified. Most
conflicts of desire and volition are more complicated than simply wanting or not wanting
to have another desire. To begin with, one might both want and not want to want a
desire to various degrees. For example, I may be pleased that my previous first-order
desire to smoke has dissipated because I value my health, though a part of me wishes I
still had the desire because I have some nostalgia for my youthful devil-may-care
attitude and lifestyle. From day to day and even moment to moment I may vacillate in
what I consider my “real” desires. Beliefs in the desirability of some desire or other play
a role in whether or not one wants to have them and those beliefs may also be held with
differing degrees of conviction. On days when I can go running without wheezing and
gasping for breath, my pleasure in doing so may buttress my desire not to desire to
smoke because it has provided new evidence for believing that the desire to not want to
smoke is my true want. On other days when I’ve had a few drinks with my friends and
they go out for a puff, that conviction may be weakened - though I no longer have the
first-order desire to smoke, I may wish, for that moment, to still have that desire. One
may also be more or less aware of one’s motivations, and more or less self-deceptive. It
is possible that a person believes that he or she wants to want something and yet not
really want it “deep down” or “high up”. For instance one might wonder whether the
dictates of one’s conscience, constituted by desires to want or not want something, are
not merely conventional mores that one has internalized without wholeheartedly
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endorsing them. Furthermore, one can be committed to an action in such a way that
one does it despite retaining some pull of desire to refrain, as may be the case for an
individual who must put to sleep a terminally ill and suffering animal.
The condition of harmony between levels is too strong a condition of
responsibility, for one is almost never entirely volitionally harmonious. However, one
need not provide a more complex necessary relation in its place, for we can say that to
be capable of responsible action one must only be able to judge reflectively one’s first
order desires and act according to those second order judgments whether or not one is
conflicted. I suggest that such reflective judgment requires two distinct capacities which
may exist independently of one another, but which must be possessed in concert for an
individual to be a person. I refer to them as ‘self-consciousness’ and ‘concern’: i.e. a.
awareness of the motives behind one’s actions and b. emotional investment in the
satisfaction of one’s desires and truth of one’s beliefs, at least insofar as they contribute
to the satisfaction of one’s desires.
Again, I do not purport to establish conditions that would make an individual
responsible for any particular action, but rather the conditions a being must meet in
order to be capable of performing some actions for which he or she is responsible.
Schechtman (2014) seems to have this difference in mind when she distinguishes
between a person as a ‘forensic unit’ and as a ‘moral self.’ The former term refers to the
sort of being that is an appropriate object for inquiry about responsibility, or as
Schechtman puts it, “a suitable target about which particular forensic questions can be
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raised and judgments made” (Schechtman 2014, 14). The latter notion construes the
person as only the performer of the actions he or she is actually responsible for, his or
her limits “set by the very actions and experiences for which she is in fact held rightly
accountable.” (Schechtman 2014, 15) My conception of persons is as forensic units,
beings who are sometimes responsible for their actions, not as ‘moral selves,’ because I
take persons to exist and be persons even when performing those actions for which
they are not responsible. For example if a person enters a temporary state of fugue in
which he is no longer able to reflect on his reasons for action, the person does not
cease to exist, but is merely temporarily unable to exercise his person-constituting
capacities.
The general picture of persons as responsible beings is also not far from Locke’s
early characterization. He understood ‘person’ as primarily useful in tracking
responsibility. Furthermore, while Locke explicitly defined persons as conscious, rational
beings, his discussion of the relation between persons and responsibility shows that the
kind of consciousness he was talking about is closer to what is now often referred to as
‘self-consciousness’ and that some type of ‘concern’ is also essential to the ‘forensick’
conception of personhood.
Person… is the name for this self. Where-ever a Man finds, what he calls
himself, there I think another may say is the same Person. It is a Forensick Term
appropriating actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents
capable of a Law, and Happiness and Misery. This personality extends it self
beyond present Existence to what is past, only by consciousness, whereby it
becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to it self past Actions
just upon the same ground, and for the same reason, that it does the present.
(Locke 1690 II. XXVII. 17)
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My view of personhood, therefore, is essentially an updated and refined version
of Locke’s conception in light of subsequent developments in philosophy as well as
psychology and other empirical areas of inquiry. I argue that the capacities for selfconsciousness and concern are necessary and jointly sufficient for personhood. In
unpacking what I mean by those terms and how they relate to one another I will depart
significantly from Locke and my understanding of/suggestion for the relation between
the concepts of ‘person’ and ‘self’ is a rather significant departure from Locke given the
special meaning I assign to the latter term (in chapter four). Nevertheless, Locke’s view
provides a helpful outline for a model of personhood, though the details must be filled in
rather differently than he had done. One great advantage of this view, which Locke
failed to capitalize on is that it allows for a unified treatment of personhood and personal
persistence over time, which will be explained in chapter two.

II.

Self-Consciousness
Self-consciousness is the capacity for critical awareness of the reasons that lead

to one’s actions and recognition of those reasons as one’s own. This capacity has long
been thought central to the notion of personhood, and rightly so. Self-conscious beings
can project their desires and beliefs into the past and future and so can be aware of the
potential and actual consequences of their own actions relevant to those intentions.
Responsible beings can be reasonably praised or blamed for at least some of their
actions. One can only reasonably praise or blame, rather than merely scold or stroke,
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someone who has the capacity to be aware of the desires and beliefs that lead to her
actions. Only then can she be responsive to praise and blame, and either endeavor to
modify her actions, attempt to restrain herself from acting in accordance with them, or
conceal them and the actions performed on the basis of them from others. For that
reason, self-consciousness is necessary for responsibility, and therefore personhood.
One focused analysis of the capacity for self-consciousness and its relation to
personhood is contained in Daniel Dennett’s “Conditions of Personhood.” (1978)
Dennett, following Frankfurt’s intuitions about what distinguishes persons from nonpersons, explicates a notion of self-consciousness that I will argue is necessary, though
not by itself sufficient (for reasons other than Dennett’s own) for being a person. It is
helpful to look closely at Dennett’s account because it explores the relations between
self-consciousness and various other conditions that are often thought to be criteria of
personhood, though I disagree with him on a few specific points that together form a
significant difference in general outlook. Dennett introduces six ‘themes’ that he thinks
are generally considered necessary conditions of being a person. He then goes on to
explain the relations of dependence between them and to explore the question of why
they are indeed necessary and whether or not they are together sufficient for
personhood. Dennett understands ‘person’ to be both a metaphysical and moral
concept and wonders whether the two concepts coincide, eventually deciding that while
they are not really wholly distinct concepts, metaphysical personhood is necessary but
not quite sufficient for moral personhood, so that they are “two different and unstable
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resting points on a continuum.” (Dennett 1978, 284) I will argue in chapter five that
metaphysical personhood is not only insufficient for being a person in the full moral
sense, but that it is not even necessary for some aspects of moral personhood. For
now, I will put the morality to one side and focus on the metaphysics, specifically the
explication of Dennett’s themes and how they are related.
Dennett's six themes are: rationality, intentionality, being treated as something
with intentions, reciprocity of that attitude toward others, verbal communication, and
consciousness, or more specifically ‘self-consciousness’ of the kind that is the focus of
this section. According to Dennett, the first three themes come together as one
package, as possession of each implies possession of the others. Here Dennett
appeals to the main line of argument from his earlier article “Intentional Systems” from
the same volume (further developed in his later book The Intentional Stance (1987)),
asserting that whether or not a being has intentionality, i.e. whether or not its behavior
results from having beliefs and desires, is entirely a question of whether or not it is
useful to explain its behavior by using intentional language. In other words, there is no
fact of the matter about whether or not something is intentional beyond its being usefully
treated as such. And its being usefully treated as such, is for Dennett, a matter of
whether its behavior appears to be rationally directed toward an end. For instance, in
the case of a chess computer:
By assuming the computer has certain beliefs (or information) and desires (or
preference functions) dealing with the chess game in progress, I can calculate under auspicious circumstances - the computer's most likely next move, provided
I assume the computer deals rationally with these beliefs and desires. The
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computer is an Intentional system in these instances not because it has any
particular intrinsic features, and not because it really and truly has beliefs and
desires (whatever that would be), but just because it succumbs to a certain
stance adopted toward it, namely the Intentional stance, the stance that proceeds
by ascribing Intentional predicates under the usual constraints to the computer,
the stance that proceeds by considering the computer as a rational practical
reasoner. (Dennett 1978, 271)
Dennett tells a plausible story about what sort of behavior should lead one to
decide whether or not a system is intentional, but his extreme suggestion, that there is
no fact of the matter about whether or not a being really has the beliefs and desires that
it seems to, is less convincing. To begin with, one might object that there is a
phenomenal experience associated with having intentions that a goal-directed being
may or may not really have. However, to show that this is a real problem the objector
must justify the premise that there actually is phenomenal feel that comes with having
intentions. The objector is more likely to succeed with desires than with beliefs, but in
any case, when one is invoking phenomenal experience, one is talking about conscious
beliefs and desires, which is another matter from just ascribing intentions alone.
Another more serious doubt comes from the fact that beings can be deceptive,
so one might doubt whether a being has the particular desires and beliefs that it seems
to. However, to be deceptive one must have some intentions, so the possibility of
deception raises no real problem for taking goal directed behavior to be evidence of
intentionality in general. Still, if one can be perfectly deceptive, such that one’s behavior,
despite one not having a desire or belief, is impossible to distinguish from that of
someone that does have it, then observable behavior cannot be all there is to say about
45

particular intentional states.8 Furthermore, besides deceptive cases there seem to be
other differences in intentional states that are behaviorally indistinguishable. For
instance two people may pursue the same goal by identical means but due to entirely
different motives. Failure to take these sorts of cases into account makes Dennett’s
extreme suggestion implausible in the same way as it does classical behaviorism.
Nevertheless, despite the dubiousness of the extreme suggestion, Dennett is
mostly right about the evidence available to us for ascribing intentionality. For him, any
kind of goal directed behavior is good enough reason for ascribing first-order, nonconscious intentional states to a being and I agree on this point as far as beliefs go,
though not in the case of desires, because, as I will argue in the next section, their
ascription additionally requires that the being in question demonstrate concern.
Regardless, on this view, all kinds of non-persons, from computers to dogs and cats,
can reasonably be ascribed intentional states.
Meanwhile, Dennett may be right that one cannot reasonably attribute intentions
to something without assuming that the being in question is rational in a minimal sense
of the term. However, it could be the case that an individual has irrational intentions, but
that no observation of its behavior (other than spoken avowals) would be evidence of
them, so that one’s answer to the question of the possibility of irrational intentions
depends on whether or not one accepts Dennett’s view about the vacuity of the doubt
8

To be sure, Dennett holds, plausibly, that genuine deception requires second-order intentions,
as will be explained below, so the objection from deception may only require that there be a fact
of the matter about whether or not someone has second-order intentions. Still, it would be
strange if the question of the reality of intentional states only came in at the higher order.
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about the ontological status of intentional states. So while I take both intentionality and
minimal rationality to be necessary features of persons, I remain agnostic about whether
there is any strong dependence between them. Either way, being a person requires
being an intentional system, though not all intentional systems are persons.
The fourth theme in Dennett’s account is ‘reciprocity.’ Here he suggests that it is
not enough for a system to be a person that it be intentional, but it must also be capable
of recognizing other systems as intentional. Dennett defines a ‘second-order intentional
system’ as “one to which we ascribe not only simple beliefs, desires and other
Intentions, but beliefs, desires, and other Intentions about beliefs, desires, and other
Intentions,” (Dennett 1978, 273) However, I prefer to reserve the appellation ‘secondorder intention’ for beings that are aware of their own first-order intentions, so as to
distinguish mindreaders - those able to reciprocate the intentional stance by attributing
beliefs and desires to others, from what I take to be a different sort of second-order
intentional systems - those capable of self-reflection or metacognition, having secondorder desires and beliefs that target their own first-order desires and beliefs. The ability
to attribute intentions to others is an ability distinct from attributing intentions to oneself.
Tests (e.g. as suggested by Lurz 2011a&b) that purport to demonstrate whether or not
chimpanzees attribute desires and beliefs to others, do not by themselves provide
conclusive evidence for whether or not the chimps are self-reflective as well, nor does
evidence of self-reflection entail evidence of attributing mentality to others. Further, I
don’t see why a being must be able to attribute intentions to others in order to be a
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person. It does seem to be a contingent fact about human beings that we are unable to
develop the self-reflective states without growing up in a community of persons and
treating other members of that community as persons. And attributing intentionality to
others may have been evolutionarily prior to self-attribution. But neither point makes it
inconceivable that there could be a self-reflective being that does not, or cannot
recognize intentions in others. In fact, some autistic individuals are claimed to be that
way. (Baron-Cohen 1997) Their being so does not imply that they are not persons.
The distinction between the two kinds of second order intentionality becomes
crucial as Dennett goes on to claim that “genuine self-consciousness” (the sixth theme,)
is not just a matter of self-reflective second-order intentionality, but also requires the
capacity for verbal communication (the fifth). Here he invokes the Gricean account of
verbal communication, which has as a necessary condition not just second-order
intentions, but third order intentions, not of the self-reflective sort, but of the mindreading
variety. According to Dennett, for Grice, this is because to successfully communicate
one must intend that another person understand one’s intentions.9
Being a person, i.e. a responsible being, requires self-consciousness, for
Dennett, because for a being to be responsible for its actions, it must engage in the kind
of “reflective self-evaluation” described by Frankfurt (Dennett 1978, 284). But to do this
one’s intentions cannot be merely implicit, rather one must consciously entertain and
9

However, it is not clear that Grice thinks of such intentions as higher-order and not just first
order and self-referential.
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decide upon one’s reasons for action. Unlike attributions of intentionality of the first
order, it is not enough that one’s actions show “an order which is there.” (Dennett 1978,
284) And the only way of demonstrating that one is capable of such conscious reflection
is via verbal communication. Dennett writes:
If I am to be held responsible for an action (a bit of behavior of mine under a
particular description), I must have been aware of that action under that
description. Why? Because only if I was aware of the action can I say what I was
about, and participate from a privileged position in the question-and-answer
game of giving reasons for my actions. (If I am not in a privileged position to
answer questions about the reasons for my actions, there is no special reason to
ask me.) And what is so important about being able to participate in this game is
that only those capable of participating in reason-giving can be argued into, or
argued out of, courses of action or attitudes, and if one is incapable of "listening
to reason" in some matter, one cannot be held responsible for it. The capacities
for verbal communication and for awareness of one's actions are thus essential
in one who is going to be amenable to argument or persuasion, and such
persuasion, such reciprocal adjustment of interests achieved by mutual
exploitation of rationality, is a feature of the optimal mode of personal interaction.
(Dennett 1978, 282)
However, even if there is no way someone could demonstrate his capacity for
self-consciousness without some verbal ability (by which I, and I suppose Dennett as
well, mean to include writing and sign language), that does not mean someone can’t be
self-conscious - that is, aware of his first-order intentions, without being capable of
communicating those intentions to someone else. The relationship between thought and
language is a contentious issue in the philosophy of psychology. Jerry Fodor’s claims
about the innateness of concepts, which are tangential to his “Language of Thought”
hypothesis, are extremely contentious, but it is a viable theory about some of the ways
thoughts are structured and related to one another and how at least purely deductive
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reasoning works. (Schneider 2009) It is plausible that if not all mentality, then at least
consciousness with respect to the intentional content of mental states require some kind
of language, (as Rosenthal 2005 suggests) and when one gets to evaluative selfconsciousness of the sort I take to be necessary for personhood, the argument for
requiring language is even more compelling. One reason for this is that conscious
introspection (i.e. silent communication with oneself) seems to involve ‘listening’ to
one’s ‘inner speech’ and brain imaging studies show activity in the regions of the brain
responsible for verbal communication during such activities (Prinz 2012, 159), so that
some form of linguistic representation does seem to be necessary for selfconsciousness.
While I am in agreement with Dennett that sensitivity to reasons and awareness
of one’s reasons for action are necessary for responsibility, and therefore personhood, I
do not think it inconceivable that those reasons could be confined to the mind of an
individual agent. Being conscious of one’s intentions likely requires something like
language, or a language-like scheme of representation, but not necessarily the ability to
communicate those representations to others. Again, it is likely the case that no human
being could develop self-consciousness without interacting with other individuals,
specifically persons, and indeed Nietzsche may have been right in attributing the
original source of human self-consciousness to societally imposed internalization of
value judgments or to the need to communicate one’s thoughts for deceptive or
cooperative purposes (Nietzsche 1887/1967), but that does not rule out the conceptual
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possibility of a being that is an island of self-consciousness unto itself. Despite the
social influence on the formation of one’s character and the external origin of one’s
values, one can be self-conscious without there being anyone else around with whom to
communicate. For this reason, it may not be necessary that one have the capacity for
verbal communication in order to be self-conscious. However, it is plausible that such
communication is necessary to provide evidence of self-consciousness.
At this point I need to explore the relationship between self-consciousness and
consciousness-simpliciter, or if there is no such notion, then one or two other senses in
which philosophers use the term ‘consciousness’. There are quite a few theories of
consciousness on the market these days, and this is not the place to go over all the
various arguments for or against each, though I must say something about how well
some of the views mesh with how I understand self-consciousness. It may seem as if
one genus of views about consciousness, the higher order theories, the most prominent
of which is David Rosenthal’s higher order thought (HOT) theory, fits most neatly with
what I have said about self-consciousness. The HOT theory claims that for a mental
state to be conscious one must have a second-order mental state that takes that firstorder state as its content, thereby making the first order state conscious. However,
some writers have objected that while this might account for a certain kind of
consciousness, perhaps “access consciousness” (Block 2002) or “transitive
consciousness,” (Mandik 2013) it doesn’t explain basic phenomenal consciousness, or
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‘what it’s like’ to be something with consciousness (Nagel 1974).10 This objection has
particular force if one wishes to claim, as I do, that animals such as dogs, cats and
elephants aren’t persons by virtue of the fact that they lack self-consciousness (as I will
argue later on, the other capacities constitutive of persons are ones that are shared to
some degree with animals) because it now seems wrong to deny, as Descartes did, that
those animals lack any kind of conscious awareness whatsoever. In 2012, a group of
scientists signed a declaration to the effect that a wide range of animals have
consciousness. The declaration states that birds, for example,
appear to offer, in their behavior, neurophysiology, and neuroanatomy a striking
case of parallel evolution of consciousness. Evidence of near human-like levels
of consciousness has been most dramatically observed in African grey parrots.
Mammalian and avian emotional networks and cognitive microcircuitries appear
to be far more homologous than previously thought. Moreover, certain species of
birds have been found to exhibit neural sleep patterns similar to those of
mammals, including REM sleep and, as was demonstrated in zebra finches,
neurophysiological patterns, previously thought to require a mammalian
neocortex. Magpies in particular have been shown to exhibit striking similarities
to humans, great apes, dolphins, and elephants in studies of mirror selfrecognition. (Low et al. 2012)
And it concludes:
We declare the following: “The absence of a neocortex does not appear to
preclude an organism from experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence
indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical,
and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to
exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that
humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate
consciousness. Nonhuman animals, including all mammals and birds, and many
other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological
substrates.”
10

Prinz holds that any kind of consciousness that does not involve what-it’s-like-ness, is not
worthy of the term ‘consciousness.’ Prinz 2012 (35)
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In denying that dogs and cats are self-conscious I do not mean that they are
incapable of affective states, nor that they lack consciousness of some sort. One way to
accommodate the claim that mere animals are not persons primarily in virtue of the fact
that they lack self-consciousness with their possessing basic phenomenal
consciousness, is to understand the distinction between the two kinds or levels of
consciousness in terms of the presence or absence of higher order thought: the basic
phenomenal kind that animals possess and that could be accounted for with a theory
that restricts itself to first-order mental states versus the self-consciousness distinctive
of persons that requires higher-order thought. However, if one endorses the HOT
theorist’s view that all consciousness requires higher-order thought then one must
demand more than just higher-order thought for self-consciousness. Rosenthal himself
does not deny consciousness in “non-linguistic” animals. He thinks they may have
HOTs, however crude, but “the HOTs of such beings would not result in their being
conscious of their mental states in the rich way we’re typically conscious of ours…
Moreover, the HOTs of creatures without language might never make them conscious
of their mental states in respect of the intentional content of those states.” (Rosenthal
2005, 6) So if one can distinguish between rich and impoverished varieties of higherorder thought, then one can maintain that higher order thought is necessary for
consciousness and that animals are conscious, but that persons are distinctive in
having the capacity for a richer kind of higher-order thought, one that makes one
conscious of one’s first order states in respect of their intentional content. As alluded to
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parenthetically above, Rosenthal otherwise suggests that the difference might be that
only persons have third-order thoughts. He writes:
We are the only creatures we know of that we regard as persons, but we can
easily imagine discovering others that we would classify with ourselves in that
way. It is not, of course, that only persons have conscious mental states; many
non-human animals presumably do, as well. There is no reason to deny to
animals without language the capacity to have suitable higher-order thoughts.
The relevant higher order thoughts do not require much richness of conceptual
resources or syntactic structure. But we have no reason to suppose that animals
other than persons are aware of whatever higher-order thoughts they may have.
And if none of an animal’s higher-order thoughts are conscious, it will lack the
particular kind of reflective consciousness that involves some measure of rational
connectedness in the way it is aware of [the awareness of]11its mental states.
(Rosenthal 2005, 146-7)
I don’t see any a priori reason for ruling out non-linguistic higher-order thoughts
of a crude sort, particularly if a clear distinction can be drawn between “conscious selfreferential thinking” and “sensory metacognition.” The latter, according to Lau and
Rosenthal (2011) might better reflect higher order representations in animals that
possess a pre-frontal and parietal cortex, “for instance the ability to rate confidence
appropriately to distinguish between correct and incorrect perception”. One researcher,
J. David Smith has run numerous studies testing various animals for metacognition, as
he defines it, aka the capacity for monitoring or regulating their own cognitive states.
One type of study tested whether or not animals would reject a task that was presented
to them, knowing that the task was difficult or impossible for them.
11

Given, as will be explained below, that Rosenthal doesn’t think consciousness plays a very
important role in behavior or in the relations between first order mental states, I found this last
part of the passage odd. In personal communication he agreed that it was a bit misleading as
stated and suggested that the text in brackets be added to make it a clearer expression of his
view.
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First, animals were given difﬁcult perceptual discriminations: the difﬁculty
potentially created uncertainty in their minds. Second, animals were given an
additional response—beyond the discrimination responses—with which they
could decline to complete any trials of their choosing. This response—sometimes
called the Uncertainty Response (UR)—allows animals to report on, or cope with,
the difﬁculty. If animals monitor cognition accurately, they should prospectively
recognize difﬁcult trials as error-risking and decline those trials selectively. (Smith
2009, 389)
A study of this kind done with macaque monkeys indicated that the monkeys
declined difficult tasks with a regularity strongly isomorphic to the results of human
trials. In the human cases, participants reported that their UR reflected their own
conscious uncertainty, suggesting that the monkeys too were aware of their own risk of
error. Some of the tasks tested the monkey’s memory for previously presented stimuli
so that the monkeys’ UR response suggested that they “judged the robustness of
internal memory representations.” (Smith 2009, 391) This aspect of the data is
particularly important, because judgments of present stimuli are much easier to explain
without attributing metacognition then are judgments of absent stimuli (though there are
paradigmatic cases of metacognition in humans involving judgments of present stimuli.
e.g. wavering over multiple choice options in an exam.) According to Smith, the studies
show that the “minimum cognitive sophistication” that can be attributed to animals who
demonstrate UR responses is “a controlled decision, on the threshold of perception or
memory… involving controlled cognitive processing… at difficult decisional choicepoints.” (Smith, 394) Pigeons and capuchin monkeys, on the other hand, showed limited
evidence of URs, despite neither species being “behaviorally or associatively
challenged.” The metacognition that macaques, and also dolphins (Smith et al., 1995)
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are seemingly capable of then seems to be a benchmark of cognitive sophistication. In
the absence of linguistic competence these kinds of tests, combined with homologies in
neural architecture may be the best evidence available for the presence of
metacognitive capacities in animals.
So if macaques are capable of this kind of metacognition and have phenomenal
consciousness, does it mean that they are also self-conscious? This question brings us
back to Dennett’s claim that the kind of reflective evaluation necessary for responsibility,
in addition to higher order intentions, must involve genuine consciousness of one’s
intentions and reasons for acting, not just “an order that is there.” For him, nothing short
of first-person verbal avowals could count as evidence of such consciousness. Some
chimpanzees who have been trained in sign language have behaved in ways that could
be interpreted as just such evidence.12 But on the HOT theory all there is to a state’s
being conscious is that there is a higher-order thought about it. Still, self-consciousness,
or, for Rosenthal, “self-referential consciousness,” could additionally require that the
higher order thought itself be conscious by virtue of being the content of a third-order
thought.
Now, if it turns out that some non-human animals are self-conscious, that doesn’t
annihilate the distinction between persons and mere animals. It could turn out that there
are just more persons than we originally thought. For instance, the more we progress in
teaching chimpanzees sign language, the more astute they become in communicating
12

Peterson (2011) describes a case of a chimp lying about having defecated on the floor,
implicating others, before finally giving up and admitting that it was her own doing.
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their motives, the harder it will be to justify considering them non-persons. Again I find it
unproblematic to view personhood as a matter of degree -- it seems that it must be so if
we are to assume that self-consciousness and concern are traits that have evolved,
since evolutionary changes are incremental. While I am agnostic about the necessity of
third-order thought for self-consciousness, I am sympathetic to Rosenthal’s caution in
declaring a being completely HOTful or HOTless, and his openness to multiple ways of
drawing the lines. As he puts it “Being a person, on this account, may be a matter of
degree, but that is as it should be. Our distant ancestors doubtless had the distinctive
characteristics of people to some degree, though not as fully as we do, and the same
may be true of other creatures elsewhere.” (Rosenthal 2005, 147) Rosenthal also uses
third-order thoughts to account for the experience of the unity of consciousness (2003).
I am sympathetic to HOT theory as an account of consciousness due to its elegance
and explanatory power, and furthermore I find the account of unity it offers compelling
as well as useful component in the conception of the self that I offer in chapter four.
However, I take my conception of self-consciousness to be compatible with other higher
order views of consciousness as well as first-order accounts. The kind of selfconsciousness necessary for personhood requires consciousness and higher-order
representation. On higher order views, consciousness and higher order representation
are conceptually inseparable -- they are one and not two capacities, while on a firstorder view of consciousness, such as Michael Tye’s PANIC (Poised Abstract Nonconceptual Intentional Content) view (presented in Mandik 2014), where what makes
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the difference between conscious and non-conscious thoughts is not the presence or
absence of higher-order thoughts, but rather differences in the content of the thoughts
themselves, consciousness and higher-order thought are distinct, separable (at least
conceptually) capacities, though both are required for self-consciousness.
I have so far argued that self-consciousness, of the sort that involves consciously
self-reflective second order desires and beliefs, is necessary for personhood. Next I will
engage the question of whether or not it is also sufficient. Dennett provides his own
reasons for thinking that it is not, which are connected to the question of the relation
between metaphysical and moral personhood, and which I will discuss in chapter five.
However, I have my own objection to the claim that self-consciousness is by itself
sufficient for personhood, which is that to be genuinely reflectively self-evaluative in the
way required for responsibility and, therefore, personhood, one must not only be
consciously aware of one’s desires and beliefs, but must also be concerned with
whether or not one’s desires are fulfilled or one’s beliefs (at least those relevant to the
satisfaction of one’s desires) are true. A self-conscious, but wholly unconcerned
individual would not be a person. I the next section I will explain exactly what I mean by
‘concern’, why it is conceptually distinct from self-consciousness and why it is necessary
for personhood.
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III.

Concern
Imagine a self-conscious humanoid robot. It is aware of its first order intentions:

its desires (in the minimal sense of goals to be attained) and its beliefs about the world
relevant to satisfying those desires. However, the robot under consideration doesn’t
genuinely care whether or not those goals are fulfilled. It is not emotionally invested in
them. Failure does not frustrate the robot, nor does success gratify it. It may even be
able to change its goals given repeated failures that cause damage to it, or change its
beliefs about how those goals are to be attained (as connectionist neural networks
seem, in a crude way, to be able to do), but the damage incurred from the failures does
not cause any feeling of sadness, anger or shame. And successes, even ones that
greatly benefit the robot (such as saving its spare battery from being exploded by a
bomb13), do not give the robot a sense of joy, accomplishment or relief. What such a
robot is lacking, is what I mean by ‘concern,’ i.e. a range of affective investment in the
attaining of one’s goals and the truth of one’s beliefs insofar as they are relevant to
one’s goals. By virtue of this lack of concern such a robot cannot be responsible for its
actions and therefore, is not a person.
Speaking more strictly than I have until now, having a genuine desire for
something, as opposed to merely being directed toward a goal, requires being
concerned that some goal be attained. A self-conscious chess computer would be
capable of representing its goals to itself so as to take a higher-order attitude toward

13

As with the elusive R2D2, prospected in Dennett (1984)
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them and will that they be enacted, believing that it has a desire to win, regardless of
whether or not it is concerned that it win. But in order for it to really have such a desire it
must have some emotional investment in winning or losing. The benefits of winning or
costs of losing must be emotionally significant to the being itself. They must be tied to its
emotional responses, such that it can become frustrated when it doesn’t get its way,
surprised when things turn out to be different than they had seemed, or satisfied and
reassured if things go well and/or as predicted. Having a desire is not just being directed
toward a goal, but requires being genuinely motivated toward attaining a goal. A torpedo
may modify its behavior in reaction to feedback about its success or failure in attaining a
goal, but it gives no indication of appreciating the circumstance as satisfying or
frustrating for itself. The torpedo does not fear failure, nor does it hope for success. It
cannot feel happy or sad for what it does or what it is. In that sense, it lacks the capacity
for concern.
Martin Heidegger makes much of the German terms ‘Sorge’ in his philosophy,
which is often translated as ‘care,’ and ‘besorgen’ which is closer to ‘being concerned
with’ and Fürsorge which is specifically care or concern for others. For Heidegger,
Sorge, besorgen, and Fürsorge describe one way of “being-in-the-world,” part of the
general condition of human beings, or “Dasein.” Inwood’s A Heidegger Dictionary
(1999) explains Sorge and besorgen as follows:
Sorge, ‘care’, is ‘properly the anxiety, worry arising out of apprehensions
concerning the future and refers as much to the external cause as the inner state’
(DGS, 56)... besorgen has three main senses: (a) ‘to get, acquire, provide’
something for oneself or someone else; (b) ‘to attend to, see to, take care of’
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something; (c) especially with the perfect participle, besorgt, ‘to be concerned,
troubled, worried’ about something. The nominalized infinitive is das Besorgen ,
‘concern’ in the sense of ‘concerning oneself with or about’ something. 3.
Fürsorge, ‘solicitude’, is ‘actively caring for someone who needs help’. These
three concepts enable Heidegger to distinguish his own view from the view that
our attitude towards the world is primarily cognitive and theoretical. Descartes's
and Husserl's ‘concern for known knowledge’ (Sorge um erkannte Erkenntnis ) is
only one type of concern, and not the primary, or a self-evidently appealing, type
(XVII, 62; LXIII, 106).
The third sense of besorgen, is closest to ‘concern’ in the way I have defined it.
The explanation provided of the role the term plays in Heidegger’s philosophy,
distinguishing his view about the way we are engaged in the world, from the purely
“cognitive and theoretical” conception of earlier philosophers, fits well with my
contention that persons are essentially emotional in addition to being self-conscious.
However, the distinction for me is not in terms of the kind of attitude we take toward the
world, or what we’re concerned with when we inquire into it, but rather that we are
concerned at all about the satisfaction of our desires or truth of our beliefs and not just
receivers and manipulators of information.
In popular discussions and depictions of artificial intelligence (as found in
countless science fiction stories) automata are described as “doing only what they were
programmed to do,” “not possessing a will of their own,” etc. What seems to be
expressed in these sorts of phrases is that part of what a mere robot is lacking, which
would be necessary for it to be a person, is something like free will. Now, one might be
tempted to explain what the will-less robot is lacking in cognitive terms that appeal to
something like self-consciousness. However, this approach does not match the
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depiction of automata in many of these informal treatments. In science fiction,
computers and robots can be depicted as hyper intelligent, hyper-rational and
completely self-conscious, but beings for whom praise and blame would be
meaningless due to their lack of emotional investment. The ship’s computer in Star
Trek: The Next Generation is one example. It is presented as entirely aware of its own
beliefs (more so perhaps than an ordinary human, because nothing is repressed or
rationalized away). It has goals in the form of operations it is commanded to perform
and ones it performs based on its own judgment of a situation, and can report on those
goals. However, nothing that it does or that happens to it has any emotional impact on
it. Holding it accountable, praising or blaming it, rewarding or punishing it, would be
pointless, because it is not concerned about the satisfaction of its desires or truth of its
beliefs. Without such concern, it cannot be a person.14 In contrast, there is another
character from Star Trek: The Next Generation, the android Data, who most would
agree is a person, though that very question is debated, in a fairly philosophically
sophisticated manner for television, in the episode “The Measure of a Man.” There, it is
Data’s enjoyment in possessing his medals, his friendship with Commander Ryker, his
possessiveness of the book Captain Picard gave him and of his memento of love
interest Tasha Yar, and his distress that he could lose all the memories he cherishes if
14

Marvin the Depressed Robot from Douglas Adams’ The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy
seems robotic despite his depression, because he has no range of emotions. He can’t not be
depressed. Nothing can affect his emotional condition, so he may not be responsive to praise
and blame in the way required for responsibility. R2D2 and C3P0 from Star Wars seem to be
self-conscious and concerned. It is only their mechanical appearance that marks them as
robots.
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he is taken apart, that convinces us he is a person.15 That is because having a “will of
one’s own,” in the sense relevant to the folk distinction between persons and mere
automata, means, in part, having not just ‘preference functions’, but genuine desires,
which require affective engagement. (The other part being, as Frankfurt first pointed out,
and was elaborated on in the previous section, what distinguishes mere animal will from
the will of persons: self-consciousness.) At one point in the episode, the character
Bruce Maddox who wishes to take Data apart in order to study him, but is faced with
resistance from Data and his comrades, inquires, for comparison, whether they would
allow the ship’s computer to refuse a refit. However, such a question is moot, because
the ship could and would never make such a refusal, because it has no concern for its
own well-being. It might caution the crew that doing so would be dangerous for their
own welfare, but it would not care if they decided not to take its advice.
If one is unimpressed by these science fictional examples of the self-conscious
but unconcerned, there are some actual cases to consider. Some individuals have
experienced complete apathy or “akinetic mutism” which is associated with damage to
or sectioning of the cingulate cortex. (Prinz 2012, 42 and 67) Such individuals are
“mute, inactive, and utterly lacking in motivation but nevertheless perceive the world
15

Though as Anderson (2000) notes, the official solution to the legal question of Data’s
personhood, as argued in the episode by Captain Picard, and similar to Putnam’s (1964)
assessment of the issue, is a kind of Pascal’s Wager, namely that the consequences should we
grant something personhood and be wrong are much less awful than the potential for evil
wrought from wrongly denying a being and, worse, class of beings personhood. However, this
solution wrongly assumes that to deny a class of beings personhood is to deny them the rights
of life and fair treatment. On the other hand, concern on its own may be a ground for assigning
those rights so that even if it was decided that Data was not a person due to not possessing
self-consciousness one could still claim on his behalf a right to not be dismantled.
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around them.” (Prinz 2012, 41) After recovering from her condition, a patient of Antonio
Damasio reported that “she didn’t speak because she felt as if she ‘really had nothing to
say.’” (Prinz 2012, 42) Prinz further reports that these individuals “seem comatose -they do not respond verbally or behaviorally to the world around them -- but they are
actually fully cognizant of the world around them.” (Prinz 2012, 67) And again, after
recovery, they report having been “emotionally dead. They do not respond to the world
around them because everything leaves them disinterested (sic).” Now it’s clear from
these descriptions that such akinetic individuals are fully aware of themselves and what
subjective states they retain16, given that after recovery they can report on what they
experienced when mute. And they report being devoid of emotional engagement, and
thus are devoid of concern. Another patient of Damasio’s, named Elliot, who had a
tumour near his frontal lobe removed, became completely emotionless and also
incapable of proper decision-making. Damasio reports:
He was always controlled… always describing scenes as a dispassionate,
uninvolved spectator. Nowhere is there a sense of his own suffering, even
though he was the protagonist… He was not inhibiting the expression of internal
emotional resonance or hushing inner turmoil. He simply did not have any turmoil
to hush. This was not a culturally acquired stiff upper lip. In some curious,
unwittingly protective way, he was not pained by his tragedy. I found myself
suffering more when listening to Elliot's stories than Elliot himself seemed to be
suffering… I never saw a tinge of emotion in my many hours of conversation with
him: no sadness, no impatience, no frustration. (Damasio 2005, 43)
These individuals all seem from their descriptions to be self-conscious but
unconcerned. However, one thing I left out of Prinz’s description is that he consistently
16

This is consistent with Prinz’s conjecture that their lack of emotion may be because
“conscious experiences of emotionally significant bodily changes are lost.” (Prinz 2012, 67)
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refers to these individuals as “people,” but calling them people would seem to contradict
my claim that concern is necessary for personhood. There are two points to make in
response to this apparent conflict. First of all, much depends on how terminal the
akinetic or otherwise emotionally-impaired condition is. The cases described by
Damasio and Prinz are mostly ones where the patients recovered (otherwise we
wouldn’t have the data of the patients’ reports.) In the introduction I addressed
Chappell’s concerns about criterialism, specifically his worry that if we define persons in
terms of high-level cognitive properties, then we must accept some absurd implications.
For example, anyone who is in a coma, or even merely asleep would not count as a
person because he or she would not be self-conscious. My response to this complaint
was that if we define persons not in terms of their occurrent properties, but their
capacities or dispositions for having the relevant properties then we can account for
individuals remaining persons even when they are temporarily failing to instantiate
them. We can further distinguish cases where a capacity is temporarily disabled, from
ones where it is just not currently in use, like being asleep. In the latter case, we can
say that a capacity is currently ‘intact’ and ‘poised,’ while in the former it is ‘intact’ but
temporarily ‘impaired’. If we define persons in terms of intact capacities that could be in
either condition, Chappell’s worry can be defused. So if an individual is only temporarily
clinically apathetic, we can say he or she has an intact, though impaired, capacity for
concern. In cases where there is no hope of the individual ever being concerned again,
then individual is no longer, strictly speaking, a person. What the lack of concern would
65

imply, is that such an individual cannot be responsible for his or her actions, though it is
likely that he or she would perform few actions anyway. Such a being might not even be
totally mute or inert and therefore still, automatically, go through the routines of his life,
but would have no emotional investment in the continuance of such habits, and would
therefore be like the self-conscious chess computer, i.e. not a person. Pierre, the
eponymous character of Sendak’s (1962) children’s book always says “I don’t care,”
even when he is about to be eaten by a lion. He does not seem to be a person until he
is removed from the lion’s belly, and grateful at surviving the experience exclaims:
“Indeed, I do care!”
Persons can be responsible because they are able to engage in actions that
follow from their consciously considered beliefs and desires, but also because they can
preemptively evaluate both the actions and the desires that yield them and decide
whether or not to perform them depending on their judgment of future consequences.
This requires both self-consciousness and concern. It requires concern because
concern is what gives rational evaluation its motivating force. Consequences can only
be weighed and considered in a way that is meaningful for an individual if that individual
is concerned about them. They cannot be genuine reasons for action without such
emotional significance. The self-conscious but unconcerned computer may calculate the
best route towards a goal, but that is not the same as considering reasons and then
acting upon the one that is most strongly motivating. Locke also thought concern was
necessary for personhood, but he did not offer any explicit definition of the capacity, and
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seemed to understand it rather differently from how I have described it, at least in how it
relates to self-consciousness. For Locke, concern for happiness is necessarily present
when a being is self-conscious. It is:
the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness; that which is conscious of
pleasure and pain, desiring that that self that is conscious should be
happy. And therefore whatever past actions it cannot reconcile or
appropriate to that present self by consciousness [i.e. self-conscious], it
can be no more concerned in than if they had never been done: and to
receive pleasure or pain, i.e. reward or punishment, on the account of any
such action, is all one has to be made happy or miserable in its first being,
without any demerit at all. (Locke, 1690 II.XXVII.346.26)
Whiting (2002) similarly seems to understand concern (though she also does not
offer a precise definition of the term) as necessarily bound up with self-consciousness.
She writes:
What we have here is a holistic package whose components are functionally
related to one another: consciousness in a normally embodied creature is
(among other things) consciousness of pleasure and pain, the very essence of
which engage their subject’s concern in ways that lead the subject to act so as to
increase the pleasures and diminish the pains of which it is conscious, and
consciousness of such action and its basis in the subject’s concern leads the
subject to impute such action to itself in a way that renders intelligible the
forensic practices of holding oneself and other subjects responsible for their
actions. (Whiting 2002, 207)
So for Locke and Whiting, self-conscious, though unconcerned, creatures are
impossible. Any creature aware of itself would necessarily be concerned for itself. But
as we have seen, Locke and Whiting are wrong about this - the two capacities are
conceptually distinguishable. A self-conscious system need not have emotional
investment, though, as I have argued above, having genuine desires does require
emotional investment. So a self-conscious, unconcerned being would have conscious
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beliefs and goals, but no genuine desires.
A self-consciously concerned being is a being with desires that can be
consciously scrutinized when deliberating over actions. On the other hand, we can
imagine highly intelligent, fully self-conscious beings that are unconcerned. In addition
to the apathetics described above, it may be the case that some ascetics wish, through
practice, to become entirely unconcerned. They may see concern as a kind of
weakness to be transcended or wish to reach a state wherein, as Flanagan (2009)
describes nirvana (though I don’t think most Buddhists would agree that this is what
they are aiming at), “one ceases to exist as a desirer and the flame that one was is
extinguished forever.” On the current proposal that would mean that these individuals
wish to transcend personhood. The transhumanist movement thinks that we will
appropriate technology in a way that will make us no longer human. However, if one
were modified in such a way that one were no longer self-conscious or concerned, it
would be more apt to say that such modifications would make one no longer a person,
and therefore would be transpersonal. This is not to say that such a being would be less
than a person. There is no reason to think that persons occupy the highest rung on the
ontological ladder. There might be beings that transcend personhood, that are in some
way more than persons. This might be something like what Nietzsche (1886) has in
mind when he envisions the Übermensch, who has overcome the human-all-too-human
(read: personal-all-too-personal) and attained a higher level of being, one without
desires and therefore incapable of responsible action; or to paraphrase Sartre (1956),
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no longer condemned to responsibility.
Just as not all self-conscious beings need be concerned, not all concerned
beings must be self-conscious. Many animals evidence a capacity for happiness and
sadness, frustration and satisfaction in the absence of self-consciousness.
Appropriating a couple of old terms, we can say they are sentient, but not sapient,
where ‘sapience’ is meant to cover all the capacities that together are sufficient for
personhood, including both concern and self-consciousness. These animals’ behavior
demonstrates concern for their own well-being without offering evidence of a capacity
for fully self-conscious awareness of their desires and beliefs. If you pet my cat Bisou
when she doesn’t want you to, she will let you know of her displeasure by whining. If
you persist she will seem to become increasingly agitated, whining louder and longer,
even growling gutturally until finally lashing out with a scratch, bite and/or hiss. It is
difficult not to infer from this behavior that the cat becomes increasingly emotionally
charged as her desires continue to be frustrated. Likewise a dog that has waited all day
for its owner to return home displays a joy and excitement when the beloved human
finally arrives which has erupted out of a desire that has increased in its intensity over
time. Behavior associated with fear is even more clearly exhibited by a large variety of
species, not restricted to mammals. And for this reason most studies of animal emotion
focus on it. In the presence of a threat to her well-being, a dog for example, Bisou stops
in her tracks before quickly diving for shelter. Her hair stands up on end and she
alternately hisses and growls. This escalating fear behavior shows that the cat is not
69

just shocked by the presence of a threat but emotionally aggravated by the thwarting of
its desire that the threat go away. According to Makowska and Weary, experimental
inquiry has provided evidence of amusement in rats. “Rats will seek out hands that have
tickled them much more than hands that have petted them an equal amount of time…
and will learn to press a lever for a tickling reward. When being tickled and during social
play, rats emit 50kHz calls that may be indicative of positive affect.” Makowska and
Weary 2013, 8) Panksepp and Burgdorf (1999) and Panksepp (2007) argue that these
responses are analogous to human infants’ laughter, and since they only occur in
environments where the rats are comfortable (i.e. ones where they have not been
subjected to stressful stimuli or punishment) their response is not merely stimulidependent, but dependent on affective state as well.
I use the term ‘concern’ instead of just saying that persons and animals have the
capacity for emotion because ‘concern’ is not just emotion, but emotion directed toward
the satisfaction of one’s desires or truth of one’s beliefs. One could imagine an
individual who displays random emotional behavior that is not caused by anything in
particular that the individual has experienced. One minute he or she is angry, the next
minute ebullient whether or not anything good or bad is happening to him or her. This
kind of condition, unfortunately, is all too common to varying degrees in people who
suffer from bipolar disorder and related pathologies. It is only in the most extreme kind
of case, however, where an individual’s emotions are never tied to their desires or
beliefs, that we have reason to deny that it is a person we are dealing with. In this way,
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concern, like intentionality in the first place, implies a certain kind of rationality. For
emotional states to be states of concern, they must be responsive to the perceived
relation between desired or believed states of affairs and the way the world actually is,
though the perception of how things are could itself be mistaken.
Belief that animals have emotions is reinforced by neuro-physiological similarities
with human beings. For instance, all mammal, and some bird and reptile brains have
amygdalae (Ledoux 2002, 218), which have been shown to play a crucial role in human
emotions, particularly fear, and are activated in situations where both animals and
humans display seemingly emotive behavior. In creatures with damaged amygdalae
fear response and conditioning is inhibited. However, despite the behavioral and
neurological evidence, some writers call into question the confidence with which we can
attribute emotions to animals. The main strand of these doubts is sometimes called the
“credibility problem.” The problem is that if emotions are understood as subjective
feelings, they cannot be assessed in non-linguistic creatures who cannot report on
them. This is because while animals may display behavior that looks similar to behavior
associated with certain feelings in humans, this similarity may be misleading as an
indication of the internal states of the animals. Ledoux’s (2002) suggestion to avoid this
problem is to define emotions not in terms of subjective feelings, but instead in terms of
processes that contribute to particular kinds of behavior, given particular stimuli, along
the lines of the information processing model in cognitive science. “Since emotions as
processes can be studied in animals and humans alike, and since… emotional
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processing underlies both emotional behavior and emotional feelings, a processing
approach is a way out of the credibility problem.” (Ledoux 2002, 205) So if one is
skeptical about attributing feelings to animals, one can read “capacity for concern” as a
bit of information processing, though I am fairly confident (as is Ledoux), that many do
have such subjective states. While one may not be able to rule out skeptical doubts on
that score, the situation is not much different in the case of our knowledge of the minds
of linguistic creatures as well. And though we might not have any way to tell with
absolute certainty whether or not an animal has the feelings inferred from its behavior,
that doesn’t mean there is no fact of the matter of whether or not it has them.
So by requiring both self-consciousness and concern, we embed persons (at
least the human ones, but perhaps also some other sorts) in the animal continuum but
at the same time mark them as distinctive. The shared capacity for concern explains our
sense of camaraderie with animals and gives us reason to consider them as deserving
of moral consideration. A New York Times Sunday Review opinion piece from October
5th, 2013, by Gregory Berns, claims that “Dogs are People, Too” on the basis of their
possessing a brain area “caudate nucleus” in common with human beings. The author
claims that “the caudate plays a key role in the anticipation of things we enjoy, like food,
love and money,” having found (by scanning the dogs in an MRI machine without
sedating or restraining them, so that “if the dogs didn’t want to be in the scanner they
could leave”) that “activity in the caudate increased in response to hand signals
indicating food. The caudate also activated to the smells of familiar humans. And in
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preliminary tests, it activated to the return of an owner who had momentarily stepped
out of view.” The author takes these findings to indicate that dogs experience emotion
and argues for their positive treatment on those grounds, claiming “that dogs have a
level of sentience comparable to that of a human child. And this ability suggests a
rethinking of how we treat dogs… And this means we must reconsider their treatment
as property.” Now, as Alva Noë rightly points out in his reply to that article (“If You Have
to Ask You’ll Never Know” NPR Blogs: Cosmos and Culture October 11th 2013), we
don’t need to scan dogs’ brains to be able to tell if they have emotions. It should be
evident from their behavior alone. I agree that neurology doesn’t tell us much about
emotions that we shouldn’t already have gathered from behavior. I grant that dogs do
have emotions, concern, sentience, and thus are deserving of our consideration,
perhaps even having a claim to rights. However, that doesn’t mean we have to stretch
the concept of a person to include them in our moral community or to recognize their
status as ends in themselves and not property.
This is one way in which the moral connotations of the concept of a person need
to be rethought. If persons are the sole bearers of rights then it will always seem absurd
to grant dogs, cats and elephants rights, because they clearly are not persons. They
cannot claim those rights for themselves - persons must claim them on their behalf,
because persons are able to think critically about their own interests and those of
others. Therefore, we should say that though dogs are not persons they deserve
respect for their interests and have a claim to the recognition of their rights. The author
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of the article suggests perhaps granting dogs a “limited personhood” and if one prefers
to think of it that way then one may. Otherwise we can treat them as persons even if
they are not strictly so, but, in any case, it is a mistake to think of dogs as full-fledged
persons. There is a crucial difference between their capacity to monitor and control their
desires and our own as regards responsibility. Noë, however, disagrees on this point.
He thinks animals are responsible, citing animal trainer Vicky Hearne as arguing
persuasively that “you can’t work with dogs unless you can take them seriously as, well,
responsible agents. A-search-and-rescue, for example, or a seeing-eye dog, is a
collaborator, not a tool.” (Noë 2013) However, while I agree that such creatures are not
just tools, and may be considered collaborators, tool and person are not exhaustive
categories and collaboration does not entail responsibility.
As I will argue in chapter five, my insistence on including concern as a necessary
condition of personhood does not imply that concern for others is necessary, nor does it
imply that persons are essentially moral, i.e. concerned with the experiences of others
in the same way that they are concerned with their own. Persons are the sort of things
that can reasonably be held responsible, but for that they need not be of the sort that do
what is right, or even recognize the difference between right and wrong from a
genuinely ethical perspective (i.e. not just following explicit rules and practical reason.)
The capacity for the feeling of empathy, which is arguably an essential part of the
biological foundation of morality, is present in many kinds of life forms, particularly
mammalian, but is always unequally distributed among the members of any individual
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species, including human beings, our paradigmatic persons. This could also be the case
with any of the imagined non-human persons of science-fictional thought experiments.
Persons are necessarily self-concerned, yet may entirely lack empathy. Requiring
empathy would make the concept of a person far less useful for the classificatory
purpose for which it is otherwise well suited.

IV.

Rationality and other proposed conditions
Both the capacities of self-consciousness and concern bear complex relations to

the concept of rationality, which is one of the most difficult folk psychological notions to
pin down with any precision. Bermudez (2005) is right to use it as the prime example of
a theory-cluster concept. As I said when discussing Dennett above, we ascribe most
intentional states on the basis of goal directed behavior and the utility of such judgments
requires that at least it is usually the case that such behavior is rational, i.e. that the
individual’s beliefs about how to accomplish his or her goals are largely justified,
otherwise we wouldn’t be able to use intentional terms to consistently describe what an
individual is attempting to do. However, it also seems to be the case that one can have
irrational beliefs, ones that depend on consistently unreliable sources of justification or
that are fallaciously inferred from justified premises. If there were an individual for whom
all of his or her beliefs were thus irrational, yet those irrational beliefs were fully
conscious and the individual in question were also concerned in the sense explicated
above, we would hesitate to call that individual a person.
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To be a person, an individual’s perceptions must give her mostly veridical
information about the world. Even if someone lost all of her capacities for visceral
sensation, if she were still able to think rationally, she would realize the reality of being
shut off from the world. If she were then unknowingly hooked up to a computer
simulation of reality she would still be able to reason based on what she experienced in
the simulation. Therefore, a person must draw valid inferences from whatever sensory
capacities she has. A minimal reasoning capacity would therefore require the ability to
perform deductive and inductive inferences. However, people differ in the degree to
which they possess those abilities which is why I hesitate to make a kind of rationality,
more robust than that already implied by self-consciousness and concern, necessary for
personhood. We just have to settle for an admittedly vague principle of “seeing things
for how they are,” though I will argue in chapter five that seeing things for how they are
does not require seeing them in ethical terms.
Having explicated the account of personhood in terms of self-consciousness and
concern with the minimal rationality implied by those capacities, I am now in a position
to view it set against the sundry items on Gordijn’s list of potential criteria. Gordijn’s
claim was that the disagreement over which of the items on the list should count as
necessary and sufficient for being a person is intractable. I will attempt to show that the
conditions on the list are either implied by the ones I have already considered or are not
necessary for personhood, and in some cases internally incoherent to begin with. It is
unlikely that this will actually settle the debates for the parties involved, but I hope to
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demonstrate that it should.
1. The capacity to experience pleasure and pain.
It is tempting to say that the capacity for pleasure and pain is a necessary
condition of concern and therefore already covered by the inclusion of the latter
capacity. However, it is conceivable (and perhaps even actual) that there be individuals
whose nervous systems are defective in such a way that they cannot ever feel physical
pleasure or pain. Such individuals may still be concerned for their health and well-being,
capable of happiness or sadness, though they are devoid of pleasure and pain
sensations. Those individuals are clearly no different from ones who do feel those
sensations in any way relevant to responsibility and therefore are persons. So the
capacity for physical pleasure and pain is not necessary for personhood, though the
capacity for positive or negative emotional states is.
2. The capacity to have desires, is clearly entailed by my account.
3. The capacity to remember past events.
This is a more difficult challenge. Sophisticated memory does seem to set
persons apart and for many, including Locke, is the mechanism that confers
responsibility over time. However, memory has turned out to be a heterogeneous group
of functions that may be differently related to the capacities constituent of persons.
Working memory seems integral to consciousness, and is characteristic not just of
persons, but many animals as well. Episodic memory is the sort that has been
traditionally thought to account for the identity relation among person-stages, but there
are reasons to doubt the adequacy of memory-based accounts of personal identity that
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will be explored in chapter two. It is enough to mention here that there have been
empirical studies of dissociative amnesic individuals, whose ability to form episodic
memories is impaired, that seem to demonstrate that episodic memory is unnecessary
for much of what we consider integral to the responsibility associated with personhood.
(Craver 2012) Craver employs a method of testing individuals with cognitive deficits
against conceptions of personhood to see if they live up to them and finds that the ones
without the capacity for episodic memory still “are able to track and respect the reward
and punishment structures of their world well enough to guide adaptive choices.”
(Craver 2012, 468) Still, these individuals do possess declarative memory or
propositional memory, just not the memory of experiences. Declarative memory is likely
necessary for rationality and self-consciousness, so that one’s beliefs can be based on
knowledge of the past and general truths and one can hold one’s desires and beliefs in
thought long enough to scrutinize them.
4. The capacity to have expectations with respect to future events.
In his account of individuals with episodic memory deficits, Craver notes that the
same neurofunctional processes associated with episodic memory play a role in one’s
ability to imagine future situations one might experience. However, while “episodic
future thought can be used to modulate decision-making about hypothetical future
rewards” an individual who is unable to form such thoughts is still able to hypothetically
value future events and is “willing to exchange an immediate reward for a larger reward
at a later time” but “cannot imagine how he would spend the money. After repeated
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questioning he says he would put it in the bank.” (Craver 2012, 468) So if 4. is taken in
that robust sense, then it seems not to be necessary. In a more rudimentary sense,
however, in order to be concerned for one’s future experiences relative to one’s desires
one must be capable of some kind of expectation or anticipation of future
circumstances, though not necessarily episodically.
5. An awareness of the passage of time.
It’s hard to say exactly what such awareness consists in. If it means
understanding of the difference between the past and the future, or A-series time, to use
Mactaggert’s (1908) designation, such understanding might be necessary for
personhood because in order to be responsible for one’s actions one must be able to
distinguish an action from its causes and consequences in such a way that one can see
that the consequences follow from the action, which is or is not justified depending in
part on the events that led up to it. As Craver puts it: “It seems requisite for us to be an
agent in any full sense that we recognize that possible futures lie ahead of us, that our
pasts are irrevocable, and that the choices we make now will have consequences in the
future” (Craver 2012, 464). It is likely also necessary for basic intentionality in the first
place. Many beliefs are time-indexed, they are about how things are, were, or will be at
various times. The same goes for desires. There are immediate wants, but also
longings for how things may turn out eventually, and sadly, for there is nothing to be
done about it, desires for what was but is no longer or even what might have been. So
understanding of time, in that sense, is necessary for personhood but is already implied
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by the notions of self-consciousness and concern.
6. The property of being a continuous, conscious self, or subject of mental states,
construed in a minimal way, as nothing more than a construct of appropriately related
mental states.
7. The property of being a continuous, conscious self, construed as pure ego,
that is, as an
entity that is distinct from the experiences and other mental states that it has;
I’m taking these two together because they both concern the concept of a self,
albeit in extremely different ways. Whether having such continuity or such a self as
conceived of in (6) is necessary for personhood is a question I will explore in depth in
chapter four, though it does seem that there has to be something to the ‘self’ in selfconsciousness. One way to understand that term is purely reflexively, where ‘self’ refers
to ‘this person’. In that case the problem is just one of explicating the reference of ‘this
person,’ at different times, which is the persistence problem which I will discuss in
chapter two. Another kind of thing ‘self’ could mean is an internal cognitive
representation of a person - something experienced, though not necessarily substantial.
The question of whether a being needs to be capable of forming such a representation
and what the nature of that representation is (i.e. narrative, imagistic, relatively
permanent or fleeting, single or multiple, etc.) will be the subject of chapter four.
However, for reasons that were explained in the introduction, I see the idea of a
self in 7. that is “distinct from the experiences and mental states that one has” as both
too scientifically and philosophically untenable to consider it necessary for personhood.
There is no evidence that such a thing exists. If it did, there is no coherent way of
explaining how it could causally relate to the rest of the person and it is unnecessary to
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explain any observable or phenomenal facts about persons.
8. The capacity for self-consciousness, that is to be aware of the fact that one is
a continuing, conscious subject of mental states;
9. The property of having mental states that involve propositional attitudes such
as beliefs and desires;
10. The capacity to have thought episodes, that is, states of consciousness
involving intentionality;
11. The capacity to reason;
12. The capacity to solve problems;
The above capacities, 8-12 have been covered already either under the notion of
self-consciousness, or in the case of 11-12, rationality.
13. The property of being autonomous; that is of having the capacity to make
decisions based upon an evaluation of relevant considerations;
13., so long as it doesn’t imply indeterministic free will, can be taken to be more
or less equivalent to the sort of responsibility that I take self-consciousness and concern
to be necessary and sufficient for.
14. The capacity to use language;
15. The ability to interact socially with others;
The above two capacities were both discussed in the section on selfconsciousness, where I argued that 14. may be necessary for self-consciousness,
though that does not imply the necessity of the ability to use language to communicate
with others. By that same token, while it may a contingent fact about human persons
that we could never develop sapience in isolation I don’t see any reason to rule out a
priori that some being could.
Having considered what I take to be a representative list of the capacities
sometimes considered necessary for personhood and explained how they relate to self81

consciousness and concern (though some of the details of that explanation had to be
postponed until later chapters), I hope to have shown that (aside from those who
believe in separate egos) one who endorses any of the capacities on Gordijn’s list
should be satisfied that my account of personhood is inclusive of them while providing a
both more succinct and complete picture. In the remaining chapters I will pick up the
threads left dangling concerning persistence over time (chapter two), reductionism and
Eliminativism (chapter three), the self (chapter four) and the moral implications of
personhood (chapter 5).
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Chapter 2: The Persistence of Persons
I.

The problem of personal persistence and responsibility for past actions
So far I have claimed that persons are beings that are capable of being

responsible for their actions. For that distinction to have any significance in practice,
persons must sometimes be responsible for actions performed in the past. Otherwise,
no one could ever be held responsible for any action, because responsibility for any
action would be expunged immediately after the action was performed. For anyone to
be responsible for any action performed by a person at an earlier time there must be a
suitable relation between the person at the later time and the person at the earlier time,
who performed the action, such that responsibility is maintained from the earlier person
to the later one. Usually the relation in question is assumed to be that of identity, though
some writers, such as Parfit (1984) have proposed slightly different candidates, such as
survival or persistence.
One reason for picking an alternative relation to identity in the above general
formulation is to allow for the sort fission and duplication cases (such as when a brain is
split and each hemisphere is placed in a different body, or a person somehow splits like
an amoeba, leaving two exactly similar persons who each have the same claim to being
the original), in response to which Parfit (1984) morphs the question of “personal
identity” into a question about “personal survival.” If the relation holds between a person
Y at a time t2 and a person X at an earlier time t1 that holds in an ordinary case of
survival at the same time and to the same degree that that relation holds between a
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second person Z at t2 and the person X at t1, then X would survive as Y and Z despite
the fact that X is identical to neither Y nor Z. That there is no transtemporal identity in
such a case should not, according to Parfit, concern us, because identity is just a
special case of survival, and that latter relation is all that really matters. Identity is
merely the one-to-one case of survival. I will grant this point to Parfit at this stage,
assuming that a person one survives as but is not identical to could be responsible for
one’s present actions. Parfit’s views about what grounds continued responsibility are
complex and not entirely clear. I will deal with them in depth later on. However, I will
assume at this stage that responsibility goes along with survival, so that whatever
grounds responsibility in the special case of identity could also hold between a person
at an earlier time and any person at a later time he or she survives as in branching
cases, allowing for the possibility that two contemporaneous persons could both be
responsible for something an earlier person did so long as that earlier person persists or
survives as those later two.
A second reason for that last disjunction, is that there is a difference between
strict identity and “identity in the loose and popular sense” borrowing a phrase from
Butler (1736) and, later, Chisholm (1976).17 In particular, if one is committed to a
mereological or qualitative essentialist version of psychophysical reductionism,
according to which a being cannot survive any change in its parts or properties, then
one might contend that no being can be strictly identical from one moment to the next
17

Though Butler and Chisholm themselves insist that persons are the only things that must be
identical over time in the strict sense.
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due to continuous mereological and/or qualitative change, though some relation holds
between numerically distinct momentary person-stages that unites them into what can
be loosely, or conventionally (invoking the Buddhist idiom) regarded as the same
person over time. As with the point made in the previous paragraph, at this stage I will
not rule out the possibility that such a loose or conventional identity is sufficient for
maintaining responsibility. For brevity’s sake, I will mostly speak of ‘persistence’, though
I will use the phrase ‘the same person over time’ where that phrase should be
understood to be similarly non-committal, and I will speak of ‘identity’ when discussing a
particular writer who uses that term.18
The question I address in this chapter is: Given the conception of personhood
developed in chapter 1, according to which a person is a being with the capacity for selfconsciousness and concern, what conditions must be met for a person at one time, t1, to
persist as a person at a later time t2, given that persons change mereologically and
qualitatively over time? In answer, I motivate and defend an account of the persistence
of persons over time in terms of the continued existence of a dynamic, organized being
that instantiates and uninterruptedly maintains the capacities for self-consciousness and
concern.
One proposed criterion of personal persistence that has been very popular among
philosophers over at least the past forty years, is the “Psychological Criterion” defended
by Parfit (1971/1984) and Lewis (1983), among others, which essentially holds that

18

Chapter 3 will deal more thoroughly with the mereology of persons.
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continuity of distinctive psychological features is necessary and, given an appropriate
causal link between states, sufficient, for personal persistence over time. In contrast, I
endorse a view I call the Core Psychological Criterion, according to which personal
persistence requires the continuous realization of core psychological features of
persons over time, but not continuity of distinctive features. Following Unger (1990),
core psychology refers to the features possessed in common by all psychological
beings, whereas one’s distinctive psychology consists of the psychological features that
an individual either possesses uniquely or else possesses in common with some but not
all other psychological individuals. The core psychological features are general
capacities, not specific psychological states. This is important to both Unger’s view and
my own, because capacities are the sorts of things that are maintained even when they
are not in use and even when they have been temporarily disabled, so that a person
would persist while asleep, while in a reversible coma, and even if cryogenically frozen.
As I will stress later on, this is an advantage of Unger’s view over the traditional
Psychological Criterion, because it is difficult to see how one’s distinctive psychological
features, even the dispositional ones, would be continuous through such conditions.
My position is similar to the “Physical Criterion” defended by Unger (1990)19, but
differs from Unger’s view in a few ways: First of all, Unger restricts the class of beings
19

Mcmahan’s ‘Embodied Mind’ (2002) account is also similar, but differs from mine in more or
less the same ways as Unger’s as well as in the additional respects that 1. the possible realizers
of minds seem, in Mcmahan’s account to be limited to organic brains and 2. Mcmahan thinks
that the functional and organizational continuity instantiating a mind could persist through
teletransportation whereas I think that such an event would necessarily interrupt such continuity.
Furthermore, I don’t take egoistic concern to be central to what matters in persistence the way
Mcmahan does.
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that could realize the core psychological capacities of persons to physical beings and
takes maintenance of such capacities to require physical continuity (not without good
empirical reasons), but I state my criteria of personal persistence in more
metaphysically neutral terms, in the sense that I leave open the possibility that there
could be non-physical persons that persist via non-physical causal continuity (though
such continuity would have to be equivalent to physical continuity in crucial respects.) I
am, along with Unger, committed to naturalism in the sense that I do not require for
personhood or persistence the existence of any entity or feature that is in conflict with
established scientific fact or is undiscovered so far by scientific method. In that class I
include an immaterial substance, a transcendent or immutable soul, and nondeterministic free will. However, I leave open the possibility that persons may be
composed of or possess such things.
Secondly, the core psychological features that Unger takes to be relevant to
persistence are those which are minimally required to be a psychological being, “my
capacity for conscious experience, my capacity to reason at least in a rudimentary way,
and my capacity to form simple intentions.” (Unger 1990, 193) Conversely, my account
requires of a persisting person the more demanding set of core psychological capacities
of persons, i.e. self-consciousness and concern. Insisting on capacities beyond those
shared by all psychological beings importantly distinguishes my view from Unger’s,
because it follows from my view that an individual organism could continue to live as a
psychological being despite failing to maintain the capacities necessary for personhood
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and would then cease to be a person.
Another difference between Unger’s account and mine is terminological, for he
calls his account the “Physical Criterion”, which is misleading given his focus on
psychological capacities, despite his insistence that they be physically realized. This is
important, because Unger’s view is different from most ‘physical’, ‘somatic’, or ‘bodily’
views endorsed in the personal identity/persistence literature by writers such as Van
Inwagen (1995), Olson (1997), and Thomson (2008), which take persons to be coterminous with the lives of individual human organisms. Unger’s view, on the other
hand, allows for the possibility that one might transform into something that can no
longer be described as a human body, without thereby ceasing to persist as a person.
The “physical” epithet is even more misleading in describing my own account given my
relative metaphysical agnosticism (as regards the possibility of non-physical beings), as
well as my contention that one might cease to be a person while remaining a human
organism if one ceased to maintain the capacities necessary for personhood. Instead, I
suggest the view be called the Core Psychological Criterion.
The appeal of the Psychological Criterion seems to rest on the intuition that our
distinctive psychological characteristics are essential to distinguishing one person from
another, so that it is “what’s on the inside” that counts. In other words, our physical
appearance and attributes are not what we consider essential to ourselves as distinct
individuals, but rather it is our psychological qualities - our beliefs, desires, values and
preferences, that matter most to our sense of who we are. This intuition lies behind such
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turns of phrase as “she is not the same person she used to be.” Such a phrase is
usually uttered when someone has radically altered her beliefs, motivations, values or
behavioral dispositions, which are generally understood to be psychological attributes.
We can understand the question about the necessity of psychological continuity in
terms of whether or not we mean it literally when we say that someone is “no longer the
same person” due to that person’s change in psychology. Most writers’ way of deciding
this question is to consider various thought experiments, as well as some actual cases,
where someone has changed psychologically and to anticipate what one’s intuitions
about identity are when presented with those cases. Through such an inquiry, one
attempts to establish not only whether or not psychological continuity is necessary, but
also which psychological features are essential and to what degree they must be
continuous for a person to persist over time.
According to Parfit (1984) when we say of someone that he or she is ‘no longer
the same person’, this may be a claim about both qualitative and numerical identity.
“Indeed, on one view, certain kinds of qualitative change destroy numerical identity. If
certain things happen to me, the truth might not be that I become a very different
person. The truth might be that I cease to exist -- that the resulting person is someone
else.” (Parfit 1984, 202) Conversely, according to the Core Psychological Criterion, no
qualitative change to a person (short of making him or her a non-person) can make that
person a numerically different person. I might cease to exist if changed into something
that is not a person, but so long as the properties constitutive of a being person are
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maintained, I remain numerically the same person.
My argument for endorsing the Core Psychological Criterion and rejecting the
traditional Psychological Criterion is essentially that the Core Psychological Criterion,
given an account of personhood in terms of psychological capacities, allows for a
unified theory of personhood and personal identity, which is also largely continuous with
accounts of the persistence of other organized beings, and embraces both the
suppositions that the unique psychological features of persons underlies our
persistence as persons while allowing that a person’s psychological features may be
highly variable over the course of her life. The traditional Psychological Criterion, on the
other hand, cannot support the last premise without ad hoc adjustments, and more
importantly, unjustifiably makes the persistence of persons radically unlike the
persistence of any other kind of organized being. Furthermore, the Core Psychological
Criterion accords with a conception of responsibility over time that reflects actual legal
practices, the abandonment of which would be untenable.
After providing a historical overview of the development of the Psychological
Criterion from Locke to Parfit and Lewis, I present Unger’s arguments for his position
against Parfit’s expanded version of the Psychological Criterion as well as offering my
own additional arguments. In some places these arguments follow the traditional
method of approaching this topic by relying on intuitions about thought experiments.
Some doubt has been cast on the legitimacy of such arguments (e.g. Wilkes 1988 and
following her, Schechtman 2014) and they are surely less powerful than one would like
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them to be, but there aren’t many better sources of justification around when debating
this issue. I have, however, appealed to theoretical considerations in addition to
intuitions as much as possible. Furthermore, I have engaged with some of the data
gathered from experimental philosophy’s initial forays into this topic and am open to
other empirical evidence that may be relevant, e.g. from neuroscience and physics. My
primary method, however, remains the prevailing way of approaching this topic, which is
that of conceptual analysis. However, the method is not just analytical, but in part
revisionary, because it involves tightening up and clarifying the concept of a person and
of personal persistence, which are vague and internally contradictory in ordinary usage.

II.

Continuity of consciousness and the memory criterion
Locke is the first modern Western philosopher to develop a conception of

personal identity in terms of psychological attributes, rather than mental substance. As
discussed in chapter one, Locke takes the concept of a ‘person’ to be a forensic one,
the purpose of which is to track responsibility over time. For him, such continued
responsibility requires that a later individual have ‘the same consciousness’ as the
individual who performed an action in the past. Both Locke’s predecessor, Descartes,
as well as his early critics, Butler and Reid, also take continuity of consciousness to be
essential, but Locke understands such continuity in terms of the continuity of
psychological attributes, specifically memories, rather than of the continued existence of
a mental substance, although, as will become evident, he means something peculiar by
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‘continuity of psychological attributes.’
For Locke, the persistence of persons cannot be accounted for in the same way
that the persistence of other kinds of complex beings, such as biological organisms and
man-made mechanical objects, can. The identity of compound, but unorganized bodies,
or 'Masses of Matter', consists in the identity of their parts, so that a change in parts
implies the destruction of one object and creation of a new one. (Locke 1690,
II.XXVII.330.15) The identity over time of organisms and other organized bodies, which
persist despite changes in their parts, consists in the continuity of their life, understood
in terms of the maintenance of their organizational structure such that it enables them to
maintain the functions associated with the sorts of things that they are. For living
organisms these functions are generally limited to continued life, nutrition, generation
and regeneration of cells. For instance, an oak remains an oak and therefore the same
oak so long as it maintains an organization of parts
as is fit to receive, and distribute nourishment, so as to continue, and frame the
Wood, Bark, and Leaves, etc. of an Oak, in which consists the vegetable Life.
That being then one Plant, which has such an Organization of Parts in one
coherent Body, partaking of one Common Life, it continues to be the same Plant,
as long as it partakes of the same Life, though that Life be communicated to new
Particles of Matter, vitally united to the living plant, in a like continued
Organization, conformable to that sort of Plant. (Locke 1690, II.XXVII.331.15)
Man-made objects, while they have no ‘Life,’ have more specific functions to
maintain, e.g. a watch tells time and a table holds other objects aloft. This account
applies to human organisms as much as it does to any others, whether oak, frog, cat or
watch, however, Locke insists that the same human organism or “same Man” (or even
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some other sort of organism, such as a super-intelligent parrot) could be at one time a
different person than at another and therefore not responsible for things the Man did as
the former person. Locke thinks that this sort of possibility is a consequence of his
definition of a person as “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and
can consider itself the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does
only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking...” (Locke 1690,
II.XXVII.335.10). Furthermore, Locke thinks that if “that consciousness” which allows
one to consider oneself “the same thinking thing” at different times and places could be
transferred from one organism or substance20 to another, the person would go with it.
“For should the Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the Prince’s past
life, enter and inform the Body of a Cobler as soon as deserted by his own soul,
everyone sees he would be the same Person with the Prince.” (Locke 1690,
II.XXVII.340.10)
Locke’s psychological account of persistence is purely first-personal.
Consciousness is what allows one to distinguish oneself from everyone and everything
else. Therefore, what makes me the same person as some person in the past is that I
maintain the same consciousness. In other words, my consciousness extends backward
to the thoughts and actions of that past person. What that amounts to, for Locke, is my
remembering having been conscious of that person’s thoughts and actions in the past:

20

Gordon-Roth (2015) argues that persons must themselves be understood by Locke to be
substances and not modes of other substances as other commentators have suggested. That
debate is beyond the scope of this study.
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For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which
makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from
all other thinking things: in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. sameness of
a rational being; and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to
any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the
same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that
now reflects on it, that that action was done. (Locke 1690, II.XXVII.335.20)
An alternative account of continuity of consciousness, which Locke rejects, would
consist in the continued existence of particular states of consciousness, so that I would
be the same person as a person in the past if I continue to possess some of that
previous person’s conscious states. Locke rejects this proposal because he
understands all conscious states, indeed all thoughts in general, to be of only
instantaneous duration, such that none persist from one moment to the next. As we
shall see later on, Locke’s atomistic conception of thought has been one of the
obstacles to establishing of satisfactory account of the persistence of persons in terms
of psychological continuity:
Because each perishing the moment it begins, they cannot exist in
different times, or in different places, as permanent Beings can at different
times exist in different places; and therefore no motion or thought
considered as at different times can be the same, each part thereof having
a different beginning of Existence. (Locke, 1690, II.XXVII.329.30)
Thus for Locke, the same consciousness over time can only be understood in
terms of memory, specifically the sort which contemporary psychologists call ‘episodic
memory’ or ‘experience-memory.’ More precisely, sameness of consciousness over
time depends on a memory (a current state of consciousness) having the same content
as the original conscious state; i.e. of the event remembered. If I can remember
performing any action, which was consciously performed by some person in the past,
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then I am the person who performed that action. If I remember giving the Gettysburg
address, for example, then I am Abraham Lincoln.
Locke's view can be stated as follows:
A person Y at t2 is identical to person X at t1 iff
1. X consciously performed some action at t1 and
2. Y at t2 consciously remembers performing that action at t1.
If Locke is right about this, then it follows that one and the same man, meaning
human being or human organism, could be two different persons at different times and
vice-versa - one and the same person could be embodied in different human organisms
or men at different times. So long as memory is preserved, survival and/or
transmigration of persons after death, reincarnation, and body switching are all possible.
However, Locke’s insistence on experience-memory as necessary and sufficient
for continuity of consciousness and therefore persistence of persons makes his view
vulnerable to several objections. The first group of objections targets the claim that
memory is sufficient for personal persistence. The most widely discussed of these
objections comes from the epistemic character of the memory criterion. For Locke, we
are the persons in the past whom we are conscious of having been. Butler (1736)
objects to this account, because he takes remembering an experience to imply that one
knows that one was the person who experienced the event remembered. He says that
memory or “consciousness of what is past” is what “does… ascertain our personal
identity to ourselves". For example, “by reflecting upon that which is myself now, and
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that which was myself twenty years ago, I discern that they are not two, but one and the
same self.” (In Perry 2008, 100) Since memory is one’s means of confirming whether or
not one is identical to a person in the past, remembering having done something
presupposes and therefore cannot constitute the fact that one is identical to the person
who did it. If remembering that I was some person in the past means that I know myself
to be that person, there must be some fact that makes me that person independently of
my remembering it. To say I remember being a person in the past already presupposes
that I am that person, and therefore cannot be what makes me that person, because in
general, knowing that something is the case cannot be what makes it that it is so.
“Consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute,
personal identity, any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth,
which it presupposes.” (In Perry 2008, 100)
Shoemaker, and later, Parfit, attempt to counter this objection by introducing the
notion of quasi-memory (q-memory), a faculty like memory but which does not
presuppose the identity of the q-rememberer with the person who originally experienced
the event q-remembered. Shoemaker defines q-memory as knowledge of
past events such that someone’s having this sort of knowledge of an event does
involve there being a correspondence between his present cognitive state and a
past cognitive sensory state that was of the event, but such that this
correspondence, although otherwise just like that which exists in memory, does
not necessarily involve that past state’s having been a state of the very same
person who subsequently has the knowledge. (In Perry 2008, 253)
Parfit refines this definition of q-memory in the form of three necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions. For him, I accurately q-remember having an experience iff: “(1) I
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seem to remember having an experience, (2) someone did have this experience, and
(3) my apparent memory is causally dependent, in the right kind of way, on that past
experience.” (Parfit 1987, 220) Parfit suggests that if we employ the concept of qmemory, then we can avoid Butler’s objection, because q-memory, unlike memory,
does not presuppose identity. However, while the possibility that one only q-remembers
an experience that one seems to remember implies that one may not be the person who
had the experience, whether or not one survives or persists as that person still requires
more than remembering or q-remembering. Parfit seems to admit this point when he
says that “we should not claim that, if I have an accurate quasi-memory of some past
experience, this makes me the person who had this experience,” and not just because
of the possibility of fission, but because “one person’s mental life may include a few
quasi-memories of experiences in some other person’s life.” (Parfit 1987, 222) So if
there need be something that makes the difference between really remembering
something that one did and only quasi-remembering what someone else did, then Butler
seems to be right after all to insist on a separate fact that makes an accurate memory
the consciousness of having had a past experience of one’s own. Parfit has a potential
explanation of this needed fact, but discussion of it requires that we first introduce some
objections to the necessity of memory for the persistence of persons.
One such objection is that we can think of countless cases where it is intuitively
plausible that memory of having performed an action is not necessary for being the
person who performed it. I have forgotten many of my previous actions, but that does
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not make it the case that they were not my actions. I don’t remember having lunch last
Wednesday, but that does not mean that I didn’t have lunch that day or that I am not the
person who ate that particular meal in the place and time that my body was consuming
it. I cannot remember my first day of high school, but that does not mean I did not
attend. Parfit attempts to answer this objection by extending Locke’s criterion so that
“direct memory connections” are not required for persons at different times to be one
and the same but only “overlapping chains of direct connections.” A person X at t1 and
another person Z at t2 are directly connected by memory or q-memory when the person
Z remembers or q-remembers having done something at t1 that X in fact did. If Z does
not bear any such direct connections to X but does bear at least one such connection to
a person Y at some time who in turn bears at least one direct connection to X, then Z is
related to X by an overlapping chain of direct connections.
This allowance also enables one who endorses a memory criterion (or any other
kind of psychological continuity theory) to answer the objection of Reid (1785),
illustrated by the example of “the brave officer” that the memory criterion would,
absurdly, allow for the possibility that two persons could both be identical and nonidentical to one another:
Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school for robbing
an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and
to have been made a general in advanced life; suppose, also, which must be
admitted to be possible, that, when he took the standard, he was conscious of his
being flogged at school, and that, when made a general, he was conscious of his
taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging.
These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr. Locke’s account, that he
who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that
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he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. whence,
it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with
him who was flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness does not reach
back so far as his flogging; therefore, according to Mr. Locke’s doctrine, he is not
the person who was flogged. Therefore the general is, and at the same time is
not, the same person with him who was flogged at school. (Reid 1785, 248-249)
Put generally, the point is that if some person Z remembers an experience of
some person Y, at an earlier time, and Y remembers an experience of a person X, at an
even earlier time, but Z has no memory of the experience of X that Y remembers, then
Z = Y and Y = X, but Z does not = X. However, because of the transitivity of identity, Z
does = X. Therefore, for Reid, the memory criterion is unsatisfactory as a condition of
identity as it would imply the possibility of such a contradictory situation. However, Parfit
points out that where there are no direct memory connections between Z and X, there
could be overlapping chains of such connections that lead from Z to X through Y. If
identity (or persistence in one-to-one cases) only requires a relation of the overlapping
sort then Z = X after all and there is no problem for transitivity. In the brave officer
example, while there are only direct connections between the flogged schoolboy and
the standard-taker and between the standard-taker and the general, those connections
form an overlapping chain that leads from the flogged schoolboy to the general. If one
only requires the overlapping chain, and does not insist on a direct connection, then one
can hold that the general is indeed identical to the flogged schoolboy without
contradiction.
This same distinction between direct memory connections and overlapping
chains of direct memory connections can help respond to the earlier objection to the
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necessity of memory that it is counterintuitive to insist that someone must remember
having done something in order to be the person who did it. One could say, that even if
one does not have a direct memory connection to the experience of acting, so long as
there is an overlapping chain leading to the person who had the experience, then one is
that person (provided there are no other similarly continuous contemporaries). For
example, even if I no longer remember blowing out the candles on my 10th birthday, it
can still have been me who did so, so long as I, for example, remember blowing out the
candles on my 16th birthday and at the time I was doing that, I did then remember doing
so on my 10th birthday.
However, the above revision of Locke’s memory criterion together with the
concept of q-memory, fails to defeat Butler’s objection. To understand why, Parfit’s
(1984) particular way of trying to evade Butler’s objection must be further explained.
Parfit distinguishes between psychological connectedness and continuity. The latter is
what is necessary and sufficient (in one-to-one cases) for identity, but it depends on
more than just some overlapping chains of direct q-memory connections. Psychological
continuity requires overlapping chains of strong connectedness, which in turn requires
that there be a sufficient number (over half) of direct connections that there are from
moment to moment in most actual lives:
My mental life consists of a series of very varied experiences. These include
countless quasi-memories of earlier experiences. The connections between
these quasi-memories and these earlier experiences overlap like strands in a
rope. There is strong connectedness if, over each day, the number of direct
quasi-memory connections is at least half the number in most actual lives.
Overlapping strands of strong connectedness provide continuity of quasi100

memory. Revising Locke, we claim that the unity of a person’s life is in part
created by this continuity. (Parfit 1984, 222)
Parfit claims that continuity of q-memory does not presuppose identity, and
therefore can (at least in part) constitute it. He seems to suggest, when he allows that
one could q-remember something that some other person did, that the difference
between a person at t2 merely q-remembering an experience had by a person at t1 and
genuinely remembering it is accounted for by the amount of direct connections. But it
seems implausible that if having some q-memories alone is insufficient for being
identical to an earlier person, that adding more q-memories would make a difference.
Why can’t I q-remember most of another person’s life without being that person? If one
q-memory doesn’t imply identity, then why should a lot of them together do the trick?
Schechtman (1990) correctly diagnoses the confusion inherent in the q-memory
approach, along the lines of the point above, by showing that non-delusional memory is
not as separable from identity as Parfit supposes, so that the idea that one could qremember something someone else did is incoherent. She thinks that the q-memory
theorist goes wrong by misunderstanding the relationship between the “nondelusionality of a memory” and “its relevance to the constitution of personal identity.”
(Schechtman 1990, 77) Q-memory cannot capture what in memory is relevant to
personal identity, such that q-memory might constitute personal identity, without
presupposing the identity of the q-rememberer with the person who had the experience,
because the qualities essential to experience-memories that make them important to
our sense of ourselves necessarily refer to us as individuals due to their dependence on
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many of our other mental states. By way of illustration, Schechtman provides an excerpt
from a book called Remembering: A Phenomenological Study by Edward Casey, in
which Casey recalls in detail, some vivid, some murky, going to see the movie Small
Change with his children. Here’s a small sample:
Anticipating a large crowd, we arrived early and were among the first to purchase
tickets. There ensued a wait that seemed much longer than the ten or fifteen
minutes it actually was. The children were especially restive and had difficulty
staying in the line that had formed - Erin attempting some gymnastic tricks on the
guardrail by the entrance, Eric looking at the posted list of coming attractions…
Once inside, we sought seats approximately in the middle of the theater, settled
there, and interchanged positions a couple of times to adjust to the height of
those sitting in front of us. The lights dimmed, and Small Change began directly.
(Or was there not a short feature first? -- I cannot say for sure.) The film was in
French, with English subtitles. I have only a vague recollection of the spoken
words; in fact, I cannot remember any single word or phrase, though I certainly
remember the characters as speaking. The same indefiniteness applies to the
subtitles, at which I furtively glanced when unable to follow the French. Of the
music in the film I have no memory at all -- indeed, not just of what it was but
whether there was any music at all. In contrast with this, I retain a very vivid
visual image of the opening scene, in which a stream of schoolchildren are
viewed rushing home, seemingly in a downhill direction all the way. (quoted in
Schechtman 1990, 80)
According to Shechtman, if such a q-memory qualitatively identical to Casey’s
memory were implanted in another person, Jane, “the amount of personal detail…
makes it difficult to imagine Jane receiving it as a quasi-memory,” for the memory
“contains a good many elements that make reference other parts of [Casey’s] life and
his personality.” (Schechtman 1990, 81) Features such as Casey’s familiarity with the
theater, his knowledge of French, and most importantly, his relationship with and
feelings about, his children “are going to be very alien to Jane,” who, we can stipulate,
has none of that knowledge or those feelings. (Schechtman 1990, 81) Memories get
102

their character at least partly from their relations to other mental states which imply
reference to the identity of the rememberer. Schechtman thinks we have to imagine
Jane’s q-memory experience in one of two possible ways.
The first is that Jane will reproduce all of the visual [and I don’t see why not to
include auditory, olfactory, but perhaps not tactile or kinesthetic?] content of the
memory without interpreting it as Casey does. That is, upon awakening from the
quasi-memory implant surgery, Jane will have images of being in a… theater,
with a woman and two children who she does not recognize, and she will also
have images of seeing a movie with these people. The second alternative is that
she will reproduce the memory exactly as it occurs in Casey, with all of the same
personal elements and associations. (Schechtman 1990, 82)
As Schechtman sees it, the former experience would not capture what “is
relevant to personal identity in genuine memory connections,” (Schechtman 1990, 82)
so that q-memories of that sort could not be constitutive of personal identity, no matter
how many of them were shared between persons at different times. It wouldn’t even be
accurate to say that such a q-memory is qualitatively identical to Casey’s memory, since
it would be missing much of the context that gives the memory its qualitative character.
However, if Jane’s q-memory did include all of the personal elements of Casey’s
memory, then its accuracy or non-delusionality would not be separable from the
assumption of identity with Casey. “If… we really wanted to reproduce the qualitative
content of Casey’s memory in Jane, we would not only have to recreate a great many of
Casey’s states in Jane, but suppress a great many of Jane’s as well, and this begins to
looks suspiciously like replacing Jane’s psychology with Casey’s.” (Schechtman 1990,
84) In such a case, Jane would have to, delusionally, believe herself to be Casey. So
Schechtman concludes, “The fact, then, that presuppositions about who has a memory
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are inseparable from its content means that one cannot, as Parfit claims, specify nondelusionality impersonally by keeping the content of a memory and simply deleting
propositions about whose memory it is.” (Schechtman 1990, 84) It is difficult to imagine
how Jane’s q-memory could be true to Casey’s memory without presupposing that Jane
becomes Casey whenever she q-remembers it.
Parfit could reply that even if Jane must believe she is Casey, and be mentally
exactly similar to him while recalling the q-memory, that does not imply that she must be
Casey. But that would rule out the idea that identity depends on the number of direct qmemory connections, as Jane would need to have at least as many connections as
Casey had with his theater-going self in order to non-delusionally experience a single
one of his q-memories.
A further problem for using memory as a criterion for identity comes from recent
plausible theorizing in neuroscience, which has been put to use in attempting to reduce
negative emotional consequences of traumatic experiences, that memories are reencoded with new information while missing some of the old, every time that they are
recalled, so that the content of a memory is never identical to the content of an
experience nor to the content of any subsequent remembering. (Schiller et. al 2010 and
Hall 2013) Different features of a past experience will be salient and others drop into the
background or even out of recollection entirely as one’s beliefs and desires change over
time and one acquires memories of new experiences. This would mean that direct
connections cannot be understood, as Locke seemed to hold, in terms of sameness of
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content.
Furthermore it seems that the continuity of many psychological attributes which
are central to our sense of ourselves as individuals does not depend on our experiencememories. There are cases of full episodic amnesia where the amnesic retains many
other psychological attributes such as beliefs and desires and other propensities. For
example, as mentioned in chapter one, Craver (2012) has reported that victims of
Korsakoff's disease, some of whom have no capacity for episodic memory still have
strong senses of themselves, what they are like, what they want from life, etc.
Perhaps surprisingly, individuals with episodic amnesia often show considerable
constancy of character. KC, for example [who lost all of his episodic memories as
well as his capacity to form new ones in a motorcycle crash], prefers the Price is
Right and M*A*S*H to other television shows, Black Label to other beers, and the
Toronto Maple Leafs to other hockey teams. He is courteous and quiet, but
lethargic and forgetful. He has a sense of humor and a pleasant smile. He is a bit
flat, but this facilitates a subtle charm. KC has a personality. The persistence of
this personality requires or is constituted by a rich set of causal connections
between earlier and later mental states. Such connections contribute no less
than episodic memory to his continuity over time in the neo-Lockean view.
The main point is this: The simple neo-Lockean formulation of N [the
“episodic necessity hypothesis”: that episodic memory is necessary for one to
be, have, or maintain a self in some significant sense] holds that episodic
memory is necessary to connect conscious experiences at different times, which
connections constitute the diachronic identity of the self [Craver uses ‘self’ more
or less interchangeably with ‘person’]. This hypothesis has evolved in response
to the threat of circularity such that episodic memory no longer plays a necessary
role in the identity of persons over time. If episodic memory’s contribution to
diachronic identity is as thin as the contribution made by q-memories, it is a
contribution that, as a matter of empirical fact, many other cognitive and bodily
systems make as well. The most viable surviving relative of the Lockean
formulation of N thus fails to support the view that individuals with episodic
amnesia lack identities over time. (Craver, 458)
Individuals like KC provide evidence that memory (of the episodic sort, which is
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what proponents of the memory criterion seem to have in mind), besides not being
constitutive of personal persistence, is also unnecessary for it. An individual with no
capacity for episodic memory or episodic thoughts of the future, may still evidence a
definitive set of character traits and preferences and may still value some future
possibilities over others. This seems to undercut the idea that continuity of
consciousness depends on the capacity for episodic memory. Most of the features we
care about persisting over time are independent of it. One might instead claim that it is
memory of the semantic sort, i.e. memory of facts, that is necessary for personhood, but
it is difficult to see how such memory is distinguishable from a capacity to form beliefs in
general.

III.

The expanded psychological criterion
Memory won’t serve as the sole criterion of psychological continuity, and

therefore the persistence of a person over time, but one can, as Parfit does, buttress the
continuity and connectedness relations by appealing to various other relations between
temporally disparate psychological states.
Parfit’s (expanded) Psychological Criterion holds that continuity of distinctive
beliefs, desires, character traits or behavioral dispositions is necessary and sufficient for
a person to persist over time, though the degree of a person’s responsibility for a
previous action depends on the number of direct psychological connections between
the person now and the person who performed the action in the past. Direct
106

psychological connections require sameness of distinctive psychological states between
persons at different times, whereas psychological continuity only requires overlapping
chains of such connections, such that two persons may have no distinctive
psychological states in common and yet be continuous by virtue of both sharing
different sets of distinctive psychological states with a person at a third time.
The Psychological Criterion essentially consists of the claim, (D), that continuity of
distinctive psychological states is necessary for personal persistence, which can be
formulated more precisely as follows:
(D) If a person X at t1 persists as a person Y at t2, then Y’s distinctive psychological
states are continuous with the distinctive psychological features of X.
Following Greenwood (1994), I take it that the states in question must be
dispositional rather than occurrent. Occurrent states are ones of near instantaneous
duration, generally conscious, which come to one’s mind in the flow of mental life, when
one thinks such and such to oneself. Locke rightly rejects these sorts of thoughts as
accounting for persistence, because of their very transitory nature, and as Unger (1990)
puts it “There is no single, occurrent mental phenomenon, such as a conscious, selfreferential thought, that any of us has at every moment of her existence. (1990, 206)
However, Locke is mistaken in thinking that all mental states are of this occurrent,
hence momentary, nature. Most mental phenomena are not occurrent, but dispositional.
The vast majority of my beliefs, desires, doubts, judgments, etc. do not occur to me at
every particular moment, but nonetheless persist as relatively stable aspects of my
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psychological makeup. If any distinctive mental phenomena are to serve as criteria of
personal persistence, they will be those of the dispositional sort.
The insistence on continuity or connectedness of distinctive psychology is natural
given the close connection between our sense of ourselves as unique individuals and
our sense of ourselves as being primarily psychological individuals. When asked for an
account of oneself, one’s natural tendency is to offer a description of the qualities that
differentiate one from others. Among these distinctive qualities, the psychological ones
appear to be of the greatest importance. One feels that most of the features of one’s
body are relatively cosmetic or accidental, when compared with one’s beliefs, desires,
goals, wishes, values, aspirations, moral commitments, emotional dispositions, etc.
Given an account of personhood that requires for being a person possession of
higher-order desires and beliefs, it might seem as if continuity of those sorts of
psychological attributes would be of greatest importance for personal persistence. If my
ability to form preferences as to what I should desire and believe, i.e. my capacity for
evaluation of my own first-order psychology, is what makes me a person, then it is
tempting to infer that the distinctive preferences I have and evaluations I’ve made make
me the specific person that I am. Along those lines, one could regard a person as
persisting so long as his or her higher order beliefs and desires remain relatively stable,
forming a character with a specific set of values. If those values were to radically
change, we might say, and often do, that it is no longer the same person we are dealing
with. For instance if an individual who had been an honest, generous, pacifistic liberal
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were to wake up one day as a lying, greedy, war mongering conservative, a friend might
think that this was not the same person who had gone to sleep the night before.
Empirical studies by Strohminger and Nichols (2014) suggest that moral character is the
most central of all distinctive psychological features to people’s sense of their own
persistence and their sense of the persistence of others.
However, there is a countervailing idea about persons, which forms part of the
initial basis for worrying about persistence over time in the first place. It is characteristic
of persons that they are highly flexible in the distinctive psychological characteristics
they possess over the course of their lives, including the higher-order ones. While it is
not necessary to being a person that one’s distinctive psychological attributes change
over time, one might reasonably claim that most persons vary, sometimes smoothly and
gradually, sometimes radically and suddenly (e.g. in response to a traumatic or
serendipitous event), psychologically throughout the course of their lives. Indeed, one of
the primary virtues of a Reductionist approach to persons, one that does not require the
existence of a transcendent, immutable soul, is that it allows for persons to persist
through such changes. The intuitive appeal of the idea that continuity of distinctive
psychological characteristics is necessary for personal persistence is lessened if it is
true that such characteristics are more variable than one supposes.
Furthermore, an account of personhood in terms of the possession of capacities
lends itself to the principle that so long as a being maintains the capacities constitutive
of being a person, i.e. remains a person, then that being must be the same person all
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along. Our treatment of watches, trees, and frogs seems to follow this principle, as did
Locke’s account of all organized beings other than persons. Locke thinks that
persistence conditions for a thing should be given by the sort of thing it is. However, in
the case of persons, Locke abandons the principle that so long as a being remains the
same sort of being it remains the same individual being. On Locke’s account, an
individual may continue being a person without remaining the same person, because
e.g. if some individual person loses all of her memories and gains new ones, there is an
organized being in a single place throughout the process with the capacities necessary
and sufficient for being a person, but for Locke, there is a different person before and
after the change in memories.
Bernard Williams (1970) offers a pair of thought experiments that, so framed, are
supposed to elicit the “Lockean” judgment that two individuals have switched bodies,
and the “non-Lockean” judgment that no switch has occurred, respectively. The
following is a presentation of the first thought experiment, though slightly altered so that
it tests Parfit’s expanded Psychological Criterion, rather than Locke’s Memory Criterion,
by referring to all distinctive psychological features rather than memories alone and
speaks of feature-swapping, instead of brain-switching, to better highlight the
differences between the Psychological Criterion and the Core Psychological Capacities
criterion:
If a person, X, were to swap all distinctive psychological features with those
realized in a different person, Y, so that X-body would end up with the psychological
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features previously realized in the Y-body and vice-versa, the common intuition seems
to be that person would then have the Y-body and person Y the X-body, such that X
should, post-swap, fear torture administered to the Y-body and Y fear torture
administered to the X-body. This way of telling the story clearly motivates the view that
continuity of distinctive psychological attributes is necessary (as well as sufficient) for
personal persistence.
Here is the second situation imagined by Williams, altered in a similar manner to
the first, by making reference to the erasure and replacement of distinctive
psychological attributes in general, rather than just memories, and assuming that the
mechanism of erasure and replacement leaves core psychological capacities
uninterrupted: Imagine that a scientist tells you that while you sleep she will remove all
traces of your distinctive psychology, leaving a being with the capacity for selfconsciousness and concern but without any of your distinctive beliefs, desires, etc. of
any order, that you currently possess. The resulting person will have instead completely
different distinctive mental states, perhaps even diametrically opposed to your own
before the operation. The person who remains will be tortured. Your distinctive
psychological states will be reproduced in the brain of a person far away, replacing the
characteristics that person already possesses. If it is rational for you to fear the torture,
then you must persist as the person who will be tortured. However, one who endorses
(D), which holds that continuity of distinctive psychology is necessary for personal
persistence, should not fear the torture in the above scenario.
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Deciding what is intuitive and what isn’t is, of course, a precarious enterprise.
Some work has been done, e.g. by Bruno and Nichols (2010), trying to assess the ways
people respond to both ways of framing the “future pain” scenario. The results seem to
confirm Williams’ assumption that when presented with the Lockean frame in which two
persons’ bodies swap brains, or swap distinctive psychological characteristics in some
other way, most respondents conclude that the two persons have really switched
bodies, while when presented with the pain frame cited above they conclude that one
should fear future torture even when one’s distinctive psychological characteristics have
been completely erased and replaced (whether or not they are implanted in another
body somewhere else). Bruno and Nichols conclude that the responses to the latter
scenario, the pain frame, are due to unfair demands that it places on respondents:
In that frame, there seems to be a demand to respond that I would feel the pain.
After all, if I am not going to feel it then who is?... There is plausibly pressure here
to give a persistence response. If this is right, then if we remove or decrease any
thought experimenter demand, we should find less inclination to give the
persistence response. (Bruno and Nichols 2010, 17)
However, this conclusion is unwarranted. The respondents might think that the
person who feels the pain is a brand new one. That they do not only confirms that it is
counter-intuitive to think that a complete change in distinctive psychology yields a
numerically different person. Furthermore, even when the gathered data suggests that
philosophical laypeople accept (D), that acceptance seems to have a limit, and that
limit, as Williams predicts, is the anticipation of future pain or death. For example, while
studies (Bartels and Urminsky 2011, Bartels et al. 2013) have found that people tend to
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discount future rewards for individuals physically continuous but distinctively
psychologically dissimilar to themselves, they have also found (Bartels et al. 2013) that
anticipated change in distinctive psychology yields no reduction in death anxiety. There
is much more that experimental philosophy can do on this subject. However, the work
so far shows that folk intuitions indeed are indeed divided over the two frames.
Sider (2001), Shoemaker (2007) and others have claimed that the intuitions for and
against (D) are intractably opposed, such that “there exist two candidate meanings for
talk of persisting persons, one corresponding to each criterion, and there is simply no
fact of the matter which candidate we mean.” (Sider 2001, 1) However I am not so
pessimistic about the situation and will endeavor to show that the latter should be more
compelling than the former once the issue is duly clarified.

IV.

What really matters in persistence
Unger (1990), has the intuition that one should fear the torture in the pain frame

scenario, because so long as core psychology is maintained in an individual person,
she is numerically the same person no matter how radical the change in distinctive
psychology. Unger follows Parfit and others in considering the question of “what matters
in survival (i.e. persistence)” in the thought experiments under consideration, but urges
that there is ambiguity in that phrase. First of all there is the “desirability use” which
Unger associates with (D) proponents such as Parfit and Lewis, but which he himself
thinks is “not highly relevant to questions of our survival” (Unger 1990, 196). According
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to Unger the desirability use amounts to the question of
what it is that one gets out of survival that makes continued survival a desirable
thing for one, a better thing, at least, than utter cessation. On the desirability use, if
one has what matters in survival, then, from a self-interested perspective, one has
reason to continue rather than opt for sudden, painless, termination. (Unger 1990,
196)
The reason for thinking the desirability use irrelevant to the question of persistence
is that it seems possible that one might continue to exist even if one found that
existence wholly undesirable. It is likely that most people would find a sudden, radical
change in their psychology, particularly as concerns their values, to be highly
undesirable, because they would not wish themselves to be a very different sort of
person, not only for the sake of others, but for their own sake. I hope I don’t grow to be
a miserly curmudgeon in my old age, but it would be irrational to believe it impossible
that I might become like that given various circumstances such as the sudden
accumulation of massive wealth and power. I would hope that my current character
would survive, but if it does not, it will be I who is corrupted. Even if that change came
about not through natural circumstances but by the unnatural intervention of the
scientist, it is rational to worry that it may be I who wakes up with undesirable distinctive
psychological attributes, just as I may be worried that I suddenly wake up with highly
undesirable physical qualities, such as disfigurement or dismemberment or even that
someone else I know might change psychologically or physically.
Next, Unger considers the prudential use of “what matters in survival,” which he
glosses as follows:
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From the perspective of a person’s concern for herself, or from a slight and rational
extension of that perspective, what future being there is or, possibly, which future
beings there are, for whom the person rationally should be ‘intrinsically’ concerned.
Saying that this rational concern is ‘intrinsic’ means, roughly, that, even apart from
questions of whether or not he [sic] might advance the person’s present projects,
there is the rational concern for the welfare of the future being. (Unger 1990, 196)
Unger thinks that it is only this latter use of “what matters in survival” that has
bearing on the metaphysical question of personal survival. This is because, while the
desirability use only pertains to what we want out of life, the prudential use also pertains
to what is undesirable yet no less real. “Very roughly, the desirability use aims at just
those situations that we should most like to encounter, while the prudential use aims at
all those that, somewhere or other in logical space, must be faced.” (Unger 1990, 197)
In other words, the desirability use is about what we positively value in our survival,
whereas the prudential use includes attributes that we might positively or negatively
value. A third use of “what matters in survival” is purely constitutive, such that “we focus
on what counts toward the case being one that involves a person who does survive,”
and are not directly concerned with “the evaluative, or the motivational matters that
surround the topic of survival,” and therefore “this use has no direct connection with
questions of rational concern for oneself in the future.” (Unger 1990, 197-8) In other
words, the constitutive use has nothing to do with what matters to the person who
survives, but rather, only what matters to us, the metaphysicians. Unger thinks that
there is an important connection between the prudential use and the constitutive use,
the former being the latter’s “motivationally relevant counterpart” (Unger 1990, 199), in
the sense that it describes the features constitutive of our persistence that we, the
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persisting, might be concerned about, but that there is no such connection between the
desirability and constitutive uses. Unger diagnoses the intuition that psychological
continuity of distinctive psychological attributes is necessary for personal persistence as
a mistake that results from employing the desirability use of “what matters in survival”
when seeking insight into the constitutional facts of persistence, when we should be
employing only the prudential use.
For Unger, Williams succeeds in revealing this mistake when he changes
perspective from the earlier third-personal Lockean frame to the first-personal pain
frame. In place of (D), Unger offers what he calls the “Physical Criterion”, the main
component of which is the claim that only the maintenance of core psychological
capacities is necessary for personal persistence (C).
To say that a capacity is maintained, for Unger, is to say something about the
nature of the physical properties which underlie it in a physical being or succession of
such beings, namely that there is a suitable structure such that the capacity is realized:
My basic mental capacities will exist from now until a future time only if, from now
until then, they are continuously realized in some physical entity or, at least in an
appropriate succession of physical entities. In largest measure, this is just a brute
fact about the relations between myself, mentality, and the objective world order.
Now, while both of us are similarly objective physical beings, and while both of us
have precisely similar basic mental capacities, you and I are different people. So,
at least during some of the time that you exist, and perhaps during all of it, your
mental capacities must be realized in one physical entity, or one succession of
them, while my capacities are realized in another. (Unger 1990, 206)
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So (C) can be stated more precisely as follows:
(C) If a person X at t1 persists as a person Y at t2, then Y contains the physical
realizer of X’s core psychological capacities or a physical realizer continuous with
the physical realizer of X’s core psychological capacities such that the realization
of those capacities has been uninterruptedly maintained from t1 to t2.
If one’s core psychological capacities are maintained over time, then, according to
Unger, what distinctive psychological qualities one has from moment to moment is
irrelevant. This view allows that persons are psychologically flexible, and can vacillate
gradually and conservatively or dramatically and radically in what they believe and value
from one moment to the next. Consistency might be a virtue in a person, but is not a
requirement, so that continuity of distinctive psychology is not necessary for personal
persistence. Therefore, in a situation like Williams’ pain frame, the fact that the person
tortured will not share any of your distinctive psychological characteristics should not
make you fear the torture any less. The intuition generated by the Lockean frame, then,
rests on not only mistaking the desirability use of “what matters” for the prudential use,
but also from thinking that a sudden change in distinctive psychological features yields a
new person, despite the continued maintenance of core psychological capacities
throughout the change. If swapping distinctive psychological features required that the
structure which instantiates core psychological capacities be dissolved and
reconstituted, then there would be a new person, because the old one would have
perished.
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If a proponent of (D) wishes to embrace the premise about the psychological
variability of persons in ordinary, gradual cases of change, but deny that persistence
occurs in the extreme cases of sudden and radical change, she must draw a principled
line where a sufficient qualitative difference yields a numerical difference between one
person and another. Parfit’s distinction between psychological connectedness and
continuity is already an attempt to draw such a line by saying that a person X persists
as person Y, so long as Y has at least half the number of direct psychological
connections with X as a person has from moment to moment in most actual lives or else
there is an overlapping chain of at least so many connections between persons at any
pair of times leading from X to Y. However, in the first place, any specified necessary
amount of connections seems arbitrary. A single connection yielding 50%
connectedness, rather than 49%, should not make such an important ontological
difference. Secondly, the move toward requiring for personal persistence only continuity
instead of direct connectedness seems to be a rather ad hoc fix, which gives up the
very intuition that made the Psychological Criterion plausible in the first place. If my
distinctive psychological features are essential to who I am, I shouldn’t think that
overlapping chains of connected features should secure my persistence as some future
person with whom I have no distinctive psychological features in common. Such
thinking is at least not implied by the intuition that my distinctive psychology is essential
to me. Furthermore, in the cases where an individual’s distinctive psychology changes
all at once, in a moment of total revelation, for instance, there would not even be the
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overlapping chains of connections necessary, on Parfit’s view, to secure continuity. And
in a case where my psychology changes completely at t1, but temporarily so, so that it is
later restored at t2, there would be psychological continuity between the person before t1
and after t2, but not between the person between those times and the person before
and after, so the proponent of (D) would have to claim that the person before t 1 ceases
to exist at t1 but then comes back into existence at t2. Here, I will only say that I find this
possibility prima facie absurd, but in the next section I will provide an argument for why
such intermittent existence is in principle impossible.
Besides the considerations already discussed, a further reason for accepting (C)
and rejecting (D), is that (C) is compatible with ordinary judgments of continued
responsibility in a way that (D) is not. According to (D), someone who wakes up
tomorrow with my body which has uninterruptedly maintained its core psychological
capacities, but who has radically different distinctive psychological attributes from those
I have today, would be responsible for the things I have done. My intuition is that this is
the right view about continued responsibility. Others may not share it, but as with the
memory criterion, I don’t see why my radically changing my mental nature should
change whether or not I self-consciously performed some action in the past. Moreover,
actual legal practice does not take sufferers of retrograde amnesia or individuals who go
through personality overhauls to no longer be responsible for past actions. Imagine if
that were the practice, and there were a procedure for criminals to have their memories
of their crimes wiped along with their desire to steal. They would then have an easy way
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to be acquitted of their deeds, arguing that they were no longer the persons who
committed them and therefore no longer responsible for the crime.
Furthermore, consider what happens when an individual recognizes his or her
responsibility for an action and takes responsibility for it in a way made explicit through
words and actions, which, in cases where one regrets those actions, leads the way to
atoning for them. Such atonement is what leads us to forgive a person, though that
atonement is made possible where it was previously not, because the person’s deeply
held beliefs, desires, and values change in a way which allow him or her to reconsider
the ethical nature of the action performed (even if he or she does not remember having
performed the action). For instance, I might come to realize that my setting fire to a
trash can outside my school was not an admirable act of righteous rebellion, but a
childish cry for attention that was thoughtless and potentially extremely harmful. My
change in values did not make it such that I was no longer responsible for the action,
rather it only allowed me to consider my responsibility in a more sophisticated, ethically
transformed way. Such an improved ethical understanding of my previous actions
requires that I recognize them as my actions, whether the improvement happens
gradually over time or all at once in a character transforming moment of insight.
Therefore, I maintain that continuity of distinctive psychological attributes is not
necessary for the persistence of persons in a way relevant to continued responsibility. In
fact, I take it as the great liberating insight of reductive approaches to personhood, such
as those maintained by many Buddhists, that persons are highly mutable and that it is
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irrational to think of oneself as bound to a distinctive psychological essence.
Parfit’s views on desert and responsibility are a bit difficult to sort out, but are,
nevertheless, important to consider. He holds that while persistence requires only
psychological continuity, desert is a matter of the degree of direct psychological
connections between a past and future person: “When some convict is now less closely
connected to himself at the time of his crime, he deserves less punishment. If the
connections are very weak, he may deserve none.” (Parfit 1984, 326) However, he
seems to distinguish this claim from one of ‘diminished responsibility,’ though he does
not quite make clear what that distinction amounts to. He continues:
This claim should be distinguished from the idea of diminished responsibility. It
does not appeal to mental illness, but instead treats a criminal’s later self as like a
sane accomplice. Just as someone’s deserts correspond to the degree of his
complicity with some criminal, so his deserts now, for some past crime, correspond
to the degree of psychological connectedness between himself now and himself
when committing the crime. (Parfit 1984, 326)
I am tempted to interpret this passage in a way that puts Parfit in agreement with
my own view about the relationship between desert, responsibility, and distinctive
psychology; namely, that desert might diminish with distinctive psychological changes,
but not responsibility. However, this does not seem to be what Parfit has in mind, for he
goes on to say:
We may be tempted to protest, ‘But it was just as much his crime.’ This is true. And
this truth would be a good objection if we were not Reductionists. But on the
Reductionist [I take both of our views to be ‘Reductionist’ in the sense that we both
explain personal persistence entirely in terms of more basic relations] view this
truth is too trivial to refute my claim about reduced responsibility. It is like the claim,
‘Every accomplice is just as much an accomplice.’ Such a claim cannot show that
complicity has no degrees. (Parfit 1984, 326)
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So Parfit does seem to think that desert and responsibility go together, but not
responsibility and persistence/identity. Still, on this point, I agree with Parfit in spirit, if
not in letter. For various reasons, I may deserve less punishment over time for
something that was, nevertheless, done by me. I depart from Parfit, however, in thinking
that we may and do forgive persons for things they have done, despite their being no
less responsible for having done them.

V. Persistence and Causation.
So far I have established my agreement with Unger that it is maintenance of core
psychological capacities, rather than continuity of distinctive psychological attributes
that matters, in the metaphysically relevant sense, to personal persistence over time. In
other words, continuity of distinctive psychology is not necessary for personal
persistence, but maintenance of core psychological capacities is. Unger argues that
physical continuity is also necessary for personal persistence, because as a matter of
empirical fact, maintenance of core psychological capacities, at least in the case of
human persons, requires the continued existence and functioning of a physical object,
namely a brain or central nervous system. To allow for some other imaginable kinds of
persons, Unger offers the following general formulation of the ‘Physical Criterion’ for
persistence of persons:
The person X now is one and the same as the person Y at some time in the future
if, and only if, (1) there is sufficiently continuous physical realization of a core
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psychology between the physical realizer of X’s core psychology and the physical
realizer of Y’s core psychology...) (Unger 1990, 202)
The above criterion reveals the second way in which Unger disagrees with
proponents of the Psychological Criterion. According to most versions of the
Psychological Criterion, there need be no continuous physical realizer of the relevant
psychological qualities, but only continuity of the qualities realized. The science fictional
thought experiment of teletransportation, as introduced by Parfit (1984), can be used to
illustrate the version of the Psychological Criterion which holds that connectedness of
distinctive psychology requires no special causal connection between the distinctive
psychological features of a person at one time and another, but only similarity : If I were
to be “teletransported” in the following way: the arrangement of the parts composing the
physical realizer of my psychology (e.g. my brain), down to the atomic level were
recorded and then destroyed, but then an individual were created in another location
whose physical realizer of his or her psychology were constructed out of entirely
different matter according to the exact arrangement recorded from my physical realizer
in such a way that psychological qualities exactly similar to my own were instantiated in
this individual, then according to Parfit, the resultant individual would be me. However,
for Unger, since the physical realizer of the resultant individual’s psychology would not
be continuous with my own, the necessary continuity of core psychological capacities
would not be maintained and therefore I would not persist as the resulting person, no
matter how similar in distinctive psychology. Unger, therefore, disagrees with the
Psychological Criterion, not just about which sorts of psychological features must be
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continued or maintained, but about what that maintenance must consist in. Specifically,
they differ over what the causal connections must be between persons at different times
such that one may persist as the other. For Unger, the disagreement over causal
requirements follows from the disagreement over essential features.
Unger endorses the following principle: that persons, like other concrete
particulars, do not admit of intermittent existence. In other words, a person cannot
cease to exist and then come back into existence no matter how instantaneous the
duration of the interval between. This would imply that resurrection is, in principle,
impossible. Unger calls this “the condition of no interruption,” (Unger 1990, 205) which I
will from here on refer to as (N) and define below:
(N) If X persists from t1 to t2, X must exist at all times between t1 and t2
As explained above, Unger rejects the view that continuity of distinctive psychology
is necessary for personal persistence, in favor of the view that all that is necessary,
psychologically speaking, for personal persistence, is the maintenance of core
psychological capacities. He thinks this requires the capacities’ uninterrupted
continuance in a physical realizer or succession of them. The second disjunct is meant
to allow for the possibility that one physical realizer might gradually replace its
components with ones of a different material, e.g. organic neurons to artificial nodes,
without interrupting the processes instantiating the capacities. In such a case the person
would persist, even though the physical realizer does not. Unger also allows that
capacities might be maintained even when they have been suspended for an indefinite
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period of time, such as in the case of super-freezing and thawing. (Unger 1990, 192)
One way to put this point, is to say that a capacity need not be poised for use in order to
be maintained, but may be temporarily suspended such as in the case of someone in a
deep, but reversible coma (whose capacity for self-consciousness may be suspended),
or one with temporary akinetic mutism (whose capacity for concern seems to be
suspended - see Prinz 2012 for discussion of this condition). This is a further reason for
rejecting (D), since it is not clear that distinctive psychological features, such as beliefs,
desires, memories, and values are continuous through such conditions, while core
capacities are. In a coma I may not believe or desire anything at all, but so long as the
coma is reversible, my capacity for self-consciousness may be maintained, assuming
that the necessary cerebral structure remains intact.
Unger does not claim that there is a conceptual or logical connection between
maintenance of core psychological capacities and physical continuity. He merely makes
an empirical claim about the sorts of processes that underlie the maintenance of
persons’ core psychological capacities and therefore persistence, i.e. physical
processes of the brain and central nervous system, and then generalizes that claim to
allow for imaginable variations that are admissible so long as they do not depart from
his general assumption of the “correctness of a certain view of reality as a whole… as
being, at the least, very largely a physical world...” which
is reasonably stable, regular, and well-behaved: For example, like rocks, trees, and
cats, people do not, along with their matter, pop out of existence, or pop into
existence. Rather, people begin, continue, or end, as a consequence of the
arrangements of certain comparatively simple physical things. (Unger 1990, 203)
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For Unger, (N), is if not an absolute condition of personal persistence or survival,
“then, at least... provides a strong guideline for any adequate account of our survival.”
(Unger 1990, 205) Endorsing (N) and (C) as well as the view of reality quoted above,
Unger derives his Physical Criterion of personal persistence. Unger sums up his
reasoning as follows:
For you to exist at a future time, you must exist, continuously, from now until then.
For that to be so, there must be the continuous existence, from now until then, of
your particular basic mental capacities. For there to be the continuous existence of
just those capacities, there must be, in this wholly or largely physical world of ours,
the continuous physical realization of them in a physically continuous realizer, or at
the least, in a physically continuous succession of physical realizers.
Consequently, for you to exist at a future time, there must be appropriate physical
continuity. (Unger 1990, 207)
However, I think there is a more powerful argument for (N) than Unger has
provided, which is that it follows from (C). Maintenance of the core psychological
capacities of persons implies that they be uninterrupted. (C) implies (N) because one
can only individuate tokens of a capacity in terms of its uninterrupted maintenance over
time. Since self-consciousness and concern are capacities shared by all persons, one
token instantiation of self-consciousness or concern can only be distinguished from
another by its continuous maintenance by the concrete particular or continuous series of
concrete particulars that realizes it. Saying that a person persists by maintaining her
core psychological capacities already implies that the person must exist uninterruptedly.
By accepting (C), one implicitly commits oneself to (N). Since, as argued above, there
are good reasons for accepting (C), one should, therefore, also accept (N).
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Like causal continuity in general, physical continuity of a thing can be understood
in a narrow sense where we only “think in terms of its constituting matter through
ordinary space with respect to time,” (Unger 1990, 203) or in a “wide” sense that is
meant to allow for various more exotic physical possibilities including the possibility that
there “be other physical dimensions in which, during a certain interval, the individual’s
matter exists.” (Unger 1990, 203) The wide sense involves a similarly liberal conception
of ‘matter’ according which “some matter will be any portion of physical reality,
regardless of state, that is suitable for constituting (wholly or largely) physical
individuals.” (Unger 1990, 203) However, Unger is only interested in cases that have
“some basis in reality,” the reality presupposed by the general worldview cited above,
which would rule out cases of interrupted existence.
The primary implication of Unger’s Physical Criterion is that it rules out as cases of
persistence those scenarios where a person’s matter is replaced all at once. In ordinary
cases a person’s matter is gradually replaced over time as cells die and new cells are
generated, such that over a person’s lifetime their cells will be completely replaced
several times. However, the gradualness of the replacement is what allows the
individual to persist. To be clear, the point is not about rapidity or slowness of the
replacement but the gradualness or abruptness. “As long as they are relevantly even
and gradual rather than uneven and abrupt, I can survive the most rapid of complete
serial replacements.” (Unger 1990, 211) His wide Physical Criterion is in essence a
version of (N) that presupposes the generally physicalist worldview.
127

The rejection of (D) in favor of (C) leads Unger to understand the necessary causal
relations that allow persons to persist over time to be equivalent to the relations involved
in physical continuity, because the maintenance of core capacities is best understood,
given the widest interpretation of the empirical evidence at our disposal, on the model of
physical continuity with its assumption of (N). This view would rule teletransportation,
but would allow for gradual replacements of organic by cybernetic parts, and even
gradual assumption of one’s core psychological capacities by a computer, so long as
that hard drive were capable of supporting a self-conscious and concerned being
(assuming those are the capacities necessary and sufficient for personhood) with no
interruption to the maintenance of its capacities. It would also support most common
intuitions about brain switching cases (that the person goes with the brain). If the brain
is the realizer of a person’s core psychological capacities, and it is kept in a suitable
condition throughout the process, then one person could exchange bodies with another
through a brain transplant. Similarly, if such thing as a soul atom existed, a single
particle that could by itself realize the core psychological capacities of a person, then a
person could exchange bodies by transferring that particle from one to the next, so long
as the soul particle continued to realize those capacities.
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VI.

Abstracting from the Physical
I agree with the spirit and most of the matter of Unger’s empirically hedged

criterion, though it is misleading to call Unger’s view the “Physical Criterion” as the
maintenance of core psychological capacities is what is most crucial for personal
persistence. Furthermore, although there is no conceptual connection between core
psychological and physical continuity, there is a conceptual connection between core
psychological continuity and whatever realizes core psychology. I take the primary
reason for commitment to (N) to be independent of the physicalist worldview Unger
presupposes. That is because, as I argued in the previous section, (N) is implied by the
conception of the persistence of persons in terms of the maintenance of capacities and
by the nature of concrete particulars in general, not only by the nature of persons as
physical objects. So to be more metaphysically neutral, and therefore ascend to
something more like a conceptual truth, which I think is desirable, one should leave
open the possibility that there be some non-physical element of a person, in the sense
that it does not obey physical laws or cannot be detected by physical senses or
instruments, that is the realizer of a person’s core psychological capacities In such a
case, a person would persist so long as the realizer or series of realizers of core
psychological capacities continue(s) to maintain those capacities. One can thereby
insist on just (N) and not the physical criterion to hedge one’s metaphysical bets. That
would be in keeping with the spirit of Locke’s decision to look at the sort of
psychological features that underlie personhood and the persistence of persons rather
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than the sort of substance. One would then say that for a person to persist, such a nonphysical element would have to obey (N) and be causally continuous in a way
equivalent to physical continuity.
Locke accounted for the persistence of most complex bodies, such as oak trees,
frogs and watches, in terms of the maintenance of an organized structure that yields the
capacities essential to the being in question. However, he refused to extend this
account to persons, because, as his example of the Prince and the Cobbler shows, he
insisted, without argument, that distinctive characteristics, memories in particular, are
necessary and sufficient for persistence. However, if he had seen core psychological
capacities instead, as criteria of persistence, he could have extended his analysis of
other organized bodies to persons.
Therefore, I think Locke should have said about persons what Reid suggested,
which was that as long as a being uninterruptedly meets the conditions for being a
person, it remains the same person. (Reid 1785, 113) However, Reid assumed that
such persistence requires the continued existence of a simple, unchanging, immaterial
soul that is distinct from any of the person’s thoughts, actions, or body parts, whereas I
do not.
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For Reid, X is a person at t1 and persists as a person Y at t2 iff:
1. X has a soul with the capacities constitutive of personhood at t1
2. Y has a soul with the capacities constitutive of personhood at t2
3. Y has the same soul at t2 as X has at t1, which means that that the soul in
question has continuously existed, maintaining the capacities constitutive of
personhood, at all times between t1 and t2
My account of persistence is what Locke should have said about the persistence
of persons if he had extended his account of the persistence of other organized beings
to them.
For Locke, a frog (one example of an organized being) X at t1 persists as (or is
identical with) a frog Y at t2 iff:
1. X at t1 possesses all the capacities constitutive of being a frog,
2. Y at t2 also possesses all the capacities constitutive of being a frog
3. Y is physically continuous with X
So it should follow given Locke's definition of persons in terms of the constitutive
capacities, which in the case of persons are psychological, that a person X at t1 persists
as a person Y at t2 iff:
1. X possesses all the capacities constitutive of being a person at t1
2. Y at t2 also possesses all those capacities
3. Y is physically continuous (or if X and Y are non-physical, causally continuous in
a way equivalent to physical continuity) with X
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Locke's rejection of this application of the principle of persistence for organisms to
the case of persons led him to the mistaken conception of personal persistence as
constituted by continuity of distinctive psychology. My view accepts the application of
Locke's principle of persistence for complex objects, in general, to the case of personal
persistence. Personal persistence over time consists in the continued existence of a
self-consciously concerned being, distinguished by the uninterrupted maintenance of
those capacities for self-consciousness and concern, which need not be stable and
unchanging in the states they produce, but rather may be, and usually are, dynamic and
variable.

VII.

The Phenomenal Criterion
There is a recent approach to personal persistence that should be discussed

because it has much intuitive appeal. It is a reconsideration of Locke’s criterion of
continuity of consciousness which appeals to neither memory nor causal relations
between distinctive psychological features, but instead to “phenomenal relations
between experiences.” (Dainton and Bayne 2005, 549) The “phenomenal approach” as
its advocates call it, is supposed to account for the anti-Lockean intuitions spurred by
the Williams’ pain frame. The idea is that in the sort of thought experiment where my
distinctive psychological features are wiped and replaced and the resulting person is
tortured, I have the intuition that it would be me who suffers the torture, not because it
would still be my body, but because my phenomenal continuity, the continuity of my
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experiential states would be preserved throughout the procedure.
Analogous to the relation between psychological continuity and connectedness
as defined by Parfit, phenomenal continuity consists of overlapping chains of
phenomenal connections. Phenomenal connectedness is the diachronic version of the
unity of conscious experience. In its synchronic form “phenomenal connectedness is
simply that relationship of experienced togetherness that holds between all the diverse
contents of a state of consciousness at a given time…” (Dainton and Bayne 2005, 554)
Diachronically, phenomenal connectedness involves the seamless merging of one
experience into another. Overlapping chains of such phenomenal connections form a
fluid stream of consciousness. According to Dainton and Bayne the connectedness and
continuity of experience are conceptually independent of beliefs, desires or memories.
On the other hand, they adhere to the inseparability thesis, which is the claim that
individual persons are inseparable from the continuity of their experiences. Where the
stream of consciousness goes, so goes the person. “Self and phenomenal continuity
cannot come apart: all the experiences in a single (non-branching) stream of
consciousness are co-personal.” (Dainton and Bayne 2005, 557) So as long as one’s
stream of consciousness is unbroken, no psychological or physiological changes will
result in one’s failing to persist. The pain sensations felt by the post-op person in the
Williams case will be connected to the pre-op person “by an unbroken chain of directly
experienced transitions.” (Dainton and Bayne 2005, 557)
The intuition that the continuity of phenomenal consciousness need not be
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affected by psychological changes is supported by the view of conscious experience
espoused by those philosophers who are impressed by zombification thought
experiments (Chalmers 1995/1996) in which one imagine an individual who is stripped
of phenomenal consciousness while retaining all of that individual’s physical and
behavioral characteristics. If such a zombie is conceivable, then we can conceptually
divorce conscious experience from other psychological facts. Furthermore, the idea is
that a person would not survive the process of zombification, which would make
phenomenal consciousness both sufficient and necessary for personal persistence.
The phenomenal approach has similar intuitive appeal to the zombie thought
experiment, by exploiting our sense that consciousness is something irreducible to any
other phenomena, whereas other psychological features, such as beliefs, desires and
memories are so reducible (into e.g. physical, behavioral, or functional states). It seems
a zombie could still have beliefs and desires without experience because intentional
states admit of, for instance, functional analyses in ways that phenomenal experience
cannot. This is not the place to engage with the former claim, but it is enough to say that
it is not obviously true. The reducibility of experience is one of the most hotly contested
topics in philosophy of mind, so a theory of personal identity that depended on taking a
position on this debate would be terribly restricted.
In any case, despite its intuitive appeal there are a good many ways to challenge
the phenomenal approach. I will consider a few in what follows. I will argue that a
weighing of the various considerations raised by these objections will militate in favor of
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my own view rather than the phenomenal approach.
To begin with, it is not clear that the continuity of experience is independent of
other psychological features or processes. Dainton and Bayne reject the idea that such
continuity can be accounted for in terms of working memory, which is one popular view.
(Horwich 1987, 35 and Mellor 1998, 122) For them such accounts are “from a
phenomenological perspective… highly unrealistic. Although we can certainly remember
experiencing change and persistence, we can also experience change and persistence
-- and we do so all through our waking hours.” (Dainton and Bayne 2005, 554)
However, this comment conflates the various kinds of memory recognized by most
philosophers and psychologists. My memory of having experienced continuity of
experience is an example of experiential memory. My memory that my experience was
continuous is an example of semantic or propositional memory. However, working
memory is neither of these things. It is a process that is generally, perhaps necessarily
unconscious which allows us attend to our tasks for periods of time. It is not something
which is an object of phenomenal experience and so is a perfectly good candidate for
what gives rise to such experience. Furthermore, just because memory doesn’t seem to
underlie phenomenal continuity doesn’t mean that it in fact doesn’t. Rather, as just
suggested, it seems more likely that the basis of phenomenal continuity would be
something not available to introspection.
A second objection to the phenomenal approach concerns the assumption that a
person’s stream of consciousness is necessarily unified synchronically. In a mundane
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sense, our attention is often divided as we perform various tasks at once. Still, even
when I am listening to music as I write this, there is still a sense in which I have one
experience of performing both activities. Either that or I may be switching back and forth
between tasks so quickly that it only seems as though I’m engaged in them
simultaneously. More problematic are the rare, but real split-brain cases, where the
corpus callosum is severed. In such cases, subjects seem to have two streams of
consciousness since some information is available to one side of the brain and not the
other. (Sperry 1968, Nagel 1971, Puccetti 1973, Moor 1982, Parfit 1987, Bayne 2008).
For example:
What is flashed to the right half of the visual field, or felt unseen by the right
hand, can be reported verbally. What is flashed to the left half field or felt by the
left hand cannot be reported, though if the word 'hat' is flashed on the left, the left
hand will retrieve a hat from a group of concealed objects if the person is told to
pick out what he has seen. At the same time he will insist verbally that he saw
nothing. (Nagel 1971, 400)
Despite phenomena like that reported above, most philosophers are hesitant to
say that there are two persons in such cases. Dainton and Bayne, so long as they agree
that there is more than one stream of consciousness, or even less radically, that there is
a single, but partially disunified stream, in such cases, would have to say that there is
also more than one person.
In a 2008 paper, Bayne argues against the interpretation of the split brain cases
that appeals to two simultaneous streams of consciousness as well as the one that
posits a partially disunified stream. In their place he proposes an alternative
interpretation he calls “the switch model” according to which split brain patients do not
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experience two simultaneous streams of consciousness but switch their attention back
and forth between streams such that they experience only one stream at a time.
As the name suggests, the switch model holds that consciousness in the splitbrain switches between the patient’s two hemispheres. The hemispheres
contribute in succession to the contents of the patient’s consciousness, but, for
the most part at least, consciousness does not occur in both hemispheres
simultaneously. The switch model paints the split-brain patient as suffering from
a kind of fluctuating perceptual extinction: when the left hemisphere is activated
stimuli in the RVF win the competition for entry into consciousness at the
expense of LVF stimuli, and the converse happens when the right hemisphere is
activated. In general, inter-hemispheric activation will march in step with changes
in the subject’s attentional focus. (Bayne 2008, 294)
According to Bayne, this model is supported by one aspect of the early split brain
findings by Levy et. al. that was hitherto unexplained, namely that one hemisphere
never disagreed with a perception of the other.
...patients gave one response on the vast majority of competitive trials. Further,
the nonresponding hemisphere gave no evidence that it had any perception at
all. Thus, if the right hemisphere responded there was no indication, by words or
facial expression, that the left hemisphere had any argument with the choice
made, and, similarly, if the left hemisphere responded, no behavior on the part of
the patient suggested a disagreement by the right hemisphere. (Levy 1990, 235)
The idea, according to the switch model is that the faculty of attention, which
results in conscious experience, vacillates between attending to perceptions from the
right hemisphere and those from the left, resulting in only one stream of consciousness
at a time. Suppose, for example, that the word ‘key’ is flashed in the left hemisphere’s
field of vision and the word ‘ring’ is flashed in the right hemisphere’s field of vision, with
the left reporting that it saw ‘key’ and the right reporting that it saw ‘ring’ but neither
reporting that it saw ‘key ring’, and neither hemisphere protesting the other’s testimony
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while it’s being made. The switch model would explain this event by saying that the
hemispheres perceived the information unconsciously and only attended to each
hemisphere’s perceptions when called upon to use that hemisphere’s method of
reporting (e.g. speech for the left and pointing or drawing with the left hand for the right.)
This is not an implausible interpretation of what’s going on in the split brain
cases, although there do seem to be some examples of conflict. For instance, Nagel
(1971) reports the following:
A pipe is placed out of sight in the patient’s left hand, and he is then asked to
write with his left hand what he was holding. Very laboriously and heavily, the left
hand writes the letters P and I. Then suddenly the writing speeds up and
becomes lighter, the I is converted to an E, and the word is completed as
PENCIL. Evidently the left hemisphere has made a guess based on the
appearance of the first two letters, and has interfered, with ipsilateral control. But
then the right hemisphere takes over control of the hand again, heavily crosses
out the letters ENCIL, and draws a crude picture of a pipe. (Nagel 1971, 400)
Even in this case, however, the conflict involves vacillation of control between the
hemispheres, and therefore, is well accommodated by the switch model. Perhaps more
troubling is the case Nagel mentions of a man whose “left hand appeared to be
somewhat hostile to the patient’s wife” (Nagel 1971 401), though perhaps further details
would reveal that this example also conforms to the switch model. However, even if the
switch model is the right explanation of the split-brain, Dainton and Bayne’s view does
not by itself save the phenomenal approach to persistence. One would have to give an
account of how when one switches from one set of perceptions to the other and back,
the two sets are continuous with one another, such that a single person persists through
the switching. If each hemisphere can be thought of as a separate experience producer,
138

then there would be two persons in a single human being. Philosophers have been
reluctant to embrace such a consequence with good reason. Split brain patients
generally function as single, unified individuals in their everyday lives, and the
inconsistencies in their behavior are usually only observable under experimental
conditions. This fits better with the idea that what unifies them is not the continuity of
their experiences but of their higher-order capacities for self-consciousness and
concern, both of which seem undivided by callosotomy.
The most obvious objection to the phenomenal approach is that experience is
not, generally continuous. We normally think of persons as persisting through regular
gaps in phenomenal continuity, in dreamless sleep or, more dramatically, blacked out or
fugue states. Overlapping chains of phenomenal connections, whatever those are
supposed to be, do not account for these discontinuities. Dainton and Bayne recognize
this problem of how interrupted streams of consciousness can be continuous, calling it
the “bridge problem,” and offer three options in reply that I are interesting enough to
consider. The first invokes James’ idea that there is a particular qualitative feel to one’s
experience, such that “even when there is a time-gap the consciousness after it feels as
if it belonged together with the consciousness before it, as another part of the same
self.” (1952, 154) Dainton and Bayne dismiss this suggestion as dubious, though it has
some intuitive appeal. However, if there is a special me-ness to my experiences I’m
hard pressed to put my finger on what it is or provide evidence for its existence, and
even if I could, what rules out the possibility that someone else could have a me-ish
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experience - an experience which feels like one of mine? Perhaps I could misremember
whether or not an experience was me-ish or q-remember the quality of someone else’s
experience, without remembering.
The second option is to treat as continuous streams of consciousness that are
not strictly so, as long as they could have been continuous given their qualitative
similarity. Dainton and Bayne rightly object that the character of one’s experiences
before and after interruptions is generally quite different, and actually it is this very
divergence that is often evidence of the fact of interruption. For example, say I am
crossing the street, thinking about this problem. The next thing I experience is being in a
hospital in extreme pain. It is the fact that my current experience is so different from the
immediately previous one that I infer an interruption in my stream of consciousness.
Furthermore, as Dainton and Bayne also point out, if experiential subjects need not be
strictly continuous, then they would enjoy intermittent existence. Such an account would
then require abandoning IIE.
Dainton and Bayne’s most promising solution to the bridge problem appeals to
the notion of a capacity in much the same way that Unger’s view and my own both do.
“When a person becomes unconscious, none of their experiential capacities are active,
but the capacities nonetheless remain in existence: the irretrievable loss of the capacity
for consciousness is what differentiates being merely unconscious from being dead.”
(Dainton and Bayne 2005, 565) So it seems phenomenal continuity does not require
actual connections between experiential states at all, but only the maintenance of the
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capacity for such states by an “experience producer” (EP). Even if an EP is not
continuously producing experiences, “we can appeal to experiences they would produce
if they were active. EPs that would produce phenomenally connected experiences if
they were active should also be regarded as co-personal. Since phenomenal
connectedness, actual or potential, obtains diachronically as well as synchronically, we
have all the ingredients we need to solve the bridge problem.” (Ibid) So a person, as
EP, persists after the wipe and replacement of his or her psychological features, so long
as he or she maintains the capacity to produce experiences throughout the procedure,
even if he or she is completely unconscious during it. In this way, their view becomes
nearly indistinguishable from my own, except that the only capacity they regard as
essential is the capacity for a unified stream of consciousness. However, while such a
capacity might be sufficient for a conscious being to persist, it is not sufficient for a
person to do so, because while perhaps necessary (though perhaps not -- see chapter
four), it is not sufficient for something to be a person that it has unified phenomenal
consciousness. This doesn’t seem to bother Dainton and Bayne as they “incline to the
view that no cognitive sophistication is necessary for our survival, and that we could
survive with a consciousness of the simplest of forms, e.g., a few basic bodily feelings
(it is arguable that we all enjoyed a consciousness of this form prior to birth.)” (Dainton
and Bayne 2005, 561) For them we are essentially “phenomenal things.” (566) If one
accepts both my account of personhood and their account of persistence one is forced
into the position that we are not essentially persons. This may or may not be a terrible
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result. Was I a fetus who became a person? If not, then I must suppose that I only came
into being when my capacities for self-consciousness and concern were fully developed,
in which case I might have to say that I was never an infant, which seems absurd. On
the other hand, if I were to lose my capacities for self-consciousness and concern, and
cease to be a person, would I still exist, provided I still had the capacity for experience?
Could I gradually turn into a frog and still exist? Settling that question is beyond the
scope of this study. What we are looking for is an account of personal persistence, such
that responsibility is maintained over time. Phenomenal continuity, even if it ensures my
persistence, does not ensure that I persist as a being responsible for my past actions.

VII.

Summing up the Core Psychological Criterion and objections
The view developed so far in this chapter can be summarized as follows:

a person X at t1 persists as a person Y at t2 iff
1. X possesses all the capacities constitutive of being a person (self-consciousness and
concern) at t1,
2. Y at t2 also possesses all those capacities
3. Y is physically continuous (or if X and Y are non-physical, causally continuous in a
way equivalent to physical continuity) with A
Now consider the following case21:
Mar-Vell dies of cancer. His wife is a brilliant geneticist and figures out how to

21

Adapted from Reed (2008)
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alter the body of another person Kl’rt, on the genetic level in such a way that Kl’rt’s body
comes to exactly resemble Mar-Vell’s body just before he died, minus the cancer, but
with a brain structured in such a way that he is psychologically exactly similar to MarVell before his death. Before the procedure, Kl’rt was Mar-Vell’s arch-nemesis, with
diametrically opposed moral beliefs and values. The person who wakes up after the
procedure at first believes he is Mar-Vell, as does anyone he encounters, however upon
discovering Mar-Vell’s wife’s notes, he comes to believe that he is not Mar-Vell but an
imposter.
i. Objection 1 - mechanical reproduction
My account of persistence supports the intuition that this is not Mar-Vell we’re
dealing with, that it is still Kl’rt and he is right to think of himself as a fake as far as being
Mar-Vell is concerned. However one might worry that we are being misled by the
biological natures of Mar-Vell and Kl’rt. What if Mar-Vell were a mechanical person and
didn’t die of cancer but of corrosion of his mechanical organs. If Kl’rt’s body was nearly
exactly similar to Mar-Vell’s but had been encoded with a different psychology which is
now altered to exactly resemble the psychology of Mar-Vell before he died, would we
still be inclined to think of the resulting persons as a Mar-Vell imposter? What significant
difference would there be between this individual and Mar-Vell had his mechanical
organs not become corroded?
My answer to this objection is that it’s not that we have been misled by the
biological nature of the individuals in the first case, but by the mechanical nature of
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those in the second. We don’t think of mechanical objects as surviving or perishing in
the same way that we do organic ones, because they don’t. Furthermore, mechanical
objects, unlike organic ones can generally persist despite being completely taken apart
so long as their parts remain in working order and do not become parts of something
else. Also, they tend to be mass produced in a way that makes them generally
interchangeable. However, if I buy two watches that are qualitatively identical except
that one is black and the other is white, the black one is destroyed beyond repair (it no
longer realizes the criterial capacities of a watch) and I paint the white one black, this
will not constitute the resurrection of the original black one, despite its now being exactly
similar to it. I think we should say the same thing of mechanical persons. Mechanical
Kl’rt has been made to be just like Mar-Vell was, but Mar-Vell has not persisted in this
new body, because he did not persist at all, he was destroyed.
Furthermore, while up to this point I have assumed for the sake of argument that
it is possible to transfer one’s distinctive psychological features from one body to
another without an actual transfer of brain matter, there is reason to think this
assumption faulty. The contrasting intuitions elicited by the version of Williams’
differently framed thought experiments that I have considered depend on this
assumption. The Lockean frame suggests that such transfer would constitute bodyswitching and the pain frame suggests that it would not. However, if this assumption is
faulty, as I think it is, the conflict in intuitions cannot even get off the ground. The
assumption seems to involve a conflation of type and token as regards psychological
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features. In the watch example, after painting the white watch black, I might say that the
new watch is the same color as the old one. However, I cannot mean that it has the very
same token of black color as the old one, but only the same color type. Similarly, were I
to produce in someone else’s brain a belief in the nature of personhood qualitatively
exactly similar to the belief that I currently possess, it would not be the case that this
person now possesses the same belief token that I possess, but only a belief of the
same type. This would be the case even if first annihilated my own instantiation of the
belief. It is manifestly impossible for me to transfer the tokens of my psychological
attributes to another person. That is, unless I transferred the physical realizer of those
psychological tokens, i.e. my brain. Therefore the dichotomy between psychological and
physical approaches to identity is a false one.
Furthermore, even if it were possible to transfer tokens of psychological attributes
from one individual to another, if one wants to claim that the identity of the person who
originally had the attributes would be assumed by the second individual, given transfer
of a sufficient number of attributes, Butler’s criticism of the memory criterion can be
extended to the expanded psychological criterion which would require that the attributes
be q-attributes, such as q-beliefs and q-desires. However, the problems Schechtman
raises for the account of identity in terms of q-memory, discussed above, apply just as
well to q-beliefs and q-desires, because “the content of these psychological states, too,
cannot be defined without presuppositions about who it is who has them.” (Schechtman
1990, 86) For example, even if I have a desire to win at tennis, at which I am an expert
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(I’m not really, but it’s Schechtman’s example), and my friend who is a novice comes to
have a similar desire with the same surface content, i.e. that ‘I’ win the game, “her
experience will be different from mine because it will not include the anticipation of the
play of the game, the feeling that she, the desirer, had been beaten by my opponent too
many times, or the anticipation of standing in front of the spectators exalted if I win and
humiliated if I lose.” (Schechtman 1990, 86) Schechtman’s diagnosis of the confusion
generated by the “psychological approach” of Parfit and others, is that features of a firstpersonal nature, such as memories, beliefs, and desires, are appealed to to give an
account of persistence that is similar to accounts of the persistence of material objects
taken from a third-person perspective.
Taking the fact that psychology is what turns out to be important… psychologicalcontinuity theorists thus make the unwarranted assumption that sameness of
psychology can be used to provide a noncircular criterion of identity of the sort
which is given for objects. But such a criterion cannot focus on subjectivity; it is,
by definition, to be objective, and must be capable of being spelled out without
including the first-person perspective of a given individual. The pieces that make
up a person’s psychology, must, to fulfil this purpose, be viewed to be as discrete
and detachable as the planks of a ship or the grains of sand in a heap… atomic,
isolable, and in principle independent of the subject who experiences them -- a
view that I have argued is highly implausible. (Schechtman 1990, 89)
Schechtman’s solution (in the 1990 paper) is to abandon the project of
establishing objective conditions in favor of focusing on a person’s own self-formed
narrative as constituting their persistence over time. I have, following Unger, made the
opposite move, by grounding personal persistence in the objective conditions for the
maintenance of a person’s psychological capacities. I do, however, think that something
like Schechtman’s view is the right account of the formation of a person’s self, which I
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take to be distinct from the persistence of the person, and which will be the topic of
chapter four.
ii. Objection 2 - change of type = change of token
A second potential problem for my view which comes out of the Kl’rt/Mar-vell
story involves the question of, assuming that Kl’rt has not become Mar-vell, whether or
not it is still Kl’rt we are dealing with after the transformation. According to my view so
long as the core psychological capacities of Kl’rt have been maintained throughout
metamorphosis, the same person, Kl’rt, should remain at the end of the process.
However, in keeping with the mechanical analogy above, there may be times when we
want to say that a certain object, a car for instance, cannot remain the numerically the
same object, if it transforms so radically as to become a token of a radically different
type than it previously was. For example if a VW bug gradually had its parts replaced
until there was no longer a bug in the garage, but a porsche, it would be strange to say
the new car is numerically identical to the original. Or to reverse the example, if I were
to lend someone my porsche and they were to return to me a bug, I would insist that the
returned car is not the same one that I lent them. Similarly, one’s intuition might be that
the transformation makes Kl’rt into such a radically different type of person that it cannot
be one and the same person we are dealing with before and after metamorphosis. My
response to this objection is that there is no clear way to distinguish types of person in
the same way as we can distinguish types of car, for the very reason that I rejected
continuity of distinctive psychology as necessary for personal persistence in the earlier
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section. Persons do not always maintain a steady enough set of characteristics. Their
beliefs and desires change gradually, and even vacillate radically from one moment to
the next. Furthermore, even when there is constancy of character, the Myers-Briggs
personality inventory notwithstanding, persons do not divide neatly into types the way
automobiles do.
A more difficult analogy to contend with would be works of art, which are like
persons in their uniqueness. If I painted my own face over an Albrecht Dürer selfportrait, it might remain a painting, even the same type of painting (a self-portrait), but
would clearly be a numerically different painting from Dürer’s. By analogy, one might
think that a sufficient change in distinctive psychology would make one person into a
numerically different person, even if it was a person all along. Where I think the analogy
fails, is that a necessary condition (though perhaps not sufficient) for a work of art
remaining the same work, is that it has been wrought by the same artist or group of
artists. Once an alien hand has affected it, it loses its numerical identity. Persons,
however, have no clear set of authors, and therefore cannot have that condition of their
persistence. With paintings, the original artist may go back to a work and alter it, thereby
changing what remains numerically the same work. If they were to completely cover the
painting with gesso and begin painting anew, there would not be a continuous work -the original would be destroyed. This would be analogous to killing a human being and
then reanimating the body with a new brain. If, however, Dürer were to paint my face
over his, one would be inclined to say that he had created a new painting, but I think
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that might be a mistake. Why consider it a new painting and not a revised one (though
not for the better)? Perhaps the intention of the author can by fiat change the identity of
a work, but there is no such analogue in the case of persons, because persons have no
author distinct from the “work” itself.
A related issue is whether or not an individual who ceases to be a person at all
can or must remain the same individual or whether something that becomes a person
was the same individual before becoming so that it is after having begun to instantiate
personhood. For instance, infants, lacking fully developed self-consciousness, are not
yet persons. Was I, who am currently a person, the infant who issued, second after my
sister, from my mother’s womb? This issue involves difficult questions about the nature
of individuals and whether or not there is an absolute, identity-simpliciter relation or only
category specific ones, i.e. identical-person, identical-infant, etc. (Geach 1962, Perry
1970) that are beyond the scope of this study, because my interest here is only with the
identity of persons, insofar as that identity accounts for continued responsibility. An
individual who ceases to be a person cannot be responsible for anything, whether or not
that particular individual survives as a non-person.

IX.

Persistence and identity
It is now time to give some scrutiny to the working assumptions made at the

beginning of this chapter. The first was that, following Parfit, the relation of identity is
merely a special case of persistence or survival. Making this assumption allowed me to
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put to the side worries about branching scenarios which make the notion of identity
problematic. If it is possible for me to “split like an amoeba” into two individuals who are
equally continuous with me in all the relevant psychological and physical respects, then
I might worry about which one of them will be me. Parfit’s answer is that neither of them
will be, but both will bear the same relation to me as if there had only been one
contender. The second assumption was that that we need not take identity in a strict,
but rather only a loose sense, because strict identity would require exact mereological
and qualitative similarity over time. Loose identity, would only require a kind of continuity
between somewhat dissimilar instantaneous entities.
If one is uncomfortable with either assumption, there are metaphysical resources
available to bring such concerns in line with the view of persistence so far developed.
These resources come from discussions about the metaphysics of time. One
metaphysical conception of time, 4-dimensionalism, which draws some support from
Einsteinian physics treats time as a dimension akin to the three dimensions of space.
Since objects have parts distributed throughout different points in space, on this
conception they would also have parts, temporal parts, distributed over different points
in time. This is often invoked to defend the identity of persons and other transitory
objects from the charge that since identity implies Leibniz’s law (if x=y then x and y have
all their properties in common) something cannot change over time while remaining the
same thing. If as an 8 year old I am 4 feet tall and 6 feet tall as an 18 year old, then I
seem to possess contrary properties. Which one am I: 4 feet tall or 6? The temporal
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parts theorist replies that I am strictly neither and that my possessing different
properties at different times yields no contradiction. This is because the whole of me
does not possess any of these properties, but only temporal parts of me do. The part of
me at 1992 is 4 feet tall and the part of me at 2002 is 6 feet tall. What I am is the 4dimensional space-time worm composed of these distinct parts. I do not persist by
enduring, continuously existing as a complete person from one moment to the next, but
by perduring, having temporal parts that are related to one another in a particular way
(e.g. constituting the kinds of processes that maintain the capacities for selfconsciousness and concern).
If one is committed to the idea that persisting individuals must be strictly identical
over time in some way, one can say that while the relation between person-stages at
different times is only a loose kind of identity, strict identity would apply to 4-dimensional
objects taken as wholes. Furthermore, if one is uncomfortable with Parfit’s view that in
instances of branching, a person persists as two distinct persons, neither of which are
identical to the original, then one can appeal to pairs of 4-D space-time worms that
share some temporal parts in common, having two heads or two tails and say that there
are two distinct persons who share some temporal parts in common or only one person
who has some temporal parts that are spatially discontinuous.22 This is not the place to
debate the merits of this appeal to the identity of 4-D worms taken as wholes or the
theory of temporal parts in general, and I think many of the disagreements involved are

22

See Moyer (2008) for a thorough discussion of these ideas
151

largely verbal. However, if one is uncomfortable with abandoning strict identity, and
settling on the looser sense of the term or with identity as a merely special case of
persistence, then some comfort may be achieved by appealing to temporal parts.
However, the discomfort seems to me, in the first place, to be the remnant of
attachment to the idea of an enduring, substantial self, which should be eschewed.
Now, while 4-dimensionalism is compatible both with my view and DPN, if one is
already a proponent of 4-dimensionalism, then one has a further reason for accepting
my view over the alternative. This is because of the difficulty for 4-d theorists of
providing a criterion for distinguishing between space-time worms, which can be
overcome if one accepts my view of the persistence of persons and other complex,
organized beings. What makes one space-time region a part of one worm and not
another? On my view, we can answer this question in terms of which physical
processes co-occurring in space over time yield a being with certain capacities. The
physical parts which serially make up the processes that ground the maintenance of the
capacities of an individual, in the case of persons these are self-consciousness and
concern, occupy the space-time regions of which an individual worm consists.
An alternative to 4-dimensionalism for trying to resolve the paradoxes of identity
discussed above would be to deny some of the logical principles traditionally thought to
be built into the notion of identity, e.g. substitutivity and transitivity. Priest (2014) does
just that, arguing that such a move dissolves problems of fission, fusion, colocation, and
vagueness among others. For the purposes of this study I have chosen to leave out
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discussion of these problems concerning the notion of identity (with the exception of the
issue concerning overdetermination discussed in chapter three which I understand to be
a special challenge to the position of reductionism about persons), so as to focus on the
issues that seem to make the logic of persons depart from that of other kinds of objects,
though I grant that any problem concerning the identity of things in general will also be a
problem for the identity of persons.
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Chapter 3: The Ontology of Persons
I.

Reductionism and Persons
Some form of Reductionism, either of theories, facts, or entities, is for many

philosophers, a crucial tenet of naturalism. In metaphysics, complex objects are
believed to be reducible to their parts and relations among those parts, which may then
be further reduced, so that they bottom out at a fundamental level of simples or else are
infinitely reducible to infinitely lower levels. In philosophy of science, the facts of biology
are taken by Reductionists to be reducible to those of chemistry and those of chemistry
to those of physics. Reducibility in metaphysics and science is desirable because it
allows that the world has a kind of hierarchical unity which would make possible a
complete understanding of the inner workings of all things. If the assumptions of
Reductionism are correct and one wishes to include persons in a naturalistic worldview,
then it seems that facts about persons must also be reducible to facts on a lower level
of description. This is not the place to evaluate those general Reductionist assumptions,
but even without them, Reductionism about persons may possess various virtues of its
own.
Reductionism about persons, in general, holds that persons are nothing over and
above their psychophysical components and the relations between them. These
components may be mental states such as beliefs and desires; physical particles such
as molecules, atoms or electrons; or more occult elements such as Nietzschean drives.
The phrase “nothing over and above” is a bit vague as it stands, and intentionally so, for
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it will mean something slightly different depending on how stringent a Reductionism one
endorses. The particular sort of Reductionism I am arguing for, and hence the more
precise meaning of “nothing over and above” I take to be true of persons, will become
clear in what follows. In any case, I understand Reductionism to be a moderate position
between the two extremes of Inflationism (or Non-Reductionism) and Eliminativism.
Inflationists believe that persons are irreducible, either because they are, or contain as
essential parts, irreducible entities that are distinct from and independent of their
psycho-physical components; or because there are facts about them that for either
metaphysical or merely linguistic reasons cannot be reduced to concatenations of facts
about their components or relations.
Eliminativists, however, either agree that persons are reducible to their
psychophysical components, but hold that, in general, fully reducible composite objects
do not really exist, or else, in the spirit of Churchland’s (1975) Eliminativism about folk
psychological concepts, think that the concept of a person necessarily refers to
something with irreducible properties, so that if all the things we are tempted to call
persons turn out to be fully reducible, there are no genuine persons after all. This
conclusion is what is known as the “Extreme Claim” (Parfit 1984, Siderits 2003,
Schechtman 2014) with respect to persons.
The “Extreme Claim” which, as Parfit (1987) puts it, is the claim that “we have no
reason to be concerned about our own futures” (Parfit 1987, 307) or as Siderits (2002)
states it, more expansively, “that four central features of our present person-regarding
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practices cannot be rationally justified: interest in one’s own survival, egoistic concern
for one’s future states, holding persons responsible for their past deeds, and
compensation for one’s past burdens.” (Siderits 2002, 37) Siderits’ version is of greater
interest in the context of the present study, because Parfit’s version, as stated23, would
not by itself pose a serious challenge to the concept of a person developed herein.
While concern, in the sense of emotional investment in the satisfaction of one’s desires
and truth of one’s beliefs, is necessary for responsibility and therefore personhood, it is
not necessary that one’s desires target one’s own future conditions or states of affairs. I
may be concerned only for the happiness or good fortune of others when I act
responsibly. I may anticipate reward or punishment in the form of benefit or harm to my
loved ones that could come at a time after I have ceased to exist. Only a particularly
radical psychological egoist would hold that concern is necessarily concern for one’s
own benefit or harm, because such a position assumes that such self-concern is the
only ultimate concern that is possible to have. The part of Siderits’ formulation of the
Extreme Claim that is threatening to the conception of personhood developed in the
present study, is the idea that holding people responsible for past deeds or
compensating them for past burdens is irrational for a Reductionist.
In the interest of showing that the conception of persons developed in the earlier
chapters of this study is consistent with the kind of naturalistic Reductionism described
above, I will endeavor to defuse some of the arguments for both Inflationism and
23

Parfit does seem to think that the Extreme Claim is relevant to responsibility as well, but does
not mention it in that formulation.
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Eliminativism. The specific form of Reductionism that I endorse may not be sufficiently
strong to satisfy all Reductionists, particularly not those who insist on what Parfit (who is
one of them) calls the “Impersonal Description (ID) Thesis,” which holds that all the facts
about persons can be otherwise stated, without remainder, in an impersonal language,
one that does not refer to persons or their identity. I take the ID thesis to be untenable,
but for reasons that do not threaten the general outlook of naturalistic Reductionism that
I am endorsing.‘Person’, on my view, is not just a convention, a merely convenient
designator that could be eschewed at the sole costs of time and verbosity, but is truly
required for a complete description of the world.
On my view persons are complex, organized, composite objects that have
features, i.e. the capacities for self-consciousness and concern, which distinguish them
from other such objects. Being the sorts of objects that have such features is due to the
organization of their constituents and nothing more, so that persons are reducible to the
organization of those constituents. Therefore, if arguments for the elimination from strict
ontology of composite objects, such as baseballs, tables, chariots, etc. on the basis of
those purported objects’ reducibility to their constituents succeed, then they must also
succeed in demonstrating that persons should be so eliminated.24 Therefore, the first
part of this chapter will be devoted to defusing the arguments for the elimination of
24

Most Eliminativists make an exception for living beings when arguing for the otherwise
wholesale elimination of composite objects. Furthermore, complex, though abstract objects such
as Clubs and nations may be exempt from elimination. However at this stage, such exemptions
are unnecessary because the argument against composite objects isn’t sound in the first place.
I will, however, discuss those reasons in the context of arguments against the ID thesis as well
as those in favor of Inflationism.
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composite objects in general. Those arguments generally appeal to the idea that if
composite objects exist then they are causally redundant given that the events they are
supposed to cause can be explained entirely as the effect of the composite objects’
components, and so if both constituents and composites exist, then events caused are
overdetermined. Since events are not overdetermined, composite objects must not
really exist. My rebuttal to this line of argument will appeal to the idea that persons and
other composite objects are contingently identical to the organized bodies which can
survive gradual changes in their components so long as the organization of components
is maintained, and so are not identical to any specific group of components themselves,
and therefore do not compete with their components for causal relevance. This part of
the chapter will have the added benefit of situating my account of persons within the
general contemporary metaphysical landscape of discourse.
The second part of the chapter will be devoted to assessing the ID thesis and its
relation to naturalistic Reductionism. Some of the Eliminativist arguments take the ID
thesis to be the part of Reductionism that entails the Extreme Claim. Parfit sees the ID
thesis as essential to the Reductionist position, but thinks it is compatible with our
forensic judgments about persons. I will argue that the ID thesis is not essential to
Reductionism after all, for the considerations against it do not conflict with the general
naturalistic worldview that otherwise favors Reductionism. A Reductionist need not
endorse the ID thesis and therefore need not worry about its entailing the Extreme
Claim. Like some other composites, such as clubs and nations, there are facts that
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cannot be stated without using the word ‘person’ but that is not because persons are
something distinct from or independent of their constituents and the relations among
those constituents. They’re distinct from mere collections of constituents, but not from
constituents so related or organized as to yield a being with the capacities for selfconsciousness and concern. The nature of the constituents and their relations may only
be describable given the assumption that they are constituents of a person, therefore
some reference to the person as owner of the constituents and author of some of her
actions may be required, but that doesn’t make the person something over and above
the constituents in a sense that would conflict with naturalistic Reductionism.
In the third section I will consider reasons that Inflationists have for thinking
persons irreducible. The reasons depend on the assumption that persons are or require
for their existence irreducible souls, or else have irreducible properties and powers,
namely indeterministic free will or “top down” causal powers. It is no surprise, given my
endorsement of Reductionism, that I reject the Inflationist’s conception of persons as
having such irreducible features. However, some Eliminativists have argued, on the
grounds of such rejection, that Reductionism necessarily slides into Eliminativism,
because if persons are beings capable of being responsible for their actions, then they
must have the features that the Inflationists insist they have. If no being has such
features, the Eliminativist argues, then no being is capable of responsibility and
therefore, no being is a person, i.e. that the Extreme Claim is true. I will endeavor to
demonstrate that contrary to the argument just sketched, Reductionism about persons
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does not entail the Extreme Claim, and therefore, does not slide into Eliminativism.
Persons either need not have all the sorts of features Inflationists require of them, and
the features they do require, namely responsibility, are compatible with their reducibility.
Schechtman (2014) understands the Extreme Claim in terms of a difference of
opinion between Locke’s view and later Reductionist neo-Lockean psychological
continuity theories such as Parfit’s concerning whether or not a person can be a
‘forensic unit,’ “a kind of entity that can sometimes be rightly rewarded or punished for
its actions.”25 (Schechtman 2014, 15) According to Schechtman, Reductionist views,
such as Parfit’s depart from Locke’s view in denying that a person is a forensic unit,
though they still want to hold that judgments of responsibility can be rationally made of
persons reductively construed. She claims, and reads Locke as suggesting, that
individual judgments about responsibility and like concerns depend upon the
existence of a more basic forensic unit for their legitimacy. Reductionist
psychological theories do away with any kind of meaningful forensic unit, and so
cannot provide that legitimacy. Relations that would justify the ascription of moral
responsibility if they held within a forensic unit are not by themselves enough for
such an ascription if the existence of such a unit is not presupposed.
(Schechtman 2014, 35)
Parfit sometimes seems to think judgments of responsibility do not require
forensic units, i.e. judgements of responsibility can be made about individual actions or
mental states in the absence of there being someone who performs those actions or
possesses those states. However, a Reductionist need not reject the notion of persons
as forensic units. Units in general admit of analysis into smaller units and their relations.
25

Schechtman’s distinction between person as forensic unit and person as moral self will be
discussed in the next chapter.
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The kinds of relations Schechtman is concerned cannot ground responsibility without
being part of or ‘within’ a forensic unit are the ones usually emphasized by Reductionist
accounts of persons, i.e. memories, beliefs, desires, and values, but the point may
apply just as well to my view, which takes the maintenance of the capacities for selfconsciousness and concern to be necessary and sufficient for responsibility. Those
capacities are capacities of persons, beings that persist over time, and who therefore
can be responsible for actions performed in their pasts.
While I agree that a forensic unit is required to make judgments of responsibility,
I don’t think that the existence of such an object is incompatible with Reductionism.
Insistence on such incompatibilism requires that Reductionism entail the Extreme
Claim, or otherwise collapse into Eliminativism concerning persons as forensic units. I
will argue that Reductionism does not in fact entail the Extreme Claim nor need it
collapse into Eliminativism for any other reason. I hold that there is a conception of
responsibility that is compatible with Reductionism. This conception of responsibility
does not support all of our pre-reflective attitudes about praise, blame, revenge, and
punishment, but it does account for and justify our sense of ourselves as purposive
agents who, at least sometimes, act because of reasons that we are able to reflect on,
and therefore can be responsible for some of those actions.
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II.

Eliminativism and Composite Objects
One reason why someone might think that Reductionism rules out the existence

of persons as forensic units is prior commitment to a general Eliminativism about
composite objects, i.e. objects that are not indivisible simples, but are composed of
parts (which may or may not themselves be indivisible simples.) If one holds such a
commitment, then it would follow that there are no persons that are “units,” forensic or
not, unless persons are indivisible simples or are not fully analyzable into relatively
simpler components, which would go against the claims of Reductionism.
Merricks (2001) defends the general Eliminativist stance regarding composite
objects. His main argument in favor of it can be reconstructed as follows: If baseballs,
for example, are composed of particles-arranged-baseball-wise, then every baseball is
co-located with the simple particles which, so arranged, compose it. But then, when
some event one would normally call 'a baseball breaking a window,' occurs, that event
would be causally overdetermined by, on the one hand, the baseball, and on the other,
the particles so arranged. However, events cannot be causally overdetermined.
Therefore, if the particles-arranged-baseball-wise broke the window, then the baseball
could not also have broken it. Merricks calls the argument for this last claim, the
“Overdetermination Argument,” which he states as follows:
The baseball--if it exists--is causally irrelevant to whether its constituent atoms,
acting in concert, cause the shattering of the window. (2) The shattering of the
window is caused by those atoms, acting in concert. (3) The shattering of the
window is not overdetermined. Therefore, (4) If the baseball exists, it does not
cause the shattering of the window. (Merricks 2001, 56)
162

Generalized, this argument is meant to show that baseballs do not cause any
events at all, because every event they are purported to cause can be wholly causally
accounted for by the action of particles-arranged-baseball-wise. And since “every
macrophysical object causes something,” Merricks (2001, 82), concludes, baseballs
must not really exist. Baseballs are “causally irrelevant” to the breaking of the window or
anything else, and only causally relevant objects truly exist. To speak of baseballs as
existing alongside the particles that compose them would be metaphysically redundant.
The term ‘baseball’ or ‘apple’ might be useful as a shorthand for ‘particles-arrangedbaseball-wise’ or ‘particles-arranged-apple-wise,’ respectively, but strictly speaking, or
“in the philosophy room,” as another Eliminativist about most composite objects, Van
Inwagen, puts it (borrowing the phrase from David Lewis), “‘There are apples’... may
well express a proposition whose falsity is consistent with the truth of the proposition
expressed by typical utterances of ‘There are apples on the sideboard if you want one,’”
(Van Inwagen 1993, 178) where that latter sentence is shorthand for the proposition that
in the philosophy room one would most accurately express as “There are particles
arranged apple-wise on the particles arranged sideboard-wise.”
This line of reasoning seems absurd, especially if one is familiar with Gilbert
Ryle’s (1949) notion of the ‘category mistake.’ One makes a category mistake,
according to Ryle, when one takes objects of two different ‘logical categories’ and treats
them as if they are of the same logical category by counting them as separate items in a
group or on a list. For example, one commits a category mistake when one counts a left
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hand glove, a right hand glove, and the pair comprised by the two gloves as 3 distinct
objects. A pair of gloves, after all, is just a left hand glove and a right hand glove.
Similarly, it seems intuitively obvious that a baseball is just particles arranged baseballwise. One may invoke the relation of identity to explain away the seeming redundancy:
a baseball is identical to a bunch of particles arranged baseball-wise, and therefore
whatever the particles do, the baseball does, but these are not distinct doings, because
there aren’t distinct things doing them. This would be akin to the move made by Kim
(1998), who, when discussing the mind-body problem, first invoked worries about
causal redundancy, but thought such concerns could be assuaged if one were to
embrace the Reductive Materialist claim of mind-body identity.
However, the Eliminativist about composite objects rejects such identity claims
on the grounds that supposed baseballs would have different persistence conditions
from the particles that are arranged baseball-wise. For instance, baseballs, if they exist,
constantly lose small portions of their particles, but in such a way that the baseball’s
persistence and window-breaking powers appear unaffected. Furthermore, a baseball, if
one were to exist, could be destroyed without destroying the particles that, when
suitably arranged, composed it. Therefore, baseballs cannot be identical to any
particular bunch of particles, because they do not have the same persistence
conditions.
Before I explain what’s wrong with the above line of reasoning, I should point out
that neither Merricks, nor Van Inwagen, actually extend their Eliminativist arguments to
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the case of persons (in Van Inwagen’s case, insofar as persons are organisms they
survive the culling). Rather, they offer reasons for excluding persons, along with other
complex organisms from the wholesale elimination of composite objects, thereby
embracing them in their ‘sparse ontology’.26 For Merricks, persons evade the
Overdetermination Argument because they, being identical with human organisms (at
least paradigmatically), have causal properties that cannot be fully analyzed in terms of
the causal properties of their parts. “For material objects,” he writes,
to be is to have non-redundant causal powers…. Human organisms have nonredundant causal powers or exercise downward causal control over their parts.
This deep, fundamental difference between the powers of human organisms and
the powers of alleged baseballs (and statues and rocks and so on) makes all the
difference with respect to the Overdetermination Argument. (Merricks 2001, 11516)
I will not go into the details of the argument for the claim that humans have nonredundant causal powers at this point, because to assert the claim in question is to
abandon Reductionism about persons, and my purpose here is to explore the
implications of endorsing Reductionism. An Inflationist might claim that in order to be
suitable targets for judgments of responsibility, persons must be capable of exerting
such “downward causal control” over their parts in a way that is inconsistent with
Reductionism. I will argue against this claim later on. For one thing, other sorts of things
such as clubs, nations, and even some machines of human invention can exert a kind of
downward causal control. A club can dismiss a member, a nation can send some of its

26

A term employed (though not invented) by Schechtman 2014 (176) to describe the ontology of
Van Inwagen and also Eric Olson.
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people to war, a computer can turn itself off after a period of disuse. However, there
does not seem to be any good reason to think that the actions of these things are not
explicable in terms of the actions of some of their constituents (majority vote, executive
branch, energy saving protocol, respectively). So Merricks must have something else in
mind when he talks of persons and animals, likely something which a naturalist, and
therefore Reductionist, about persons should claim is not required for personhood.
However it takes no appeal to special causal powers to defend ordinary, nonliving, composite objects from the Overdetermination Argument. One strategy for doing
so has been developed by Thomasson (2007), in the spirit of Ryle, which provides a
clearer definition of what counts as a logical category by explaining that objects of
different logical categories bear relations of ‘analytic entailment’ to one another. She
uses the expression ‘analytically entail’
to mean ‘entail in virtue of the meanings of the expressions involved and rules of
inference’, so that a sentence (or set of sentences) φ analytically entails a
sentence Ψ just in case, given only logical principles and the meanings of the
terms involved, the truth of φ guarantees the truth of Ψ. Thus where φ
analytically entails Ψ, given knowledge of the truth of φ, as well as grasp of the
meanings of the terms and reasoning abilities, a competent speaker may
legitimately infer the truth of Ψ on that basis alone. (Thomasson 2007, 16)
Thomasson then employs this analysis to explain away problems of causal and
ontological overdetermination. According to her, if claims about particles arranged
baseball-wise causing windows to shatter analytically entail statements about baseballs
causing windows to shatter, it “does not require more of the world” or “any extra causal
action” (Thomasson 2007, 16) to make both of the two statements true than it does to
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make either one true individually. Therefore, there is no overdetermination, “no doubling
or competition between the claims” (Thomasson 2007, 16). Claims of existence, on her
view, “are to be resolved by determining whether the applications [for the sort of thing in
question] are fulfilled, and that conditions for those ordinary terms are established by
ordinary, competent speakers.” (Thomasson 2011, 157) In the case of baseballs, the
application conditions are that particles have been assembled by an artisan according
to the official standards of professional baseball in such a shape that they are
collectively capable of being thrown, hit, and caught in the ways required for playing a
game of baseball. That is just what it is, analytically, to be a baseball and “if the serious
ontologist disregards the application conditions standardly accepted by competent
speakers in favor of higher metaphysical conditions, then her denial that these
conditions are met tells us nothing about whether or not there are any [baseballs], for if
she shifts the application conditions she shifts the terms of discourse and is not denying
the existence of our familiar [baseballs].” (Thomasson 2007, 157) A ‘baseball’ that has
causal powers beyond those of the particles that compose it, would not be a baseball at
all, but some kind of super-baseball. To borrow a term from Paul Edwards (1949),
demanding that an object meets such a condition in order to exist is to “highly redefine”
the term ‘object,’ to add necessary conditions to its application that are not part of the
ordinary meaning of the term.
However, this strategy for rejecting Eliminativism carries with it the cumbersome
baggage associated with the notion of analyticity and so may be objectionable to many
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philosophers influenced by Quine (1951). Furthermore, as stressed by Bennett (2009),
Thomasson’s view makes the identification of the components and object composed too
strong, i.e. necessary, whereas one might wish to allow for possible worlds where
particles arranged baseball-wise would not yield baseballs. Finally, her view does not
adequately address the problem of identifying a composite object with a collection of
constituents that changes over time.
The strategy for countering the Overdetermination Argument which I prefer
requires claiming only contingent identities between composite objects and the
arrangements of objects that compose them. In arguing for such an identity, one need
only show that the Eliminativist’s reasons for rejecting the identity between, e.g.
baseballs and particles arranged baseball-wise are unfounded. To begin with, notice the
second reason above for rejecting the identity of composite objects with their parts.
There the problem was that all the same parts could remain in existence, though the
composite be destroyed. However, this possibility betrays the fact that it is not the parts
themselves that matter for the identity of the object, but rather the way they are
organized or arranged. As discussed in chapter 2, Locke’s account of the persistence of
organized, composite objects over time does not appeal sameness of parts, but rather
their organization or arrangement. Similarly, baseballs are not identical to the particles
which are arranged in such and such a way, but the arrangement of particles, which
may include some particles at some times and different ones at others. What makes it
the same arrangement, and hence the same baseball, is the maintenance of the
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capacities constitutive of baseballs, just as maintenance of the capacities constitutive of
persons is what accounts for an individual person’s persistence over time.
Goldwater (2014b)27 argues along these same lines that both sides of the debate
over composite objects have mistakenly identified those objects with the “mereological”
sum of their parts, whereas it is not the sum, but the arrangement of those parts which
matters. He asks the reader to consider the following question: “if tablewise
arrangements play the role of tables in perception and discourse, whereas composites
of simples do not, might this suggest the table just is the tablewise arrangement, rather
than the composite?” (Goldwater 2014b, 3) And he concludes:
My answer is yes. That is, I argue that a table just is a tablewise arrangement,
and a chair just is a chair-wise arrangement. More generally, I argue that all
ordinary material objects (the inanimate ones, at least) just are arrangements (of
simples, most likely). Correlatively, I deny that ordinary objects are composites of
simples (in the way the nihilist and universalist conceive of them); instead, they
have a different nature.
Moreover, an existence claim is not far behind. For if there are tablewise
arrangements, and tablewise arrangements are identical to tables, then there are
tables. Thus, by showing (or reaffirming) there are such arrangements, I defend
the existence of ordinary objects- whatever the fate of mereological sums.
(Goldwater 2014b, 3)
So if what I have so far been calling composite objects are not merely sums of
parts, but arrangements of them, and the Elminativists (or ‘nihilists’, as Goldwater calls
them) admits that there are such arrangements, then it turns out that they believe in socalled composite objects after all. As Goldwater understands it, arrangements are
multigrade relations “expressible by variably polyadic predicates such as ‘arranged
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Goldwater, also has his own analysis of the notion of logical category (Goldwater 2014a)
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tablewise’” or else by “other linguistic forms such as names,” (Goldwater 2014b, 10)
though some nominalists might wish to resist such an option. Similarly, Goldwater
assumes there can be both tokens and types of arrangements, though the latter may
reek offensively of Platonism to some noses. In general, nominalist convictions might
lead some philosophers to scoff and the introduction of one class of objectionable
ontological entities in exchange for an abandoned other. I will not address such
concerns here except to reiterate that as Goldwater contends, the defender of
arrangements need not suppose any ontological claims that have not already been
assented to by the Eliminativists, who agree that there are particles arranged in such
and such a way.28
As I see it, arrangements should not be understood as existing independently of
particles that are so arranged. However, arrangements of particles, like composite
objects as ordinarily conceived, admit of changes in the actual particles so arranged, so
is there is no trouble identifying the arrangements with the objects. Furthermore, the
28

He does also offer the following argument against a “nihilist-cum-nominalist”, i.e. one
who believes in simples arranged table-wise, but not in tables as arrangements: “consider
specifically a mereological nihilist-cum-nominalist account. On this view, there are simples
arranged tablewise, but there are no tables, and no tablewise arrangements either (‘arranged
tablewise’ being a predicate applicable without incurring its own commitment to tablewise
arrangements). One consequence of this view is that a person (assuming one exists) cannot
perceive a table- since a table does not exist to be perceived (obviously, I’m taking ‘perceive’ to
be factive here). So what does the person perceive? It can’t be the tablewise arrangement,
since that doesn’t exist either on the nihilist-cum-nominalist view. The only remaining answer,
then, is that it is the simples which are perceived. But simples can’t be perceived- they’re too
small. Tablewise arrangements, however, are perceptible (and they’re just the right size and
shape). So even the mereological nihilist – i.e. she who denies there are composite objects
such as tables – should at least accept the tablewise arrangement. Or else it is hard to see just
what someone is seeing when they look at an alleged table.” (Goldwater 2014b, 15)
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causal efficacy of objects such as baseballs, should not be attributed to the
mereological sums of particles, but to the arrangements they participate in. A bunch of
atoms cannot break a window unless they are appropriately arranged. It is the
arrangement, i.e. the baseball, that does the breaking. As Goldwater puts it: “scattered
atoms do not have the same causal powers that those same atoms would have if
arranged more densely. As the only difference between these scenarios is their
arrangement, the difference in causal power is attributable to that arrangement.”
(Goldwater 2014b, 13) So the baseball does have causal powers that its parts don’t
have after all. But that doesn’t mean the baseball isn’t fully reducible. It is nothing over
and above its parts and the relations between them, specifically those relations, or that
single multigrade relation, which is their table-wise arrangement.
The identification of composite objects with arrangements shows the way toward
diagnosing second major error in Merricks’ Overdetermination Argument.29 (The first
error was thinking that composite objects are supposed to be identified with some
specific group of particles) That argument depended on the idea that if, e.g. baseballs,
exist, then both they and their parts arranged baseball-wise have the power to break
windows. However, there is sleight of hand concealed in the power attributed to the
particles. The particles are on a lower level of explanation than is the window. The
window is on the level of the baseball. If baseballs don’t exist, then neither do windows,

29

This argument is also effective at defusing the related Eliminativist argument from co-location
involving, e.g., statues and clay. The statue is not to be identified with the lump of clay, but with
the clay arranged in a statue-shape.
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so if Merricks is right, then nothing has the power to break windows, particles nor
baseballs. He should have said that the particles arranged baseball-wise have the
power to scatter the particles arranged window-wise. But if he had said that then there
would be no redundancy - baseballs break windows, particles arranged baseball-wise
scatter particles arranged window-wise. Or given identification of composite objects with
arrangements, the situation can be stated more accurately as follows: baseball-wise
arrangements of particles, i.e. baseballs, destroy window-wise arrangements of
particles, i.e. windows.
One potential problem for identifying composite objects with arrangements lies in
the individuation and persistence of arrangement tokens. What makes one table-wise
arrangement distinct from another, assuming that tables can be moved from one spatial
location to another, and even dismantled and reassembled? Goldwater himself declines
to make any claims about the persistence or individuation conditions of arrangements in
general, which, I think, is just as well, because there probably are none except that
whatever capacities are constitutive of that sort of arrangement function separately
(individuation) and are maintained (persistence). One must attend to the particular
characteristic properties of each arrangement, if not arrangement type, to know what
counts as separately functioning, and what sorts of changes the arrangement can
persist through. Living, organic beings do not seem capable of surviving certain kinds of
dismantling. In the case of human persons, dismantling of the brain or disconnecting it
from natural or artificial life support is sufficiently disruptive to the capacities for self172

consciousness and concern as to entail annihilation, though an android person could
potentially be more resilient, should the parts of the android brain have such properties
that if they were reassembled would allow the android to resume the use of its personconstituting capacities. In the case of a human brain, disassembly does not yield parts
that have such properties.

III.

Parfit and the ID thesis
Parfit (1984) argues for a kind of Reductionist position, influenced by Hume and

the Buddhist tradition, that he calls the “bundle theory” of persons or “constitutive
reductionism”, which holds that persons are nothing more than series of bundles of
constituent psychophysical states. These constituents change from moments to
moment, so that each bundle has only a temporary existence. These bundles are strung
together from moment to moment by the relations of psychological continuity and
connectedness. Parfit contrasts the bundle theory primarily with the Inflationist “ego
theory”, the view that there is a persisting, perhaps immortally so, ‘self’, ‘soul’ or ‘ego’
which is separate from the fleeting psychophysical elements of which a person’s mindbody are composed and which thereby accounts for a person’s continued existence
over time despite the transience of the psychophysical elements.
Setting aside for the moment the specifics of Parfit’s account of personal identity
(which I have already largely disagreed with in the previous chapter), Parfit sums up the
most general form of the Reductionist position with regard to personal identity in the
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following two claims:
(1) that the fact of a person’s identity over time just consists in the holding of
certain more particular facts…
(2) that these facts can be described without either presupposing the identity of
this person, or explicitly claiming that the experiences of this person’s life are had
by this person, or even explicitly claiming that this person exists. These facts can
be described in an impersonal way. (Parfit 1984, 210)
The second claim is often referred to as the Impersonal Description (ID) thesis,
which holds that all the facts about persons can be otherwise stated, without remainder,
in an impersonal language, one that does not refer to persons or their identity. This
claim is roughly equivalent to the Buddhist view that persons (among most, sometimes
all, other things) have a merely “conventional” existence. This “Buddhist Reductionism”
rests on a distinction in Buddhist philosophy between what is ‘ultimately real’ versus
what is merely ‘conventionally real’, i.e. between what is real independently of the
perspectives, purposes and concerns of persons and what is only real relative to those
perspectives, purposes and concerns, insofar as marking something out as significant
and distinct from other things has some utility for the purposes of survival, experience,
communication, discourse, etc.30 According to Buddhist Reductionism, as Siderits
(2003) calls it, persons, like other composite objects are not ultimately real, because
what is conventionally referred to as a person is only a series of distinct, momentary
collections of psychophysical elements. Nevertheless, persons are real in the
conventional sense, because grouping some such momentary psychophysical elements
30

Though Carpenter (2014) argues that the Buddha’s teaching should be interpreted as saying
that any positive view about the nature of persons or selves should be avoided because it is the
source of ego-clinging and therefore, suffering.
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into collections and those collections together into some temporally extended series
rather than others has a certain utility. This utility is grounded synchronically in the
spatiotemporal contiguity between the (physical) elements and diachronically in the
causal connections that obtain between the momentary collections of elements.
Buddhist Reductionism is, therefore, meant to be generally Reductionist, not
Eliminitavist.
The distinction between Reductionism, Non-reductionism and Eliminativism is
illustrated in the Buddhist literature through the example of the chariot. As Siderits
explains it:
...’chariot is a convenient designator for a set of parts assembled in a certain
way. Thus while there are ultimately no chariots, there are those wholly ‘imchariotal’ facts into which all chariot-talk may be reductively analyzed; it is these
facts that explain the utility of our talk of the fiction… Given this utility we may say
that while the chariot is ultimately unreal, it is conventionally real. This will be the
reductionist view of chariots. The non-reductionist will claim that chariots are both
conventionally and ultimately real -- that in addition to the parts of which chariots
are composed, ultimate reality also contains some sort of separately existing
chariot-essence. And the eliminativist will claim that chariots are both ultimately
and conventionally unreal -- that our talk of chariots is misleading and should be
replaced by some entirely new way of conceptualizing collections of chariot parts.
(Siderits 2003, 7)
Similarly, persons, are seen by the Buddhist Reductionist as conceptual
constructions that are only conventionally, not ultimately real. This is the Buddha’s selfdescribed ‘middle path’, developed by the Abidharma schools, between the Eternalism
of the non-reductionist Nyaya and Samkhya schools, who believe in a transcendent self,
called, respectively, atman and perusha, and the annihilationism of the Eliminativists, for
whom the denial of an eternally and separately existing self entails “that the person
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goes out of existence after a relatively brief duration.” (Siderits 2003, 13)31 So if one
adopts the ID thesis, then like the Buddhists, one may use the term person as a
“convenient designator” or a bit of time saving shorthand, but there would be no facts
about persons that cannot be expressed as facts about their constituents.
Parfit contrasts his Reductionism with non-Reductionism (what I call Inflationism),
which comes in two major forms that agree in their denial of the two Reductionist claims
stated above, though for different reasons. The first form of Inflationism holds that “A
person is a separately existing entity, distinct from his brain and body, and his
experiences,” either “a purely mental entity: a Cartesian Pure Ego, or spiritual
substance” or “a separately existing physical entity, of a kind that is not yet recognized
in the theories of contemporary physics.” (Parfit 1987, 210) I reject this form of
Inflationism about identity/survival for the same reasons I objected to it as an account of
personhood in chapter one. If the separately existing ego is a non-physical entity and
hence unobservable and unexplainable by observable processes then making its
existence a necessary condition of personhood would violate the present study’s
commitment to naturalism and if the ego is supposed to be a separately existing
physical entity, then there is so far no empirical evidence that such a thing exists.
Furthermore, if the ego is independent of and distinct from any particular
psychophysical functions, then its continued existence would not guarantee the
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This sort of Eliminativism, of course, only rules out persons as diachronic, not instantaneous
beings. However, instantaneous persons could never be responsible for actions performed in
the past and so considering them persons would be of no utility.
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continuance of any of the features relevant to personhood, i.e. self-consciousness and
concern.
The second form of Inflationism is the so-called “further-fact” view, which Parfit
states as follows: “though we are not separately existing entities, personal identity is a
further fact” beyond any enumerable impersonally construable psychophysical facts.
(Parfit 1987, 210) This view can be interpreted as a genuine ontological thesis or else
as a merely linguistic one. The former amounts to the claim that facts about persons
cannot be fully analyzed into concatenations of psychophysical facts. The latter,
linguistic, reading of the further-fact view, is simply a rejection of the ID thesis, not of
Parfit’s first Reductionist claim, insisting that facts about persons are not fully
translatable into an impersonal language. In other words, the linguistic version of the
further fact view holds only that we can’t say everything true about persons without
using the word ‘person’. The ontological interpretation of the claim is anathema to
naturalistic Reductionism, for it would imply a disunity between personal and
subpersonal levels of explanation. If facts about persons are something more than
concatenations of psychophysical facts, so that no good explanation can in principle be
given of how the personal facts arise from the subpersonal facts (including physical,
chemical, biological, and psychological facts, etc.), then there is a genuine gap in the
scientific worldview. However, interpreted linguistically, the further-fact view by itself
poses no such threat. This is because there are some reasons why we cannot do
without the term ‘person’ that do not imply a disunity between explanatory levels.
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Sorabji (2006) attacks the ID thesis, arguing that the ownership and authorship of
one’s mental states and actions constitute facts about persons that cannot be fully
described by referring to non-personal elements. In other words, Sorabji takes the facts
about ownership and authorship to be what are left out if one uses only impersonal
language, and he thinks that Parfit concedes this in a 1999 paper where the latter
revisits the Reductionist position. “The idea that thoughts, acts, or experiences are had
by, or performed by, something...” (Sorabji 2006, 266) is not something that can be
rephrased in purely impersonal terms. Therefore, “ownership, which is part of the
concept of a person, is no longer included as something deducible. This seems to be a
weaker form of reductionism, [than Parfit’s earlier view] in that the account is not of a
person, but only of a person’s components. And it might be added that the components
themselves are under-described, in that it is omitted that the mental processes and
events are owned.” (Sorabji 2006, 266) However, for Parfit, elimination of facts about
ownership is not elimination of anything of great importance. The difference between
the personal and impersonal schemes
...is not metaphysically deep… is in part merely grammatical. In our [personal]
scheme, all thoughts, experiences, and acts are claimed to be had by or done by
either some persisting body or embodied brain, or some distinct entity that has
this body and brain. In my imagined scheme, these thoughts, experiences, and
acts might instead be claimed to occur in this persisting body or embodied
brain… I do not see the importance of this distinction…. my imagined beings…
would be missing certain truths, since it is true that all thoughts have thinkers,
and that all experiences have subjects. But this is like the truth that, for every
continuous flowing of water in a certain pattern, there is a river which does the
flowing. And that truth does not have to be understood in any adequate
understanding of such flowings of water. The same may apply to the truth that,
for every stream of thoughts or experiences, there is an entity that thinks these
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thoughts and has these experiences. This metaphysical scheme… is no worse
than ours. (Parfit 1999, 260-62)
Parfit takes the facts about ownership to be irreducible but trivial, apparently in
the sense that our forensic and ethical practices do not depend on them. Sorabji
disagrees, and attempts to show that various everyday statements of great importance
about persons are inexpressible without referring to persons. Most of Sorabji’s
arguments, however, target Parfit’s own specific variety of Reductionism, and which
appeals to streams of consciousness formed from links between atomistic mental
states. Such an appeal, Parfit believes, allows him to say, in contrast to the ‘hyperreductive’ views of Williams (1970), Thomson, and Nagel (1986), that persons are
logically distinct from their bodies or brains (such that they could persist in different
bodies or brains over time) though they are not separately existing entities. (Parfit 1999,
218) This prevents Parfit from saying that the body or brain is the subject of
experiences. Instead, Parfit wants to say, along with his imagined Reductionist beings,
that experiences occur “in some persisting body…” without the body “or any other
entity...” being “the subject of these experiences, the thinker of these thoughts, or the
agent of these acts.” (Parfit 1999, 228) Thoughts and decisions, under this impersonal
conceptual scheme are mere co-located happenings, not acts or properties of
individuals, so that no reference to the individuals that have them is needed in order to
describe such ‘happenings’. That there are facts about individuals who have such
thoughts and make such decisions, is, for Parfit, true, but trivial. None of our usual
practices concerning persons depend on them.
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I think Parfit is wrong here on all counts. The facts of ownership are reducible,
they are not trivial, yet they cannot be described impersonally. To begin with the latter
two points, Sorabji offers persuasive reasons why Parfit’s version of Reductionism, by
eliminating facts about ownership, cannot do justice to crucial aspects of agency and
ethics. Most relevant to the current study are his arguments to the effect that judgments
of responsibility, and the attendant practices of praising and blaming, are inexpressible
or incoherent if we are restricted to an impersonal language. He says:
First, what about deserving credit or blame? We are not now being allowed,
except as a way of talking, to think of a person as deserving credit or blame.
Rather it would be the act that deserved credit or blame, and the resulting
stream. But this would have to be in the different sense that it would be more
admirable, or less so, just a sunset may be admirable, without anybody
deserving credit or blame… Could we... substitute for the idea of deserving
punishment the idea of using punishment to deter? Deterrence would be difficult
to effect if, in the absence of owners, there is no one who would suffer from
deterrent measures, and no one who would benefit from their being applied.
(Sorabji 2006, 275)
Sorabji is right that actions, experiences, and streams of consciousness cannot
be responsible for themselves. However, as I argued in chapter two, the relations of
psychological continuity and connectedness that form Parfit’s streams of consciousness
are not the best candidates for what constitutes persons and their persistence over
time. Rather, endorsing the alternative view I have developed, which sees persons as
persisting due to the maintenance of the capacities constitutive of personhood, allows
one to reduce facts about persons to facts about the things which are organized in such
a way that they instantiate the capacities. According to this view the person is identified
not with a stream of consciousness or series of psychological events, nor with any
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particular brain or body, but with whatever arrangement of components continues to
maintain uninterrupted instantiations of the constitutive capacities. Some fact about a
person at a time can then be reduced to some fact about whatever parts of the person
are currently instantiating the relevant capacities, usually the brain and central nervous
system, which can in turn be reduced to the organization of neurons or other elements.
However, reference to the psychophysical constituents of a person presupposes
reference to the person herself. After all, we describe their organization by saying they
are arranged person-wise. Alternatively, we might say that they are arranged in such a
way that they instantiate the capacities of self-consciousness and concern, but
psychological capacities are necessarily capacities of beings who have them. They
don’t exist independently of those beings like Platonic Forms, but are immanent to
them, like Aristotelian formal properties. An individual capacity for self-consciousness or
concern must be the capacity of some individual. If an individual possesses both such
capacities then that individual is a person. So long as those capacities are maintained
uninterruptedly, it is the same person who has them the whole time.
The crucial point here is that capacities don’t float around by themselves but are
what they are, in part because they are owned. This is analogous to a club or a nation.
A member of a club is only a member is we presuppose that there is a club. However,
that doesn’t mean that the club is not reducible into its members and the relations
between them. The same goes for a nation and its citizens. If, as Parfit supposes,
persons are like clubs or nations, then it is no surprise that certain facts about them
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cannot be described impersonally, even though they are fully reducible. Of course
nations don’t own their citizens in the usual sense of property but in a looser sense of
‘own’ which just implies having them as constituents and that their identity as citizens is
dependent on them being constituents of the nation. If one prefers, ‘bearers’ could be
substituted for ‘owners’. In any case, components of an organized whole, whether
concrete parts or abstract properties are what they are at least partially in virtue of
belonging to that organization. A heart is not a heart unless it’s pumping blood through a
body. A capacity for brittleness depends on there being an object that is easily
shattered. However, the conceptual priority of the organization does not imply its
irreducibility.
Organized entities with the capacity for self-consciousness and concern can be
responsible for their actions and are the appropriate objects of praise and blame. They
can be reduced to their components, but the components themselves cannot be held
responsible, so that responsibility is an emergent property of organized beings. But that
doesn’t mean that persons are irreducible to their components, nor that facts about
ownership cannot be reduced to facts about the relations between components. My
actions belong to me as the author of them because they are performed by my brain
and body, which are mine because they are, perhaps only temporary, components of
me. They are indescribable in isolation from their role as components of me, but that
doesn’t make me something over and above them in the inflationist sense.
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IV.

Shifting Coalitions and the Extreme Claim
The version of Reductionism I endorse asserts only the first of Parfit’s two

theses, which was the following:
(1) that the fact of a person’s identity over time just consists in the holding of
certain more particular fact.
For my purposes it will help to broaden and sharpen that claim - broadening it to
include all facts about persons, not just those about identity (with which I would expect
Parfit to be in agreement); and sharpening it by specifying just what more particular
facts, the facts about persons consist in. For the latter, I have already explained that
facts about persons consist of facts about the organization or arrangement of
psychophysical constituents, such that they instantiate and maintain the capacities for
self-consciousness and concern.
Inflationists, on the other hand, besides denying the ID thesis, insist that there is
more to persons than the above. Persons possess properties or powers that are not
fully explicable in terms of the organization of their components and without which they
would not be the sorts of beings that are responsible for any of their actions. In other
words, the Inflationists hold that Reductionism about persons, of the sort I have
endorsed, implies the Extreme Claim as regards responsibility and hence slides into
Eliminativism. If Reductionism is true of all the beings we ordinarily call persons, then
the Inflationist claims, those beings are not actually persons, since they are incapable of
being responsible for their actions.
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I have already given reasons for rejecting the sort of inflationism that rests on the
claim that the existence of persons depends on some element that is distinct and
independent from any of the person’s psychophysical constituents. Presently I will only
consider that version of Inflationism which appeals only to “further facts” about persons
in the genuinely metaphysical sense above distinguished from the merely linguistic
sense.
Why there should be irreducible facts in the absence of an irreducible soul or ego
is a mystery to me, but it is just this mysteriousness that is the core of the further fact
view, according to which persons are possessed of properties and powers whose
underlying causes no scientific investigation will ever reveal, because there are no such
causes. This view goes hand in hand with libertarian views about free will, which hold
that persons are capable of initiating actions that are not completely determined by
previous events. I have already rejected such a capacity in chapter one as a necessary
condition of personhood because it is in conflict with a commitment to naturalism.
However, proponents of libertarian free will claim that it is necessary for responsibility
and therefore personhood, so to reject it would entail the Extreme Claim. In response I
have offered a compatibilist conception of responsibility following Frankfurt. Still, there
are some objections to the idea that a coherent account of responsibility can be built
upon Reductionist premises, so that Reductionism will entail the Extreme Claim after all.
One such objection that I find worthy of defusing is addressed by Siderits (2003)
as part of his general defense of Buddhist Reductionism, though this particular
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argument is threatening to any Reductionist, even one who does not accept the
Buddhist variety with its claim that person is a mere conventional designation.
Siderits is concerned to show how persons could be capable of self-scrutiny, selfcontrol and self-revision (examples of the kind of downward causal powers appealed to
by Inflationists) without violating what he calls the “anti-reflexivity” principle which states
that “an entity cannot operate on itself.” (Siderits 2003, 27) Self-scrutiny, in particular, is
the sort of Frankfurtian higher-order judgment of one’s beliefs and desires which
requires the capacities self-consciousness and concern, and that I argued in chapter
one, is necessary and sufficient for personhood. According to proponents of the
argument that Reductionism implies the Extreme Claim, self-scrutiny requires a
separate self as subject and chief executive with one’s particular mental states
comprising its object, because if the mental states that play the role of the subject that
scrutinizes and are ever themselves objects of scrutiny, which any state seems
potentially capable of being, then some mental states would have to serve as both
subject and object, and that would violate the anti-reflexivity principle. “For if each of
them is a potential object of the executive function, and an entity cannot operate on
itself, then it seems that none of them could be the one enduring subject that performs
this function.” (Siderits 2003, 26) This is why it seems that responsibility requires a
distinct self, something that scrutinizes all.
Siderits invokes the “shifting coalitions” conception of self-revision as
Reductionist alternative to the Inflationist’s distinct self. He rightly points out that the
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anti-reflexivity principle is only violated if the same mental states are subject and object
simultaneously. A Reductionist can endorse an account of self-scrutiny that appeals to
shifting coalitions of mental states playing the role of chief executive at different times,
such that each coalition can be the object of scrutiny at the times when it is not the
subject. According to the Reductionist, the temptation that leads to positing a distinct
self and that should be resisted is to take a particular set of mental states that play the
subject role relatively frequently and hypostatize them into an enduring subject. As
Siderits puts it: “Thus arises the notion that a person has an essence -- that some
constituents are more central to the existence of the person than others.” (Siderits 2003,
27) Holding this view would require one to deny that the set of mental states taken to be
the subject is itself subject to scrutiny. But if one has no way of revising the chief
executive, then one can’t be responsible for the way that executive scrutinizes and
potentially controls and revises one’s other mental states and behavior. Like any good
commonwealth, there need to be checks and balances on executive authority. “For
instance, when I decide to curb my bedtime snacking I may be employing a particular
standard of acceptable body shape, which I may subsequently decide is politically
problematic and morally questionable.” (Siderits 2003, 26) The Inflationist claims that
the self, being independent from the psychophysical elements, is, like an absolute
monarch, the sole source of independent valuation in a person (and may be propped up
by a conception, usually religious, of an infallible conscience or divine mandate). But if
one, for good reason (namely, that we have no evidence for such a thing and the
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concept of it may be internally incoherent in various respects) denies that such a distinct
self exists and says that the executive function is played by some mental/brain states,
those mental/brain states must also be subject to scrutiny by the rest of the person/brain
at some times. Siderits offers the shifting coalitions view as a solution to this problem:
If I am to be capable of revising [or at least scrutinizing] my own character, then I
require a stock of beliefs and desires on the basis of which I may critically
evaluate and seek to reform various of my dispositions and tendencies I am
called upon to monitor. It may now seem as if, were they to constitute a part of
the ‘I’ that performs self-revision [or scrutiny], then the anti-reflexivity principle
would be violated. But what this picture omits is the possibility that a given stock
of beliefs and desires might serve as a basis for a particular bout of self-criticism,
yet some among these stand under subsequent scrutiny on the basis of a
distinct, (though perhaps overlapping) stock of beliefs and desires… On one
occasion my anal-compulsive disposition might lead to extirpation of the desire to
smoke. Yet, subsequently a wish to be more accommodating to others might
lead to an effort to curb my anality. At one time the anal disposition belongs to
the coalition making up the ‘executive’, later it falls out of this shifting coalition.
(Siderits 2003, 65)
The shifting coalitions approach posits a kind of feedback loop between
mental/brain states, which allows one to have a sense of self-determination that
depends on nothing that is undermined by Reductionism. Each coalition that at one time
plays the role of executive can be at another time the object of a different coalition’s
scrutiny as well as control and revision. Even if the activity of each coalition is causally
determined, the fact that there are internal checks and balances and that I can’t be
aware of all the facets of my psychology at once yields a rationally tenable sense of
self-determination.32

32

Nietzsche seems to have something like this in mind in his analysis of the phenomenon of
willing: That which is termed “freedom of the will” is essentially the affect of superiority in relation
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Siderits’ view is vulnerable to an immediate objection: if Reductionism is
interpreted in a particularly strong sense. If persons are reduced to collections of
simples of minimal magnitude or reduce infinitely into elements of infinitely smaller
magnitudes (gunk), a kind of mental punctualism seems to follow. If mental states are
fleeting, momentary things, then a particular set of beliefs and desires would not have
the temporal duration required to be at one time the subject and at another time the
object of scrutiny. So for the shifting coalitions view to work, Reductionism cannot be
conceived in such a way that it implies mental punctualism or atomism. Reductionists
should not make the mistake of denying temporal extension to mental states. Beliefs
and desires must supervene on physical processes in such a way that they exist for
some duration, long enough to be both subject and object of revision. Furthermore, our
current understanding of how mental states are realized in the brain suggests that this is
the case. As Brown (2006 and 2013) argues, thoughts should be identified, not with
static configurations of neurons, but with patterns of synchronous neural firing. When
philosophers claim that mental states are identical to or supervene on brain states, the
to him who must obey… A man who wills commands something within himself that renders
obedience, or that he believes renders obedience… We are at the same time the commanding
and the obeying parties… “Freedom of the will” -- that is the expression for the complex state of
delight of the person exercising volition, who commands and at the same time identifies himself
with the executor of the order -- who, as such, enjoys also the triumph over obstacles, but thinks
within himself it was really his will itself that overcame them. In this way the person exercising
volition adds the feelings of delight of his successful executive instruments, the useful “underwills” or under-souls -- indeed, our body is but a social structure composed of many souls -- to
his feelings of delight as a commander. L’effet c’est moi. what happens here is what happens in
every well-constructed and happy commonwealth; namely, the governing class identifies itself
with the successes of the commonwealth. In all willing it is absolutely a question of commanding
and obeying, on the basis, as already said, of a social structure composed of many “souls.”
(Nietzsche 1886, I.19)
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term must, somewhat misleadingly, refer to such patterns of firing if those claims have
any chance of being true. I don’t mean to rule out the possibility that mental states can
be realized in some other way, but if we see that in the case of human beings, the
neural foundations of the mental are extended in time, then it may be less difficult to
understand how the mental states themselves could be so extended (perhaps
indefinitely).
The shifting coalitions strategy will not satisfy such thinkers as Strawson (1986)
or others who think that Reductionism undermines self-determination because it implies
causal determinism. Strawson thinks that to see oneself as self-determining, one must
think of oneself as ultimately responsible for one’s character as well as one’s actions.
Even if one’s character is formed internally by the feedback mechanism of shifting
coalitions, Strawson would argue that the way in which this system functions is
determined by factors before one’s birth. Siderits offers the following example of the
kind of self-determination an agent must be responsible for: “So my miserable childhood
resulted in a predisposition to behavior that causes trouble for myself and others?
Others tell me to stop kvetching. I agree, and set about trying to reform and improve my
character.” (Siderits 2003, 64) The shifting coalitions model shows how, for a
Reductionist, such an example of self-revision is possible. However, Strawson would
object that in such a case whether I am or am not “the sort of person” who would
respond that way to the criticism of others, or who can find the strength within myself to
push back against the forces of my upbringing, is not really up to me. In other words, it
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is still a matter of deterministic luck whether or not I have the right coalitions, with the
necessary strength to bring about a particular act of self-revision.
The shifting coalitions view allows us to accurately distinguish between two types
of phenomena, i.e. cases where one’s actions are compulsive or automatic, and ones
where one’s actions are caused by inner states that have been subjected to selfscrutiny, those which one may be responsible for. This is not the kind of full, ultimate
responsibility that Strawson is interested in. Nothing short of a genuinely transcendent
agent acting outside of the deterministic causal matrix could fit that bill. However, it is
also not the weak sort of responsibility that Siderits rightly rejects,
according to which it is enough that the action ‘come from within’ the agent,
regardless of how the agent came to have the particular beliefs, desires,
dispositions etc. from which the action flowed. But this temptation should be
resisted, since we do expect agents to take responsibility not just for their actions
but also for their own character… Being responsible for my actions means being
responsible for being the sort of person who would perform those actions. Any
account of freedom that omits this is justly criticized as too weak. (Siderits 2003,
64)
The sort of responsibility made possible by the shifting coalitions strategy is
distinguished by the recognition that actions ‘come from within’ in different ways. The
ones that result from a process of dynamic self-scrutiny are the ones that we may be
responsible for. As long as that is the only sort of responsibility required for personhood,
then Reductionism about persons need not imply the Extreme Claim as regards
responsibility, and therefore, need not slide into Eliminativism.
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Chapter Four: ‘Person’ and ‘Self’
In several places throughout the preceding chapters I have left promissory notes
regarding the term ‘self’, saying that I am reserving it for special purposes which I am
now prepared to explain. There is an ordinary use of the word ‘self’ (and related words
where it is conjoined with something else - such as ‘myself’, ‘yourself’, ‘himself’, ‘herself’
etc.) according to which the word has a merely indexical use, referring to a person.
Locke had this sort of use in mind when he says “Person, as I take it, is the name for
this self,” apparently jabbing a thumb in his own direction, and continues: “wherever a
man finds what he calls himself, there, I think, another may say is the same person.”
(Locke 1690, ii.xxvii.26) And a bit before that: “so far reaches the Identity of that Person;
it is the same Self now it was then; and tis by the same Self with this present one that
now reflects on it, that the Action was done.” (Locke 1690, ii.xxvii.25) However, there is
also a tradition of using ‘self’ to refer to something that is not identical to an entire
person, but is only part, if an essential part, of one. In this latter usage, ‘self’ is often
taken to be synonymous with ‘soul’ and understood to be a part that is separate from
any of a person’s mental and physical components, though it is also thought to account
for the identity of a person over time, in both the metaphysical (as discussed in chapter
two) and socio-psychological (which I will explain below) senses. Additionally, ‘self’ has
been thought to account for subjective experience and the unity of consciousness. So
far I have rejected accounts of personhood and personal persistence that have
appealed to an enduring, separate or distinct, self on naturalistic grounds. However, that
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does not mean that there are not good naturalistic candidates for what ‘self’ might refer
to when not referring to an entire person. Furthermore, while my account of personal
identity does not appeal to such a ‘self’, at the same time it also does not appeal to
continuity of distinctive psychological states. For that reason, people interested in
‘identity’ in what I call the socio-psychological sense, will at this point think that my view
of persons is seriously impoverished. Social psychology is largely interested in people’s
‘identities’, meaning what characteristics they take to be most central to their own sense
of the sorts of persons that they are. Social psychological theories of identity, appeal to
individuals’ perception of their own personhood, how they feel about their bodies, their
membership in social groups, their relations with other individuals, the music, television
shows and other art and media they enjoy, their moral codes, and their styles of dress,
among many other factors that contribute to how these individuals self-identify. For this
reason, this conception of identity, or what I will call ‘the self,’ as opposed to ‘the
person,’ is a fundamentally subjectively constituted sort of thing. It is constituted by the
ways in which individuals are aware or at least think they are aware of the persons they
are. I don’t mean to suggest that such identities are formed in isolation from other
people. Our selves can be partially or even largely socially constituted in the sense of
‘social’ distinguished by Greenwood (1994): that we hold them because we believe they
are held by members of the social groups to which we belong, as well as the broader
sense of the term, which it is better to call ‘interpersonal’: that our particular ideas about
our selves are influenced by other people and our interactions with them. However, in
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the end, each self is a mental product of the bodily experiences and neural activity, or
analogous implementation, of one individual person and what that person takes her or
himself to be.
I understand the issue concerning that social psychological sense of self to be
distinct from the one about metaphysical identity or persistence as well as the issue
about continued responsibility, but I do not find it uninteresting, unimportant or delusory.
Therefore, I propose a conceptual division of labor. Talk of persons and their identity
and persistence should cover the metaphysical question which I addressed in chapter
two. The term ‘self’ will be reserved for talking about the social psychological issue of
identity, but also questions about subjectivity and the unity of consciousness, because I
take them all to be related. They all have to do with the way in which individuals (some
of which are persons) experience themselves as distinct from, but in various ways,
related to the rest of the world. With this division of labor, seemingly paradoxical
statements about persons and selves can be translated in ways that make them
coherent. For example “He’s not himself today” can be taken to mean, “this person has
a largely different self today from the one he usually has” so as to avoid the paradox
that one and the same person can be a different person at one time than at another.
The self changes though the person remains the same. More controversially, “she’s not
the person she used to be” can be translated as “this person has a radically different
self than the one she used to have.” The latter translation is more controversial,
because there the word ‘person’ in the sentence is actually being replaced by the word
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‘self’, while ‘person’ takes the place of the pronoun ‘she’. However, as I will endeavor to
show in this chapter, I believe such a revisionary move is theoretically justified (though it
might not be convenient or pleasant to actually talk that way in everyday life). The self,
in my sense of the term is what one is conscious of when one is self-conscious, i.e. the
object of self-consciousness, and hence having one or more selves is necessary for
being a person. As I hope to make clear in what follows, this use of ‘self’ is not entirely
unrelated to the indexical use, because ‘selves’ are formed by subjectively indexing
mental states to individuals. In pathological cases, where a person indexes their states
to more than one distinct individual (what the person might consider distinct persons,
but which are really distinct selves), multiple selves arise, which may appear to the
person so affected as different persons though that is not objectively the case.
The first part of the chapter will be an explication of what I mean by ‘self’ and why
I think it should be treated as a distinct concept from ‘person’. This will lead to a
discussion of whether or not there is a self as the subject of experience, taking on
arguments such as those by Hume (1748) and more recently, Prinz (2012), to the effect
that we have no experience of such a thing. I will argue that the critique of selfexperience is correct in saying that there is no experience of self as distinct from mental
particulars, but that the experience of self is the experience of a mental object, which is
itself a complex and dynamic mental particular. Insofar as there is a subject of
experience, it is not itself experienced, nor is it properly called ‘self’, but is only the
perspective from which a person experiences the world and her self as object or else
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merely the thoughts a person has about her self. Next I will offer my positive account of
the self as dynamic internal representation of an organized being. To illustrate the sort
of thing I have in mind, I will engage with neurocognitive accounts developed by
Damasio (1994 and 2011) and Metzinger (2004), but my view is compatible and
potentially continuous with various theories of the self as biologically and socially
constructed. My view is that the ‘self’ is a dynamic internal representation of an
organized being’s psychological states (which themselves, on the first order, are
representations of the individual’s bodily states and actions, as well as of properties of
the outside world and the being’s relations to it) of which, in some cases, usually of
persons, the being is capable of being aware, via even higher order representation.
Since that awareness is only partial and there is the potential for inaccuracy at every
order of representation, a person can be wrong about her self. Her self can
misrepresent her, the person’s, first order mental states as well as bodily states and
properties of the world/relations to it, and she can also misrepresent her self in
introspective self-consciousness. Discussion of Damasio’s idea of the ‘autobiographical
self’ will lead to consideration of whether or not the selves of persons must be
narratives. I will argue that they need not be explicit or conscious narratives, but just
having what Damasio calls a ‘core self’ in the first place requires a kind of minimal,
implicit narrativity. The last part of the chapter will deal with specific characteristics of
the self, particularly what kind of entity it is, ontologically speaking, as well as whether it
is necessarily unified or stable. I will argue that it can be understood either as a mental
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object, i.e. a representation or as a series of (usually neural) processes, because the
neural processes are identical with the representation. Furthermore, selves are
necessarily unified and stable if only from the perspective of the being that has them. In
self-conscious beings there is a possibility of multiple selves in a single being due to the
subjective indexing of mental and physical states to distinct representational units or
individuals. The paradigmatic examples of such multiplicity of selves are cases of
dissociative identity disorder (DID).

I.

Self vs. Person
The first reason to distinguish between ‘self’ and person is that, given the

account of personal persistence discussed in chapter two, the fact that a person
persists over time says nothing about what that person is like other than that he or she
continues to be a person. However, when one thinks about the ‘identity’ of a person, in
various social and psychological contexts, one is interested in what that person is like,
e.g. what her distinctive character and values are, what groups she sees herself as
affiliated with, who her family members are, what her occupation is, what her artistic
preferences are, etc. The main intuition that leads me to the view of persistence
defended in chapter two is that all these things could change radically and yet the same
individual person would remain. However, I do not deny that there is a real sense in
which a person may shed an ‘identity’ and assume a new one or in which I may not ‘be
myself’ some days. To talk about the kind of identity that is built up out of these
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contingent, distinctive factors, that may come and go throughout the life of a person, it is
appropriate to talk about the ‘self’ as a feature of a person, conceptually distinct (but not
ontologically separate or independent) from the person.
A second reason for distinguishing between ‘person’ and ‘self’ is that the
distinction corresponds to a distinction between the objects of inquiry concerning
responsibility for an action versus the amount of praise or blame/reward or punishment
appropriate for that action. Recall Schechtman’s (2014) distinction between a person as
a “forensic unit” and as a “moral self,” according to which the former notion marks out
which beings are appropriate targets for any forensic inquiry, whereas the latter is the
object of particular forensic inquiries into whether or not a person is responsible for a
particular action performed in the past. I have in mind a similar distinction, except that I
don’t think that a change in moral character has any bearing on continued responsibility
for a past action. As I see it, if a person at one time persists as a person at another time
(the earlier forensic unit persists as the later), then the latter is responsible for anything
for which the former is responsible. However, inquiry into the moral self of the latter, as
compared to the former, is required in order to decide the degree to which praise or
blame/reward or punishment is appropriate. The idea is that while a person is always
responsible for, e.g. the bad things she has done, if she has changed morally over time,
so that she would not repeat such an action or has come to feel remorse for the action,
then some of the work that blame or punishment would have done has already been
accomplished, making it inappropriate for the same degree of reprobation to be meted
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out as would be appropriate if no such change had occurred. However, it is harder to
make the same case for morally good actions, i.e., that if a person has changed morally
for the worse since the time praiseworthy actions are performed, the same degree of
praise/reward is no longer appropriate. There may be an asymmetry between the cases
of moral change for the better and for the worse. A person in line for a promotion who
later does something disgraceful, would not still deserve the promotion, but that may
have more to do with the fact that a promotion is based on what we expect that
individual to accomplish in the future, not just what that individual has done in the past.
A better example might be someone who is supposed to receive a humanitarian award,
but goes on a killing spree the day before the ceremony. However, even in that case our
reluctance to give that individual the award might have more to do with not wanting to
look as if we’re promoting the recent negative behavior than a change in what the
individual deserves.
Regardless of whether or not the cases of positive and negative moral change
are symmetrical, a useful way to employ my distinction between ‘person’ and ‘self’ in
these kinds of situations is to say that one might be the same person as an earlier one
yet have a radically different self, such that while one is still responsible for the things
one did in the past, one may no longer be deserving of reward or punishment for those
actions. This is why in criminal law there is usually a judgment of guilt or innocence by a
jury and then a separate decision about punishment determined by the judge, the
statutes and precedent.
198

A third reason for the distinction between ‘person’ and ‘self’ is the sense of ‘self’
as a subject of experience, the experiencing, knowing, owning and acting inner agency
within the person. This is the sort of thing that Descartes takes to be indubitable along
with each act of thought, while Hume denies that he has any experience of it. The
conception of ‘self’ in the previous two paragraphs was of a kind of object (though
perhaps one that is essentially subjective, in the sense of being experienced privately
by the one who has it, as well as subjectively constituted). Prinz (2012) has recently
defended Hume’s skepticism about the self as subject of experience, or more precisely,
has cast doubt upon the idea that we have any experience of such a thing, while
Damasio (2011) and Strawson (1999, 2011) have argued in favor of a ‘phenomenal I’
(to use Prinz’s phrase). This debate over whether or not there is an experienced self as
subject of experience is not, for the disputants, a debate about the existence of persons.
Therefore, it is clear that there is already a conceptual distinction between ‘self’ and
‘person’ in play, and assuming the debate about the self is a real disagreement and not
a pseudo-issue (though it might turn out to be), that may be further reason for observing
and maintaining the distinction. At this point, it is necessary to delve further into this
particular issue of whether or not there is a self as subject of experiences and whether
or not we have any experience of such a thing, where I will argue that we in fact do not.
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II.

Is there a self-as-subject and can it be experienced?
Most of what I have to say about the self in this chapter is about the self as it is

an object of experience. However, the self is also sometimes thought of as a subject of
experience, an observer of events both mental and physical, a doer of deeds, and a
constant presence distinct from those experiences, events, and deeds. This has been
the primary role of the self in traditional theories from Hinduism’s Atman to Plato’s
Psyche, to Descartes’ Cogito that identified the self with an immortal, immutable soul
that lies behind and apprehends one’s particular mental states and experiences, and
could survive death, persisting into the afterlife/next life. More recently, Strawson (1999)
and Damasio (2010) have posited a self as subject of experiences. For Damasio, ‘self’
is something generated by sufficiently complex nervous systems and, in its most
sophisticated form, appears to an individual who has one as two different things,
depending on the perspective one takes. On the one hand there is the self as object,
which Damasio describes as “a dynamic collection of integrated neural processes,
centered on the representation of the living body, that finds expression in a dynamic
collection of integrated mental processes,” (Damasio, 9) which comes close to the idea
of self that I mean to develop in this chapter. Briefly, this conception of the self-as-object
is of an internal representation of the states of an individual in relation to its
environment, which the individual utilizes to guide its interactions with that environment.
On the other hand, according to Damasio, there is also the self-as-knower, the self that
apprehends the self-as-object.
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Hume’s (1738) denial of the self was aimed at the self-as-subject standing
behind one’s individual perceptions and his argument was that when he introspects, he
has no experience of such a thing. He says: “[W]hen I enter most intimately into what I
call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold,
light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time
without a perception, and can never observe any thing but the perception.” (Hume 1738,
252)
Prinz (2012) argues at length in favor of Hume’s view, by showing that
experiences that are believed to be of the self-as-subject are not of it, but rather one or
several of Hume’s stumbling blocks. First of all, Prinz challenges Damasio’s conception
of self as knowing subject. He specifically objects to Damasio’s account because of its
overemphasis on continuity of bodily feelings as the basis of self-experience. Damasio
follows William James in taking the “core of sameness running through the ingredients
of the Self” (James 1890, 350-52) to be the experience of similarity despite changes in
bodily feelings, so that one experiences oneself as being the same subject despite such
changes, as opposed to Hume’s view that all one experiences is a continuous series of
changing impressions. Prinz offers three specific arguments against the DamasioJames view. To begin with, he argues that bodily experience is not necessary for selfexperience. Many highly intellectual tasks that are paradigmatic examples of when the
self is most present, such as doing philosophy or solving crossword puzzles, are ones
where one’s body is largely absent from consciousness. Secondly, Prinz argues that
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bodily awareness is not by itself sufficient for the sense of self, citing instances when
one notices changes in another person’s body and infers emotional change from those
behaviors, but is therefore focused on the other person and not on one’s self. The third
argument appeals to the general lack of correlation between bodily feelings and a sense
or experience of self. More intense emotions are not accompanied by a greater sense of
self, but rather shift one’s focus to external matters, e.g. as your feeling of “terror after
hearing an intruder enter your house… makes you forget yourself for a moment and
focus intensely on the sounds coming from the intruder.” (Prinz 2012, 227) Now it
seems to me that these arguments do not clearly distinguish self-as-subject from selfas-object, but I agree with the basic idea that awareness of bodily changes or
sensations is not necessary for having a self. Changing conditions of the body and the
feelings associated with them are some of the things that are often the content of the
complex representation of the self as object, e.g. the nagging sensation in the pit of my
stomach ever since I learned that a loved one has fallen ill. Damasio may even be right
that the selves of the simplest organisms are mostly or wholly composed of somatic
representations, but that truth is not a necessary one, nor need it even be contingently
true of human beings and other organisms whose selves involve more abstract or
intellectual features. I will have more to say about Damasio’s conception of the self-asobject in the following section.
While in his discussion of Damasio’s view, Prinz does not clearly distinguish
between self-as-subject and self-as-object, sometimes he does correctly make the
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distinction, as in his critique of Goldberg, Harel, and Malach’s (2006) defense of the self
as subject. Those authors point to conditions in which one seems to “lose oneself” as
exceptions that prove the rule. If there is a self that is recognized to be absent in some
experiences, they argue, it must be present in others. For example, Goldberg et al used
fMRI scans to compare the brains of people asked to read a list of words and decide
whether or not those words were true of themselves versus people asked to read a list
of words and decide whether each was a noun or a verb. They found that the first group
had greater activity in the superior frontal gyrus (SFG) region of the brain. This
increased activity was also found in other self-directed tasks, leading the authors to infer
that “the SFG is the neural correlate of self-awareness” (Prinz 2012, 221) and that tasks
in which it is active are those where one has an experience of the self-as-subject. Prinz
correctly objects to this reasoning by pointing out that
the Goldberg study can best be regarded as an investigation of the self as object,
rather than the self as subject. In their tasks, we report things about ourselves,
but in so doing, we are treating the self as just another thing in the world with
certain describable features. We are not experiencing ourselves acting as the
subject of thought or experience. This is not the elusive self as I. They do not
establish that some thoughts have a qualitative component that occupies the
same position that the word I occupies in self-ascriptions, such as ‘I like this
music.’ (Prinz 2012, 223)
I agree with Prinz here and think that he could have extended this point to cover
many of the other supposed pieces of evidence in favor of an experienced self-assubject. It just seems to me incoherent to claim that the self-as-subject is experienced.
To make the incoherence plain, we can paraphrase the claim as “the self-as-subject is
the object of some experience.” How can one thing be both subject and object at once?
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This was the paradox of self-scrutiny addressed in chapter three, but there I advocated
the shifting coalitions view which claims that the subject of self-scrutiny is never the
same element of a person as the object being scrutinized. Any belief or desire can
potentially be the object of self-scrutiny, but when it is the object, it cannot at the same
time be the subject.
At the end of his discussion of this issue, Prinz switches gears and suggests
that, despite there being no experience of the self-as-subject, we may have reason to
think it is there “by virtue of its absence.” (Prinz 2012, 240) In other words, we know
there is a self-as-subject implicitly or inferentially, despite our inability to directly
experience it. He gives three reasons to think there is a self-as-subject. First of all, there
is “the fact that we always perceive the world from a perspective… conscious states are
presented from a point of view.” (Prinz 2012, 240) One way to think about how this
reveals the self-as-subject is to reflect on Prinz’s comment about the self-as-subject
being analogous to the ‘I’ in ‘I like this music’. If we always view the world from a
perspective, then ‘I’ can act as an indexical which refers to a particular point of view.
Secondly, Prinz claims that the self-as-subject is shown in the boundaries of our
experience, that we only ever perceive a portion of our surroundings, e.g. I cannot see
what is directly behind me or things far away. Finally, he makes a suggestion that he
says echoes Wittgenstein echoing Schopenhauer (who was echoing Kant), that the selfas-subject is inferable from the fact that “the qualities of our experience are dependent
on our sensory apparatus… the senses do not simply pick up the world as it is; the
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impose order on it” such that “the self is the limit.” (Prinz 2012, 240) So the self as
subject is the locus of the perspective from which we view the world, which is bounded
and imposes a structure on our experience colored by our sensory apparatus, beliefs,
desires and values. My only objection to this idea is that I don’t see why the self should
play this role rather than the person. The line I will take in what follows, drawing from
Damasio, Metzinger and Rosenthal’s ideas, is that the self is a dynamic representation
of the states of the person. By generating thoughts about that representation a person is
able to scrutinize it. Those introspective thoughts may become part of the self if they are
themselves introspected. However, when they are not themselves scrutinized, those
introspective thoughts are not re-represented and therefore not indexed to the self. So
to say that they are the self as subject is somewhat unwarranted. Rather, whatever
thoughts are scrutinizing a person’s thoughts and perceptions at any time are generated
by and therefore belong to the person as a whole. It is, therefore, the person that is the
subject of experiences, not the self.
Nietzsche writes in Beyond Good and Evil §54:
Formerly, one believed in ‘the soul’ as one believed in grammar and the
grammatical subject: one said, ‘I’ is the condition, ‘think’ is the predicate and
conditioned – thinking is an activity to which thought must supply a subject as
cause. Then one tried with admirable perseverance and cunning to get out of this
net – and asked whether the opposite might not be the case: ‘think’ the condition,
‘I’ the conditioned; ‘I’ in that case only a synthesis which is made by thinking.
(Nietzsche 1886, 67)
On my view there are two things ‘I’ might refer to, neither of which is a soul in the
traditional sense: 1. the person, who is the thinker of the thoughts (though not
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necessarily a cause or the cause of them) and 2. the self, in the sense I will explicate in
the next section, which is a result of, i.e. conditioned by, thinking. The first is the subject
that has thoughts and experiences, the second is a thought of and experienced object
formed from more basic thoughts and experiences.

III.

Self as dynamic internal representation
Damasio (2010) offers a biologically grounded account of the self, conceiving of it

as a representation the states of an organism and its relations to the world, which he
sees as anchored in William James’ views on the subject. According to Damasio,
‘selves’ are generated by organisms to help regulate their states in response to
changing environmental circumstances, distinguish them from external objects and in
some cases mark them out as having relatively stable characteristics over time.
Damasio distinguishes between three stages in the development of ‘self’
demonstrating the differences as well as the continuity between ‘selves’ of simple
organisms and those of human beings. First, there is the ‘protoself,’ which is “an
integrated collection of separate neural patterns that map, moment by moment, the
most stable aspects of the organism’s physical structure,” (Damasio 2011, 190)
generating interoceptive ‘primordial feelings’ that allow the organism to monitor and
preserve its well-being through changing environmental conditions. This emphasis on
‘feelings’ is what Prinz takes issue with, as noted above. However, ‘feelings’ can be
substituted with ‘first order states’ to yield a version of Damasio’s view that does not fall
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prey to Prinz’s critique. An organism is capable of balancing its internal states in
reaction to changes in its surroundings by registering those changes against its
represented current state and modifying itself accordingly. In humans this is
accomplished via “master interoceptive maps” in the upper brain stem nuclei and insular
cortex. (Damasio 2011, 191)
The level of core self introduces a ‘protagonist’ into the internal representation of
the organism in order to more fully represent the distinction between the organism and
what it encounters in the world. This level is bit more obscure than the other two, but
Damasio claims that there must be “some intermediate self process placed between the
protoself and its primordial feelings, on the one hand, and the autobiographical selves
that give us our sense of personhood and identity, on the other.” (Damasio 2011, 202)
The core self state, for Damasio, involves representing objects in the world that are the
cause of the protoself’s modifications but are distinct from it, resulting in a
‘feeling of knowing the object,’ a feeling that differentiates the object from other
objects of the moment… The core self, then, is created by linking the modified
protoself to the object that caused the modification, and object that has now been
hallmarked by feeling and enhanced by attention. (Damasio 2011, 203)
While I’m not sure Damasio would agree, I think the core self should be
understood as not a distinct self from the protoself, but merely one which is more
complex and clearly marked off from its surroundings. The core self is generated
through ‘pulses’ of images, telling a non-verbal narrative of the relations between the
organism, external objects, and the feelings caused by their interactions. Also, I don’t
think the core self should be understood as representing objects in the world directly,
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but as representing first -order states of the organism which in turn represent the world
and the organism’s relations to it. I take having a core self, in this sense, to be
necessary for being a person.
Metzinger (2004), whose account of self and consciousness is partly influenced
by Damasio’s work, comes close to this idea, positing a theoretical entity he calls the
Phenomenal Self Model (PSM), the content of which is:
...your current bodily sensations, your present emotional situation, plus all the
contents of your phenomenally experienced cognitive processing… one could
even say that you are the content of your PSM. All those properties of yourself, to
which you can now direct your attention, form the content of your current PSM.
Your self-directed thoughts operate on the current contents of your PSM: they
cannot operate on anything else. When you form thoughts about your
“unconscious self” (i.e., the contents of your mental self-model), these thoughts
are always about a conscious representation of this “unconscious self,” one that
has just been integrated into your currently active PSM. If you want to initiate a
goal-directed action aimed at some aspect of yourself -- for example, brushing
your hair or shaving yourself -- you need a conscious self-model to deliberately
initiate these actions. (Metzinger 2004, 299)
The first order states of you, the person -- affective, intentional and perceptual -whose contents are states and actions of your body, of the world, and of the relations
between your body and the world, are in turn the contents of your self which represents
them. Introspection and deliberation involves thinking about one’s self and therefore,
according to higher order views of consciousness, results in the representations that
constitute one’s self becoming conscious. (See Figure 1 below) This claim is also
compatible with first-order views of consciousness, except, for those views,
introspection does not involve thinking about or re-representing the self, but attending to
it, making it globally available, etc. In any case, the point is that when one introspects,
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one becomes conscious of one’s self. I take the difference between persons and
animals to be in this ability to consciously scrutinize the self. Having a self of a certain
complexity, at least at the level of Damasio’s core self or Metzinger’s PSM already
implies being conscious in the basic phenomenal sense, but the kind of selfconsciousness that distinguishes persons from other concerned beings requires the
even higher-order capacity to introspect the represented features that constitute the
self, so as to be able to take evaluative attitudes toward one’s conscious desires and
beliefs. Beings that lack self-consciousness can have selves, but they can’t be
conscious of those selves. Among beings with the capacity for concern, only persons
can be conscious of their selves.
However, this consciousness need not be infallible, either because one’s self
inaccurately represents one’s first order states or else because one misrepresents
oneself in introspection. To begin with, one’s self-representation might be incomplete or
false. Persons can be largely deluded as to what they are actually like. For example, a
person might think him or herself open-minded or charitable and yet really behave
narrow-mindedly or miserly. That is not to say that in all or even most cases people do
not accurately self-represent, but only that it is sometimes the case. Caruso (2013),
drawing on Rosenthal’s HOT theory, has argued that it is the incompleteness of one’s
consciousness of one’s own first order states, i.e. the internal causes of one’s actions,
that leads to the subjective illusion of indeterministic free will. Whether or not such a
strong claim is true, a somewhat weaker one, that we are often unconscious of the true
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inner causes or motivations for our actions, is plausible and may have some empirical
evidence in its favor (e.g. Nisbett and Wilson 1977, Haidt 2001), though such purported
evidence is still up for debate. Even if we are usually aware of the causes of our actions,
we may be only aware of the proximate causes and not the distal ones, e.g. I may be
aware that I bought a particular brand of chewing gum because I prefer that brand, but
unaware that my preference was caused by subliminal advertising. It may still be the
case that we are mistaken about or unaware of some of our mental states that are not
directly related to action. Practitioners and proponents of Buddhist mindfulness
meditation claim that such practice can increase the accuracy and completeness of
awareness of one’s self. Mindfulness practice seems to have had some effectiveness
when combined with cognitive behavioral therapy in treating depression and other mood
disorders which may result from a negative mis-characterization of one’s self (as shown
by, e.g., Manicavascar et al. 2011).
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[Figure 1]
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IV.

The narrativity of selves
Damasio describes the process that yields a core self as a non-verbal narrative.

According to him, this narrative becomes explicit and conscious in more sophisticated
organisms that possess an ‘autobiographical self’. With the autobiographical self, an
organism is capable of linking together memories into a coherent pattern, generating the
‘sense of self’ stressed by many thinkers as essential to one’s ‘identity’. Narrative
conceptions of personal identity as well as social constructivist psychological views are
often motivated by this autobiographical ability, though as I have already argued, there
are persons who lack this ability because of deficits in episodic memory. However, even
individuals with Korsakov’s disease have some conception of themselves as extended
through time and as having relatively stable psychological features. They are just
unable to recall past events or anticipate future ones. So I think that while persons must
have core selves, they need not have autobiographical ones, they need not construct
explicit narratives out of their past and anticipated experiences. However, I do think that
already on the level of core self there is necessarily a kind of minimal or implicit
narrativity. To make this point clear it will be helpful to engage with some of the
literature on the narrative view of personal identity.
A position on the issue of personal identity championed by Schechtman
(1996/2007), Dennett (1992) and Velleman (2005), is that it is constituted by a narrative
which links successive events of a person’s life together into a coherent whole. Taking
this as a view of the self, rather than the person, would be to identify the self with the
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narrative or to insist that selves are necessarily narrative. By way of example, I will
focus on Schechtman’s formulation of the view, which she calls the Narrative Selfconstitution view. (NSC) According, to Schechtman, in her 1996 book, The Constitution
of Selves:
the difference between persons and other individuals...lies in how they organize
their experience, and hence their lives. At the core of this view is the assertion
that individuals constitute themselves as persons by coming to think of
themselves as persisting subjects who have had experience in the past and will
continue to have experience in the future, taking certain experiences as theirs.
Some, but not all, individuals weave stories of their lives, and it is their doing so
which makes them persons. (Schechtman 1996, 94)
So according to this view, to be a person and remain the same person one must
think of oneself as persisting over time, and narrativize one’s experiences into stories.
Schechtman originally presented this view as an alternative to reductive psychological
theories of personal identity that understood such identity in terms of relations between
the psychological features of momentary person-stages, and which, for her, fail to
express “the deep diachronic unity of self-consciousness that is taken to underlie the
capacity for forensic actions.” (Schechtman 2014, 100) However, Schechtman has
distanced herself from that view to some extent, because she thinks it does not properly
distinguish between the forensic unit and the moral self, or between what she calls the
“re-identification” and “characterization” questions appropriate to those objects of
inquiry, respectively. (Schechtman 2014, 103) In other words, it is not clear if NSC is an
explanation of the continuity of a person’s character (moral self), or of the person itself
(forensic unit). It seems to me (and Schechtman seems to more or less agree), as
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should be no surprise given my account of persistence in chapter two, that ‘self’ is better
suited to explaining characterization rather than re-identification. Even if narrativity does
not explain how a person persists, or is to be re-identified over time, as an answer to the
characterization question we should consider whether or not it is necessarily true of the
selves of persons that they are narratives. In the following discussion, all comments
about persons should be applied to consideration of selves.
According to NSC, persons must think of themselves as persisting subjects over
time and weave their past experiences and anticipated future ones into coherent stories
in order to persist over time. Strawson (1999) asserts that he himself does no such
thing. Personally, I do tend to think of my life in terms of a narrative, but this may be
somewhat of a delusion and I certainly am in no position to make any claims about
another person’s mental life on that score. Individuals with Korsakov’s disease seem
clearly to be persons and have selves in the sense I have been discussing in the
foregoing, and yet do not have the access to past and anticipated experiences in order
to construct stories of their lives (or any stories at all). Furthermore, some persons may
have fragmented or discontinuous self-narratives as do those who experience frequent
fugue states.
Schechtman does, however, have a response to these sorts of objections. She
denies that one’s narrativizing need be conscious or explicit. “...’having an
autobiographical narrative’”, she writes, “does not amount to consciously retelling one’s
life story always (or ever) to oneself or anyone else. The sense in which we have
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autobiographical narratives on this account is cashed out mostly in terms of the way in
which an implicit understanding of the ongoing course of our lives influences our
experience and deliberation.” (Schechtman 2014, 101) Now, it’s not entirely clear to me
what such unconscious or implicit narrativizing might amount to. If it is just that one’s
present thoughts and actions have an effect on the future and one sees oneself as
being formed by what has happened in the past, then that does seem necessary for
personhood insofar as it is necessary for self-consciousness and concern, and that is a
kind of narrativity of which Korsakov’s patients do seem capable. They can remember
facts and link them together in logical sequences, though they are unable to describe a
scene as if they were present for it in the way necessary for explicit storytelling.
Another sense in which one’s self might be implicitly or unconsciously narrative is
if it is formed not by the person who has it but by other people. Schechtman considers
this idea when she offers an expanded version of the NSC on the way to developing her
more recent position on personal identity, the “Person Life View” (PLV). Now clearly, the
way I interact with other people and the ways I perceive their perceptions and
judgments of me contributes to my self, but I don’t see how the way they understand my
life narratively should constitute my self-narrative. I might not care at all how others
think about me and fail to take their stories into account, even implicitly and
unconsciously. All in all, the selves of persons are necessarily narrative in only the
minimal, implicit sense, noted above. However, I do think it is true that only (but not all)
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persons are capable of narrativizing in the more robust, explicit sense and this is why it
is characteristic, though not constitutive, of personal selves that they are narrative.

V.

Ontology, unity, and stability of selves.
Strawson (1999) offers an analysis of the concept of the self which includes

various suggestions about what characteristics belong to it. One issue is about the
ontology of selves, specifically, where Strawson claims, rather vaguely, that the self
must be understood as a ‘thing.’ Now there is an obvious and uninteresting way in
which it must be true that the self is a ‘thing’, in the way that everything with a name is a
‘thing’, but Strawson seems to have something more substantial in mind. He says “the
self is not thought of as a state or property of something else, or as an event, or as a
mere process or series of events,” though not “a thing in the way that a stone or a chair
is,” but “has the typical causal profile of a thing - as something that can undergo things
and do things… a ‘thinking active principle’ [in Bishop Berkeley’s sense]” (Strawson
1999, 132) From this description, it seems that by ‘thing’, Strawson means an object,
though not a physical object. I’m not sure I agree that objects, as opposed to states,
properties and processes, are the only things that can undergo or do things (and in the
final analysis I think at the least ‘mental state,’ ‘mental property’ and ‘mental object’ talk
is interchangeable), but regardless, I understand the self to be a kind of mental object,
i.e. a representation The self is a representation of one’s first order states and therefore,
a mental object. Mental objects can do things insofar as they play causal roles in an
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individual’s behavior, e.g. different beliefs about my self may cause me to pursue
different career paths, and they can undergo things insofar as they can be rerepresented and scrutinized by even higher-order representations in introspection and
sometimes may even be altered in light of such scrutiny. The self as mental object is
also reducible to physical states or processes, so it is both an object and a set of states
or processes. Selves are mental, but, given psychophysical reductionism, they are also
physical.
Two characteristics that I take to be, in some sense, essential to selves are
stability and unity. By stability, I mean that selves do not change radically over time.
Historically, most views of the self have insisted that it must be completely or largely
immutable. By unity I mean that the self is experienced by a being who has one and is
capable of being aware of having one as a unified whole, at every moment, belonging to
a single individual. Selves are individuated only by a person’s experience of their
sameness and difference, by whom they represent their intentional states as belonging
to. Radical instability and disunity of self imply multiplicity of selves though not
multiplicity of persons. A consequence of this view is that the correct description of
cases of dissociative identity disorder, and perhaps other similar conditions, is to say
that in such cases a single person has multiple selves.
There is seeming synchronic unity and diachronic stability in self-experience,
while at the same time, there is some evidence that suggests plurality, divisibility or
instability. While self as object, like conscious experience, does usually seem
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synchronically unified, it may also be experienced as divided, for instance, in conflicts of
motives or crises of identity. Diachronic stability of self as object seems to be one of the
characteristic features of selves, and the reason why they are often thought to play an
essential role in personal persistence. The idea of self is partially the idea of something
relatively enduring. However, just as it may become synchronically disunified, one’s self
may also, become diachronically destabilized, as one feels oneself to be (or have) “a
million different people [read: selves] from one day to the next” (as expressed in the
song “Bittersweet Symphony” by the Verve (1996)). Strawson (1999) thinks diachronic
unity is not a necessary feature of selves, and suggests that they may actually be very
short lived and fractured.
The self-representation of a person usually constitutes, for that person, a stable
‘identity’ constructed out of the person’s self-perceived personality traits, affiliations, and
preferences. This leads to the idea that personal identity consists in such stability. As
has been seen in Korsakov’s patients like KC, such a sense of stability is independent
of the capacity for episodic memory or future-directed mental time travel. However,
even in typical cases, this sense of stability may be largely an illusion as regards the
actual characteristics of a person. Social-psychological studies related to the situationist
critique of the idea of virtue or stable character traits (e.g. Isen and Levin 1972/1975,
Harman 1999/2000, Doris 1998/2002) purport to show that people’s behavior displays
less regularity than they believe it should, based on their own self-concept. The jury is
still out on how serious a threat to idea of stability of character these studies truly pose.
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However, even if our character traits aren’t genuinely stable, the subjective sense of
stability may be essential to the self and this may reflect the way we as organisms must
maintain stability on a subpersonal level regarding homeostasis and other processes
involved in life regulation. In Damasio’s terms, the sense of stability that comes with our
awareness of core self states may be parasitic on the conditions regulated by the
protoself.
Theories of personal identity that appeal to stability of traits include social
psychological accounts that take the relations between individuals and their families,
ethnicities, and other social groups to be partially constitutive of who they are. For
instance, according to Greenwood (1994) a person’s identity is constituted by her
“identity projects” or the “moral careers” upon which she embarks. He writes:
Theoretical descriptions of identity projects are theoretical descriptions employed
in the explanation of intentional human behavior, or human actions. According to
this form of social psychological theory of identity, a theoretical reference to
intrinsically social identity projects -- and their associated emotions, and motives
-- provides the best explanation of many human actions, and of the similarities
and differences in actions to be found between different persons, and the same
person in different times and places. Thus for example similarities and
differences in the preparation and performance of high school and college
students may be explained in terms of differential levels of commitment to the
moral career of academia. The disruptive activities of some high school students
may best be explained in terms of their commitment to alternative moral careers,
such as those provided by teenage gangs. (Greenwood 1994, 112)
I grant that commitment to different identity projects can play the explanatory role
that Greenwood thinks it can. On the other hand, I think someone can remain the same
person despite radically altering her identity projects. For example, the kid who has had
enough of the thug life and decides to give school another shot is the same person who
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was previously committed to her gang. As far as the self goes, it does seem as if,
subjectively, persons think of themselves largely in moral and social terms. The
colloquial expression “I was a different person then” which I think should be revised as “I
had a different self then” seems especially appropriate when it is a change of morality or
social membership that has provoked it. “I’m not [don’t have] my self today” might also
be especially apt if one acts in a way that conflicts with one’s usual moral beliefs. I
earlier cited the Nichols and Strohminger (2014) study which showed that participants
were more likely to think that a change in identity occurred when an individual’s moral
character radically changed than if their memories or their desires and preferences were
eliminated, or if they suffered from visual object agnosia. That provides evidence that
one’s self is largely or often constituted by one’s moral beliefs. If those beliefs are
dependent on one’s social group membership, then such membership is transitively
constitutive of the self and a radical change in group memberships might entail a
quantitatively different self.
Wilkes (1988) has argued that in conditions such as hypnotism, fugue states, and
bouts of epileptic automatism, where individuals behave radically uncharacteristically for
periods of time, usually without remembering the period in question, we do not think of
them as being different persons during that period, and I agree, but suggest that we
should think of them as possessing different selves. Similarly, in cases where treatable
neurological ailments cause radical changes in personality, such as the case of Mary
Jackson, a patient of neurologist Kenneth Heilman, whose sudden shift from a
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monogamous honors student to a promiscuous crack smoker was explained when a
tumor was found pressing on her prefrontal cortex (Heilman, 2002), we might want to
say that the person’s normal self is temporarily replaced by a different one. However it
isn’t entirely clear that we should say so. Individuation of selves has to do with the
degree to which a person thinks of those selves as individuated, and only in extreme
cases, where a person genuinely and consistently believes there is more than one self
within them and this belief is reflected in behavior and physiology, do I think we should
say a multiplicity of selves is present.
An issue at the crossroads of consciousness studies and the topic of the self is
the phenomenal unity of experience. Conscious experience seems to be of a
seamlessly unified field, our various sensory modalities, thoughts and feelings seem
tied together at each moment into a coherent whole, and there are several theories that
purport to explain why that is. One view, popular among neuroscience-minded
philosophers, is that conscious states are unified due to the synchrony of synaptic
firings underlying them, particularly in the 40hz range. The view has been endorsed by
Prinz (2012) among others, and has been used to explain not only the unity of
consciousness, but also the more basic concept of a brain state (Brown 2006 and
2013). However, while giving an account of the neural correlates of unity, this leaves the
issue on the cognitive level of explanation, of exactly how synchrony yields unity,
unanswered. A view which does not appeal directly to neurology but which assumes
potential reducibility, and which pitches its explanation on the cognitive level, is
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championed by Rosenthal (2003), who draws upon the resources of his HOT theory to
explain the unity of consciousness. According to his account, higher order
representations of mental states include an “essential indexical” which tags the
represented states as belonging to the same individual. As Rosenthal puts it:
each HOT makes one conscious of oneself in a seemingly immediate way,
encouraging a sense of unity across HOTs. And the same considerations that
make us assume that our first-person thoughts all refer to the same self apply
also to HOTs; becoming conscious of our HOTs in introspection thus leads to a
sense that our conscious states are unified in a single self. (Rosenthal 2003,
325)
This view fits very nicely with what I have said about the self so far and shows
why such a self is necessarily unified. Since having a self is entirely a matter of how one
represents one’s own states, then if those states are represented as belonging to
distinct individuals, experience would not only be disunified, but there would in fact be
separate selves to which the differently indexed states would belong. There would not
be more than one person, but subjectively it would appear that way to the person whose
experience is disunified. Common experiences of divided attention and conflicting
motivations, which may be interpreted as examples of disunity do not involve the states
in question as being represented as belonging to distinct subjects and so are not
genuine examples. On the other hand, the voices heard by schizophrenics, alien hand
syndrome, “hidden observers” in hypnosis, seem to be true disunities, and therefore
involve a plurality of selves. As a description of such phenomena, my account of the
constitution of selves may seem too voluntaristic. Individuals with DID do not seem to
be in conscious control of the number of selves they have. However, my account should
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not be construed as voluntaristic. Selves are subjectively constituted, however, such
constitution is not always in the control of the person who has them. When one
becomes conscious of one’s first order mental states, the first order states are
represented as belonging to an individual. However, that indexing does not result from
consciousness but only occurs as part of it, making it appear to the person that he or
she is composed of one or more individuals.
Given the distinction between persons and selves developed in this chapter, I
propose that we describe disunities (and discontinuities or instabilities) of self as a
single person having more than one self at a time or over time. This phenomenon is
most apparent in cases of dissociative identity disorder. Wilkes (1988) describes a
number of cases which she thinks call into question the “Lockean” criteria, for being an
individual person, of unity and continuity of consciousness. The most extreme of these
cases, and the only ones she thinks really compel us to revise our concept of an
individual person, are cases of multiple personality disorder, which is now referred to by
clinicians as dissociative identity disorder (DID). One case Wilkes describes is of a
patient known as “Christine Beauchamp”, who appeared to fragment into multiple
personalities that vied for control over “Christine’s” body. Some of these alters had
knowledge of the actions of other alters, and some had control over others’ thoughts.
Some alters would be present, hidden observers, “listening” in on what was being
thought said and done when another alter was in control. In such a case, some mental
states are being attributed to one subject while others are attributed to a different one.
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For Wilkes, this means that there is reason to say more than one person is contained in
the body or else we must revise our concept of an individual person. I take the latter
option, that we should revise the concept of an individual person so that it does not
require unity and continuity/stability (or recognize that those conditions were not part of
the concept in the first place) in the respects that a DID patient lacks them. I think we
should say that in such cases there is more than one self present, because selves do
require unity and continuity/stability, though those things are constituted by their being
perceived as such by the person. There is, in such cases, however, only one person,
because there is only one self-consciously concerned being - only one organized
structure realizing those capacities, one agent representing the mental states as
belonging to multiple individuals. Therefore, when deciding responsibility for an action, a
DID patient is a single person who may or may not be responsible for some actions.
However, all of his selves would have to be taken into account both when deciding
whether or not he is responsible for the particular action as well as the degree of praise
or blame/reward or punishment appropriate.
Returning to the case of Mary Jackson, though her character and behavior
changed radically due to her tumour, she did not represent her thoughts and actions as
belonging to a distinct individual. For that reason I would say that she had a single self
from before during and after the period when she had the tumour, though it changed
qualitatively quite a bit. One might object at this point, that individuating selves in this
way makes it so that the concept of ‘self’ doesn’t do the work I mean for it to do in
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interpreting phrases like “I am (have) a different person (self) than I used to be (have),”
since such a phrase is not always uttered and believed by someone with a pathology
such as DID or schizophrenia. However, even in non-pathological cases, the phrase is
sincerely uttered when someone thinks that she has changed so radically that her
current thoughts, actions and experiences are not attributable to the individual she was
in the past. So in such a case I think it is appropriate to say the person has a
quantitatively different self, as their current features are indexed to a different individual
than their former features were. Again, this criterion is genuinely subjective, so if Mary
genuinely feels that her thoughts, actions and experiences during her tumour period
really belonged to someone else, then she did have a different self during that period. If
she believes she was a different person than she is mistaken about that, though if she
were to come to understand the distinction I have drawn between persons and selves
she might come to agree that she was not actually a different person but merely had a
different self.
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Chapter 5: Metaphysical and Moral Personhood
I began this study by explaining that the concept of a person has been
considered not only to be a metaphysical concept, but one with ethical or moral one
connotations as well, and there has been some doubt cast by various writers, including
Dennett (1978) and Chappell (2011) on the notion that one can fully disentangle the
metaphysical criteria from the ethical and moral connotations. Indeed, to some extent it
follows from my account of persons that one cannot fully do so because of the forensic
implications of ‘person’, which are at the same time its principal utility as a term. The set
of capacities, self-consciousness and concern, possessed jointly by all and only
persons, is also the set of capacities required for someone to be responsible for his or
her actions such that it would be reasonable to put that individual on trial or have him or
her offer testimony, sign a contractual agreement, or give informed consent, provided
the person is able to communicate with a sufficient number of the other persons
involved in a given case. However, despite being bound up with the notion of
responsibility, the metaphysical notion of a person as I have presented it implies nothing
about the moral goodness of persons, i.e. that they are concerned for others or
otherwise behave in morally obligatory or praiseworthy ways. Furthermore, establishing
whether a being is or isn’t a person cannot by itself settle bioethical debates about
euthanasia, abortion, and animal cruelty, where the question of the rights of individuals,
their value as beings, and the reality or significance of their suffering is at issue.
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In this chapter, I argue that the metaphysical concept of a person has no moral
implications, beyond the issue of responsibility, that follow from it uniquely. I will begin
by arguing that nothing about the metaphysical concept of a person or a responsible
agent grounds any ideal of moral behavior, because while responsibility, and therefore
personhood, requires concern, it does not require that one is concerned for the interests
of others, so that even complete psychopaths may be persons. Then I will turn to the
role of personhood in bioethics, appealing to writers in that field who have offered
reasons for thinking that the concept of a person is unhelpful for resolving bioethical
debates and offering my own argument for that claim, to the effect that the set of
paradigmatic person constituting capacities are not the same as the capacities morally
relevant to those debates and that unlike responsibility, which is a matter of
metaphysical fact, rights are social constructs that are conferred upon persons and
other beings by persons and so do not have definite metaphysically grounded
conditions of application. Finally, I will argue, following Singer (1975/2002), that while
our judgments of whose interests are morally significant are partially grounded in the
capacity for concern, because being a concerned being is necessary for having
interests in the first place, judgments of moral significance are not similarly grounded by
other capacities such as self-consciousness and responsibility.
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I.

Personhood and concern for others
According to the view developed in chapter one, to be a person one must have

the capacity for concern, which I define as affective investment in the satisfaction of
one’s goals (which is what makes a goal a genuine desire) and the truths of one’s
beliefs, at least insofar as they are related to the satisfaction of one’s desires. This is the
case, because without concern one cannot fully appreciate the consequences of one’s
actions and therefore cannot be responsible for any of those actions. One’s concerns
may be self-directed or directed towards others, in the sense that one may be
emotionally invested in the satisfaction of one’s own desires or in the satisfaction of
someone else’s desires. A psychological egoist would claim, however, that all concern
is ultimately self-directed. This is not the place to argue that point, but, as I mentioned in
chapter two, one can in the present be concerned that things will be one way and not
another in the future long after one ceases to exist, so that one’s concerns need not be
self-directed in the sense of pertaining to one’s own anticipated experiences. I think that
they need never be so, and in that sense a person might be entirely altruistic. On the
other hand, I hold that a person needn’t ever be concerned for the satisfaction of the
desires of anyone other than him or herself and in this way I depart from many other
writers on the subject of personhood. As I see it, normal human beings, the paradigm
examples of personhood, as well as many other creatures33, admit of varying degrees of

33

Peterson 2011 relates evidence of varying levels of empathy and altruism within different
animal species. For instance: “Fifteen rhesus monkeys were taught to acquire food treats by
pulling on one of two chains, either of which would deliver the same amount of food….
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concern for others. Paragons of altruism, such as Siddhartha Gautama, Jesus and more
recently Mother Teresa are at one end of the spectrum, overflowing with their concern
for others seemingly without limit. In the middle are people like myself, and probably my
reader, who are deeply concerned for a few others, particularly those people one
regards as close friends and family members, and have some minimal concern for all
humans and perhaps some other sentient beings, but also a substantial degree of
selfishness that limits our concern for others. Loving someone might be understood as
being as concerned for that individual as much as (or more than) you are for yourself,
so that most of us can love one or a few other individuals, but not everyone.
On the opposite end of the spectrum from the saints are the psychopaths, who
seem to have no concern for others. The term ‘psychopath’ and the closely related
‘sociopath’ have been dropped from recent editions of the DSM, and the symptoms
whenever the experimental monkeys pulled one of the two chains [a third monkey within their
view] would receive a shock… two thirds of the monkeys quickly developed a significant
preference for pulling on the chain that did not shock the other monkey, and of the one third of
the group who showed no preference, two actually stopped pulling the chain altogether...
[choosing] genuine hunger and even the possibility of starvation rather than cause pain to a
fellow monkey.” (Peterson 2011, 229) Also: “One day in late June 2000, a young African forest
elephant weak from malnutrition, collapsed off to one side of a narrow, sandy trail in a Central
African forest… within a few hours died… During... [the following] two days, then, elephants
walking along the sandy trail made 129 visits to a fellow elephant in trouble… About 50 percent
of them reacted as you might expect: They showed signs of fear and avoidance… One
exceptional individual, known as Miss Lonelyheart, visited several times on the second day and
reacted aggressively to the body, stabbing it with her tusks and attempting to tear pieces away
from it. Miss Lonelyheart was already well-known [to the observing scientists] as a social misfit,
and her bizarre behavior was not out of character… the elephants identified in the other half of
the sample… included many instances of socially positive reactions to the drama of another
elephant in trouble. Some 15 percent of the total visits during those two days involved protective
behavior: the visitor seeming to protect or guard the body from others. And in about 18 percent
of the cases, the visiting elephants looked as if they were trying to assist or revive the dying
elephant, mostly by attempting to push or lift her upright, using their feet, trunks or tusks.”
(Peterson 2011, 217-218)
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associated with such labels are now included under the larger umbrella of ‘antisocial
personality disorder’. However ‘psychopath’ still looms large in the psychological
literature, so I will continue to use it here. Hare (2003) offers a checklist of psychopathic
personality and lifestyle traits which includes the following: glib and superficial charm,
grandiose self-worth, need for stimulation or proneness to boredom, pathological lying,
cunning and manipulativeness, lack of remorse or guilt, shallow affect, callousness and
lack of empathy, parasitic lifestyle, poor behavioral controls, promiscuous sexual
behavior, early behavior problems, lack of realistic long term goals, impulsivity, failure to
accept responsibility for actions (which implies that they are in fact sometimes
responsible), many short-term marital relationships.
Psychopaths are primarily characterized by their lack of remorse and failure to
govern their actions according to moral rules. Though long considered a psychological
disorder, psychopaths are often very high functioning and successful by many
measures. In response to a casual statement by Hare that ‘‘Not all psychopaths are in
prison. Some are in the Boardroom”’ (Hare, 2002). Babiak et. al (2010) ran studies
whose “results provide evidence that a high level of psychopathic traits does not
necessarily impede progress and advancement in corporate organizations.” (Babiak et.
al, 192) Therefore, psychopathy does not fit into the general definition of a psychological
disorder as something that impedes an individual from achieving her goals or living her
life as she chooses. Nevertheless, psychopathy is seen as pathological because of the
harmful effects the psychopath’s behavior has on the rest of society. There is
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considerable debate over just how to understand the underlying psychological defects
that lead to the psychopathic personality and lifestyle. Some comparison has been
made with another psychiatric condition, autism, which has been thought to be primarily
constituted by a deficit in mindreading or Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e. the ability to infer
the beliefs, desires and other intentional states of other people from their behavior. (E.g.
Baron-Cohen 2002) However, recent work has shown that psychopaths do not
characteristically display deficits in ToM. (Richell et al. 2003) Other research has
distinguished cognitive ToM from affective ToM (i.e. empathy) and found that
psychopaths are deficient in the latter but not the former. (James et al. 1997 and
Shamay-Tsoory et al 2008) The idea is that psychopaths have no problem interpreting
the behavior of others and assigning intentional states to them, including negative
affective states of suffering and distress - they are actually quite good at that, and use
that understanding to manipulate people for their own purposes - they are just not
emotionally moved by the bad feelings of others, i.e. they don’t feel bad that other
people or animals are suffering.
This explanation of psychopathy, that it is due to emotional, not cognitive or
intellectual deficits is complicatedly related to the classic ‘moral insanity’ diagnosis
(Prichard 1835), whereby psychopaths lack the capacity to recognize the difference
between right and wrong. This complication cuts to the heart of moral philosophy, the
question of whether or not one can truly appreciate the difference between right and
wrong, yet not be moved to do what is right, without suffering from any weakness of will.
231

Psychopaths do seem to appreciate that there are moral rules, what counts as following
them, and that other people take themselves to be bound by them. According to the
findings of Cima et al. (2010) and Koenigs et al. (2012) psychopaths do not differ from
non-psychopaths in their judgments about various moral dilemmas. Cima et al. (2010)
conclude from this that psychopaths understand what counts as morally right or wrong - ordinary emotional reactions to morally salient scenarios are not necessary for such
judgments -- but that they don’t care about whether or not their own actions are right or
wrong. One aspect of morality that they do fail to appreciate is the difference between
moral and conventional rules. In one respect they see all rules governing behavior as
moral rules, because they are serious and authority independent, however, they don’t
take themselves to be bound by any of those rules, seeing them as mere expressions of
particular values which they need not share, and in that respect treat them as
conventional.
Consider the following quote from the paradigmatic psychopath, Ted Bundy,
who recorded these comments about committing the rape and murder of a woman:
Then I learned that all moral judgments are ‘value judgments,’ that all value
judgments are subjective, and that none can be proved to be either ‘right’ or
‘wrong’. Believe it or not but I figured out that for myself that if the rationality of
one moral judgment was zero, multiplying it by millions would not make it one
whit more rational. Nor is there any ‘reason’ to obey the law for anyone, like
myself, who has the boldness and daring – the strength of character – to throw
off its shackles. I discovered that to become truly free, truly unfettered, I had to
become truly uninhibited. And I quickly discovered that the greatest obstacle to
my freedom, the greatest block and limitation to it, consists in the insupportable
‘value judgment’ that I was bound to respect the rights of others. I asked myself,
who were these ‘others’? Why is it more wrong to kill a human animal than any
other animal, a pig or a sheep or a steer? Is your life more to you than a hog’s life
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to a hog? Why should I be willing to sacrifice my pleasure more for the one than
for the other? Surely, you would not, in this age of scientific enlightenment,
declare that God or nature has marked some pleasures as ‘moral’ or ‘good’ and
others as ‘immoral’ or ‘bad’? In any case, let me assure you, my dear lady, that
there is absolutely no comparison between the pleasure I might take in eating
ham and the pleasure I anticipate in raping and murdering you. That is the
honest conclusion to which my education has led me – after the most
conscientious examination of my spontaneous and uninhibited self. (quoted in
Michaud and Aynesworth 1989)
There doesn’t seem to be any cognitive impairment in Bundy’s reasoning. His
view of morality is not so different from that of an emotivist like Charles Stevenson, who
takes moral judgments to be mere expressions of feelings, rather than claims about the
world that may or may not be confirmed or disconfirmed by facts. (Stevenson 1937) The
difference between them is that, unlike Stevenson, I suppose, Bundy just doesn’t seem
to feel bad about those he is harming (nor would he for harming a hog or a steer,
though his reasoning would seem equally to imply that he should be a vegetarian as it
would that he may rape and murder people). One can understand moral rules as noncognitive, emotive value judgments or as social conventions, but think that they are very
special value judgments or conventions because of the severe consequences of their
violation, consequences that would cause emotional distress in most people. Bundy’s
attitude towards his victims is then best understood as a deficit in empathic distress, not
a deficit in cognitive abilities. He appreciates the facts of the situation that people take to
be morally relevant, but he does not respond to them emotionally the way most people
do. This is due both to a lack of empathy and a lack of the fear response most people
would have when considering how one would feel if roles were reversed and someone
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behaved in this way toward oneself. Bundy sees that attitude as a type of courage and
therefore lauds himself for it, contemptuous for those whose weakness binds them to
morality.
However, despite this lack of concern for others and deficit in some emotions
such as guilt, shame and fear, psychopaths like Bundy do have concern, in the sense
that they care that their own desires be satisfied. They do experience many emotions,
such as anger, frustration, joy, and amusement. Furthermore, as the Bundy quote
shows, they are fully self-conscious, appear to appreciate their own desires and affirm
them as desires they are pleased to have. They proudly claim ownership of their desires
as their own. Therefore, I see no reason to think they are not responsible for their
actions or lack personhood. If anyone is responsible for doing something that is wrong,
it is the unconflicted psychopath and not individuals who suffer from weakness of will or
ignorance. Psychopaths are persons, just extremely bad ones. Intuitively, when a selfconsciously concerned individual does things that we disapprove of, and does not
display any inner conflict, but seems perfectly content to do those things, we do not
think their personhood or responsibility diminished, but only think of that individual as a
bad person responsible for bad things. That concern, but not concern for others, is
necessary for personhood, explains and justifies the intuition that psychopaths are
responsible for their actions and are, therefore, persons. Concern for others is unequally
distributed among persons, as it is within many animal species, so that being a person
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or non-person says nothing about the extent to which one may exhibit positive moral
behavior.

II.

Irrationality, insanity and immorality
Some philosophers offer arguments for the claim that behaving immorally entails

a lack of rationality or sanity, and therefore a lack of responsibility or personhood,
because, they claim, there is normativity bound up in those very notions. In chapter one,
I engaged with Dennett’s “Conditions of Personhood” (1978), examining his six
‘themes’, basically agreeing with him (with a few caveats) that they, particularly the sixth
theme of ‘self-consciousness’, are necessary for personhood, though arguing that he
left out one other essential condition, that of ‘concern’. Dennett himself is not satisfied
that his list, which he takes to be a more or less complete analysis of the metaphysical
features associated with the notion of a person, gives us exclusive and exhaustive
criteria for ‘moral personhood’, but not because any further criteria were left off his list.
His remarks are rather enigmatic, so I here quote them at length before offering
analysis:
Now, finally, why are we not in a position to claim that these necessary
conditions of moral personhood are also sufficient? Simply because the concept
of a person is, I have tried to show, inescapably normative. Human beings or
other entities can only aspire to being approximations of the ideal, and there can
be no way to set a "passing grade" that is not arbitrary. Were the six conditions
(strictly interpreted) considered sufficient they would not ensure that any actual
entity was a person, for nothing would ever fulfill them. The moral notion of a
person and the metaphysical notion of a person are not separate and distinct
concepts but just two different and unstable resting points on the same
continuum. This relativity infects the satisfaction of conditions of personhood at
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every level. There is no objectively satisfiable sufficient condition for an entity's
really having beliefs, and as we uncover apparent irrationality under an
intentional interpretation of an entity, our grounds for ascribing any beliefs at all
wanes, especially when we have (what we always can have in principle) a nonintentional, mechanistic account of the entity. In just the same way our
assumption that an entity is a person is shaken precisely in those cases where it
matters: when wrong has been done and the question of responsibility arises.
For in these cases the grounds for saying that the person is culpable (the
evidence that he did wrong, was aware he was doing wrong, and did wrong of his
own free will) are in themselves grounds for doubting that it is a person we are
dealing with at all. And if it is asked what could settle our doubts, the answer is:
nothing. When such problems arise we cannot even tell in our own cases if we
are persons. (Dennett 1978, 193-4)
Dennett says that the metaphysical conditions he has claimed are necessary for
being a person cannot be sufficient for being a person in the full moral sense, but I think
this way of putting the point is confused. Here is what I think he is really getting at: He is
suggesting that whenever a person acts immorally, the rationality of their behavior is
called into doubt. Because rationality is a necessary condition of personhood, we have
reason to doubt that anyone who acts immorally really does meet the criteria for
personhood. Since this doubt arises in just the cases where the concept of moral
personhood is important, i.e. when someone has committed an immoral action and we
want to know whether or not he or she is responsible for doing so, we are left with a
paradox. An individual who self-consciously performs an immoral action acts irrationally
and therefore does not act intentionally in the way necessary for being self-conscious.
Therefore, what follows from Dennett’s reasoning isn’t really about the sufficiency of his
conditions, but instead, that there are no metaphysical conditions that can be seen as
necessary for moral personhood. If rationality is necessary for intentionality,
236

intentionality necessary for self-consciousness, self-consciousness necessary for
responsibility and responsibility necessary for personhood, and to act immorally is
irrational, then anyone who acts immorally is, in respect of that action, not a person. If
‘person’ is essentially normative, implying a moral ideal of good conduct, then almost no
one really is or has ever been a person.
Citing Locke’s passage about the forensic nature of ‘person’, Dennett explains
the moral notion of a person as that of a being “who is accountable, who has both rights
and responsibilities,” (Dennett 1978, 176) and then goes on to wonder whether being a
self-conscious being (or regarded as one) is equivalent to being an end-in-oneself or
merely a precondition of being one. However, this characterization goes beyond Locke’s
forensic use of person in a way that muddles the issue. Being responsible in a sense
that is more or less synonymous with ‘accountable’ is central to personhood, however,
as I have argued above, being an individual with rights or particular ‘responsibilities’ (i.e.
duties or obligations)34 or being and end-in-oneself does not go hand in hand with
responsibility/accountability. So Dennett’s target in attempting to fit the metaphysical
conditions of personhood to the moral notion is broader and more heterogeneous than
he thinks. ‘Moral personhood’, for Dennett consists not just in the capacity for acting in
such a way that one is responsible for those actions, but also being the bearer of ‘most
rights’ (which ones he does not enumerate) and of having and recognizing duties to
others, i.e. treating them as ends-in-themselves. Given such a maximal conception of
34

One can be responsible for one’s actions even if there are no particular things that one is
obligated to do.
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what it takes to be a moral person, Dennett is right to think that most, perhaps all of us,
fall short of the mark. However, where I disagree with Dennett is about his claim that the
normativity associated with the moral notion of personhood is built into the metaphysical
conditions themselves, such that one can’t even claim with any assurance that any
individual is a genuine person in even the metaphysical sense of the term.
Dennett’s claim, that an individual’s rationality may be called into doubt whenever
that individual does something morally wrong, is dubious. That would only be the case if
it is always or at least usually irrational to do things that are morally wrong. To assume
that is so is to endorse a conception of morality where doing the right thing is entirely a
matter of grasping truths about what constitutes right or wrong action, the principal truth
being either, following Kant, that one should treat others as ends in themselves and
never as means to one’s own ends; or, following the utilitarians, that one should act to
secure the greatest possible benefit and least harm, taking the interests of all morally
relevant beings into account. One could argue in favor of either principle by appealing to
the fact that there are no ethically relevant differences between one person and
another, so that one has no good reason to privilege one’s own interests over those of
another. However, it’s not clear that there are decisive reasons for not privileging one’s
own desires over those of others.
Rawls’ ethical theory attempts to provide some such reasons, supplementing
Kant’s or the utilitarian’s principles (though not necessarily in such a way that Kant or
the utilitarians would have approved) by providing a justification for taking the interests
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of everyone else into account. If one had no idea what station in life one would end up
in, one would choose the most equitable distribution of benefit possible. Granting Rawls’
view that in the “original position” where individuals are asked to make judgements
about the normative principles that should govern society, an ideally rational agent
would opt for justice (as Rawls conceives of it), Dennett claims that “just as part of our
warrant for considering an entity to have any beliefs or other Intentions is our ability to
construe the entity as rational, so our grounds for considering an entity a person include
our ability to view him as abiding by the principles of justice.” (Dennett 1978, 190)
However that would only be true if we were in the original position so that the most
rationally self-interested choice (assuming that the kind of rationality necessary for
being ascribed intentions really does require one act to maximize self-interest in the first
place) were the choice that is also the most just. As it is we do not in fact make our
decisions behind a veil of ignorance, so it is not clear that it is most rational to care what
happens to anyone besides oneself. If someone steals or kills for profit, it is clear that
the person is rational in both the minimal sense implied by goal-directedness that
Dennett takes to be the ground for thinking of something as an intentional system and in
the sense that the person is acting in her own self-interest. There need be no fault in
that individual’s ability to reason in either sense. Only if one’s goal is to be egalitarian or
altruistic in one’s actions, would selfish behavior be a sign of irrationality, though even
then it might also be explained by weakness of will.
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A related challenge to the claim that persons needn’t act morally comes from
Susan Wolf’s criterion of sanity for responsibility. Wolf develops her criterion as a
supplement to what she calls “deep-self” views of responsibility, such as Frankfurt’s, but
also those of Watson (1975) and Taylor (1976). What she takes to be common to these
views is that they
share the idea that responsible agency involves something more than intentional
agency. All agree that if we are responsible agents, it is not just because our
actions are in control of our wills, but because, in addition, our wills are not just
psychological states in us, but expressions of characters that come from us, or at
any rate that are acknowledged and affirmed by us… In one way or another, all
these philosophers seem to be saying that the key to responsibility lies in the fact
that responsible agents are those for whom it is not just the case that their
actions are in the control of their wills, but also the case that their wills are in the
control of their selves, in some deeper sense. (Wolf 1987, 49)
I have appealed to the kind of view Wolf is talking about in my account of
personhood. Wolf agrees that such a view distinguishes responsible agents from, on the
one hand, kleptomaniacs and other compulsives, who reject their desires or see them
as alien to themselves, so that their first order desires and the actions that result from
them are at odds with their deep selves (given my account of the self in the previous
chapter, it seems to me that the adjective ‘deep’ doesn’t add much, but I’ll use it for
now) and on the other hand, from animals or other intentional agents who cannot be
responsible for their actions in the way that persons can because they lack deep selves
altogether. I’m more interested in the second distinction than the first because my view
is about the conditions necessary and sufficient to be a responsible agent in general,
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not those for being responsible for some particular action. A kleptomaniac may be
responsible for some other actions even if he is not responsible for stealing.
However, Wolf thinks that having the capacity for second order volitions or any
other kind of deep self is not sufficient for being a responsible agent, because one might
still lack a further necessary condition of responsibility, which she calls ‘sanity’. She
introduces this condition by way of illustration through the story of ‘Jojo’, raised by a
sadistic dictator of a father who teaches Jojo to delight in hurting people. Jojo learns to
fully identify with the sadistic desires he develops as a result of this upbringing in the
way Frankfurt and the others think is sufficient for responsibility. However, for Wolf, it is
clear that Jojo is not a responsible agent, not because he lacks some kind of self-control
over his actions, but because Jojo is not sane, his values are not “controlled by
processes that afford an accurate conception of the world.” (Wolf 1987, 55) Now,
keeping in mind my distinction between being responsible for some action vs. being a
responsible agent in general, I’m not sure if Wolf would deny that Jojo meets the latter
condition and is therefore, on my view not a person at all (Wolf herself does not seem to
agree that being a responsible agent goes hand in hand with being a person). However,
Wolf explains the scenario as if all of Jojo’s actions follow from the wicked nature
cultivated in him by his father, so it would follow that, on Wolf’s account, Jojo cannot be
responsible for any actions and therefore, given my account of the criteria for being a
person, lacks personhood.
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Wolf’s definition of sanity is taken from the legal domain, specifically the
M’Naghten rule or ‘right-wrong’ test, according to which “a person is sane if: (1) he
knows what he is doing and (2) he knows that what he is doing, as the case may be, is
right or wrong,” the second of which requires, for Wolf, “the minimally sufficient ability,
cognitively and normatively to recognize and appreciate the world for what it is.” (Wolf
1987, 55) On her view an immoral individual such as Jojo counts as insane because
such an individual violates the second of the two conditions, by failing to recognize or
appreciate certain facts about the world, i.e. moral facts. For example, she says that “a
person who, even on reflection, cannot see that having someone tortured because he
failed to salute you is wrong plainly lacks the requisite ability [to distinguish right from
wrong]” and therefore, “although like us, Jojo’s actions flow from desires that flow from
his deep self, unlike us, Jojo’s deep self is itself insane.” (Wolf 1987, 56)
The criterion of sanity, for Wolf, supplements the deep-self views, by offering
what she thinks should be a satisfying response to the hard determinists’ objection to
the compatibilism of the deep-self views that we are no more free to choose our deep
selves than we can our first order desires. Her point is that what is needed, beyond the
ability to scrutinize and revise ourselves, is not the ability to create ourselves, as the
hard determinists would have it, but rather only to correct ourselves, to “self-evaluate
sensibly and accurately.” (Wolf 1987, 60). This, for Wolf, marks a distinction between
sane individuals, who are capable of evaluating themselves sensibly and accurately and
only they can transform themselves as that evaluation tells them to, and therefore, can
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“take responsibility for the selves [they] are but did not ultimately create,” (Wolf 1987,
60) and insane individuals, who do not possess that capacity.
Aside from the fact that Wolf’s criterion does little that should satisfy the hard
determinists, there are several objections to her argument that such a morally loaded
attribute of sanity is necessary for responsibility. She has considered some of these
objections herself, and has attempted to respond to them, though, as I will try to show,
unsuccessfully. Furthermore, the more powerful objections are those which do not
appear in her essay, some of which are actually made salient by her answers to the
others.
The first objection Wolf considers targets her apparent confidence in her own
and other sane people’s judgments that they are in fact sane, that they appreciate the
morally significant aspects of the world and that their deep selves are appropriately
calibrated in response to those aspects. How can one ever be sure that one is any
saner in one’s moral judgments than Jojo, a Nazi or a slave owner. Wolf’s answer is that
“nothing justifies this except widespread intersubjective agreement and the considerable
success we have getting around in the world and satisfying our needs.” (Wolf 1987, 60)
She admits that in time we may discover that some things in our cognitive and
normative outlook may be revealed to be mistaken, “but our judgments of responsibility
can only be made from here on the basis of the values and understandings that we can
develop by exercising the abilities we do possess as well and as fully as possible.” (Wolf
1987, 61)
243

There are two main ideas of what justifies a judgment of sanity in this response
that I will list in reverse order: 1. what lets us get around in the world and satisfy our
needs and 2. widespread intersubjective agreement. The first can be no help in deciding
who is sane and who isn’t, assuming that Nazis, slave owners and Jojo aren’t sane,
because such people are quite good at satisfying their own needs at the expense of
others. Wolf might answer, that it is not what satisfies one’s individual needs that
matters, but what satisfies the needs of everyone. However, as ethical puzzle cases are
meant to show, it is often the case that a given action must satisfy some people’s needs
at the expense of others. Furthermore, to assume such a general moral principle that
one should act to satisfy the needs of all or of the greatest number, etc. cannot be the
basis on which judgments of moral sanity are made, because they would then be
question-begging. We cannot decide who is sane between the egoist and utilitarian just
by assuming that utilitarianism is true.
As for the second idea, while intersubjective agreement does play a role in how
we decide what is reasonable to expect from others, it cannot by itself determine who is
morally sane and who is not, because that would make righteous dissent impossible in
the same way that cultural-bound ethical relativism does. The dominant voice in society
could then never be wrong in its ethical judgments, so that, contrary to Wolf’s claims
(which can be challenged for other reasons) slave owners of the past would actually
turn out to be sane and abolitionists insane.
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Nevertheless, these objections are not by themselves fatal to Wolf’s view
because they only target an epistemic claim about how we decide who (including
ourselves) is sane or insane. That we could be largely wrong about that implies that
there is an objective truth about who is sane or insane, in Wolf’s sense, although it is
not clear that there is such a truth anyway. The issue of the truth or falsity of moral
realism, the view that there are objective moral facts about the world, on which partially
rests the issue of the objectivity of judgments of moral sanity, is an enormous one in
moral philosophy and resolving it is certainly beyond the scope of this study. That Wolf
seems to assume its truth might by itself be taken as a weakness of her position,
particularly because of the epistemic limits addressed in the preceding paragraph. More
importantly, though, even if there are objective moral facts, it is even more doubtful that
failure to recognize them or be moved by them constitutes insanity in a way that
mitigates responsibility.
Wolf herself admits that “it would unduly distort ordinary linguistic practice to call
the slaveowner, the Nazi, the male chauvinist even partially or locally insane,” (Wolf
1987, 57) but maintains that “the reason for withholding blame from them is at bottom
the same as the reason for withholding it from Jojo,” (Wolf 1987, 57) i.e. they are unable
to judge the world for what it is, and therefore their deep selves are not sane. I’m not
sure how Wolf means to iron out the apparent contradiction in these two
pronouncements. Perhaps she means that ‘not sane’ is the appropriate descriptor,
though ‘insane’ is not, but I don’t see why there is a difference between them. In any
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case, sanity does not seem to be the issue. A slave owner may believe that her slaves
are naturally inferior individuals, and would certainly be wrong in that opinion, but being
wrong is not the same as being insane. Ignorance is not the same thing as insanity (or
non-sanity). A Nazi may have been brought up to believe that there is an Aryan race
whose members are the rightful rulers of humanity. Simply believing this, given a lack of
evidence to the contrary, is not insanity. Believing it in the face of such evidence might
be. So being a Nazi in a humane society is really a better ground (though not a decisive
one) for attributing a lack of sanity to an individual than is an individual’s being a Nazi
having grown up in Nazi Germany.
Jojo’s insanity, for Wolf, is due to the fact that Jojo was deprived of the sort of
experiences necessary for developing an appreciation for the difference between right
and wrong. I wonder, however, what sort of experiences would have been sufficient for
such appreciation. Would any kind of countervailing influence suffice? A humanitarian
leaflet found in the gutter? An overheard diatribe spoken by a prisoner being hauled off
in shackles? A cousin with anti-authoritarian leanings who visited the house twice a
year? Or looking directly into the eyes of a suffering person who pleads for his help?
Suppose there are some cases in which these meager sources of dissent do sufficiently
contribute to the ‘sanity’ of some individuals, but not in Jojo’s case, where they are
similarly available. Does Jojo, then, still get off the hook? If so, then it can’t be because
the right experiences were unavailable.
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An even more powerful objection to Wolf’s position, one that she anticipates, is
that if her view is correct then only morally good people are sane. This is similar to the
problem Dennett saw with his own conditions of responsibility and personhood. If
responsibility requires rationality and it is irrational to be immoral, then no one is ever
responsible for doing something morally wrong.35 Wolf responds to this objection, in a
way that she admits is not entirely satisfying, by distinguishing between the ability to
judge the world for how it is and the exercise of that ability. However, as she herself
recognizes, it is difficult to see what that distinction amounts to. If not exercising such an
ability is a matter of weakness of will, then it seems that such a failure is the kind of
case that is a paradigmatic example of something that, on the deep self views, one is
not responsible for, because one does not fully identify with or approve of one’s action.
On the other hand, if the failure to do what one judges to be right or to refrain from doing
what one judges to be wrong is not weakness of will, what it means to judge something
to be right or wrong must be clarified. One might believe that there is a certain rule, and
yet not wish to obey it. This seems to be the case with psychopaths. So a sane but
immoral person would be one who knows what the moral facts are, because she knows
what the rules others abide by are, but does not follow those rules. Perhaps what
distinguishes Jojo from that sort of person is that Jojo hasn’t ever learned of the moral
rules of others, and so cannot judge what would count as an instance of following them
versus not doing so. But again that seems to be a matter of ignorance, not insanity. We
35

R. Abelson (2014) raises this objection and thinks that it also applies to Kantian morality in
general.
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might not punish an individual for committing a crime or an immoral action because that
individual was ignorant of the rule forbidding it, but that is not the same as judging the
individual to be insane. If Jojo fails to do what is right, to want to do what is right, and to
want to want to do it, after being educated in moral principles, then the problem would
have to be that he is not moved to do what he has been taught is morally right for he
has not internalized those values. Such a failure cannot then be one of knowledge or
correct perception, and so I think must be of feeling.
Cases where an individual self-consciously affirms something immoral are best
understood not as irrational or insane, but as lacking concern for the interests of others.
This can seemingly be either programmed by genetics or taught from experience, but in
either case individuals who delight in torture, lie, cheat, steal, rape and murder without
compunction, do not fail to see the world for what it is, but rather fail to care about it in
the way that most of us do. Again, concern is necessary for responsibility, and
therefore, for personhood, but that does not require that one is concerned for anyone
other than oneself. Assuming someone like Jojo is aware of but does not abide or wish
to abide by the principle that causing unnecessary suffering in others is wrong, then
what Jojo lacks is empathy. However, a lack of empathy does not mitigate
responsibility. It is precisely those who are aware of the harm they are causing to others
but who do not care about that harm who are most justifiedly judged culpable for
causing it.
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III.

Responsibility, rights and personhood
Another way in which personhood has often been thought to be bound up with

ethics and morality is in the domain of rights. I have already mentioned Chappell who
takes the class of persons to be our primary moral constituency (PMC). Similarly,
Anderson (2000) defines a person as “any entity that has the moral right of selfdetermination,” a right that distinguishes “persons from pets and from property. A
person is the kind of entity that has the moral right to make its own life choices, to live
its life without (unprovoked) interference from others.” Other authors (e.g. Campbell
2011) who take persons to be the unique bearers of various rights have used the
concept of a person to decide bioethical debates such as abortion and euthanasia. If
only persons have a right to life, then deciding whether or not a fetus is a person should
decide whether or not abortion is wrong. Similarly for euthanasia, if it is only wrong to kill
persons or let persons die and not other beings, then it is crucial to know whether or not
a fetus or someone in an irreversible persistent vegetative state, being kept alive only
by artificial life support, is or is not a person, in order to know whether it is morally
permissible to pull the plug.
However, there have been several challenges to the idea that persons are
unique bearers of rights or moral significance. Most visibly, there is the animal rights
movement, which claims rights to life, fair treatment, and freedom on behalf of nonhuman animals. One way to reconcile this tension might be to extend the sphere of
personhood to include all animals, but this would be to abandon the primary usefulness
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of the term ‘person’ since most of what we consider animals are clearly not responsible
for their actions in the way that normal human beings are, because they lack selfconsciousness. This fact is the reason for the absurdity of granting the status of ‘person’
to dogs and cats, and even non-living beings such as rivers. Avoiding this absurdity
would require saying that beings other than persons can have rights. The example of
Bolivia is instructive, where ‘nature’ has been granted rights, though there is no mention
of personhood. (Vidal 2011) A further reason for which the usefulness of the concept of
the person for resolving ethical debates has been questioned comes from the motley
way it has been employed in the bioethical sphere, leading some writers to hold that it is
too messy a concept, metaphysically speaking, to help us resolve the all-important life
or death issues surrounding abortion, euthanasia and animal cruelty.
Gordijn (2011) is one writer who has has argued that the concept of a person
should be removed from the bioethical arena. The main thrust of the attack is that
because neither philosophers nor ordinary people can come to a consensus on what a
person is, the concept can only be employed irresponsibly when it is used to demarcate
a class of beings with a special moral standing as regards our freedom to harm or kill
them. I agree that the danger Gordijn fears is real and that personal status does not
decide who or what falls within our sphere of ethical concern, though I don’t endorse his
argument for that claim.
Gordijn thinks that the concept of a person is hopelessly vague. There is no
common usage of the term. It is largely an invention of philosophers and none of them
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agree on what it means. For this reason, the term cannot be usefully employed in
bioethical debates. It can only lead to deception and confusion, and it doesn’t look like
there is any emerging philosophical consensus that can fix it:
a purely pragmatic use of the concept of the person as gathering the
different qualities that transform an entity into a moral agent cannot be
defended, since using the concept of the person only leads to confusion
within the debate. This is… because the variety of lists of necessary
conditions for personhood that the participants have in mind is so great,
that the concept of the person is far from unambiguous. Therefore, using
the concept does not contribute to mutual understanding and thus has no
pragmatic use at all. (Gordijn 1999, 354)
The problem, as Gordijn sees it, is that since Locke divorced the concept of a
person from any reference to a particular substance (physical or mental) personhood
has been treated as a matter of a being (made of any kind of substance) having certain
properties. While most contemporary thinkers assume that persons are always physical,
since everything is, the focus is on the properties (biological or psychological) not the
substance that possesses them (if there are substances at all.) The possession of these
special properties not only makes something a person, but is supposed to give it a
special moral status. A being with these properties, however they are delineated, is
supposed to have special rights and privileges, e.g. a right to life and fair treatment. The
problem is that because there is such a plurality of conflicting lists of person-making
properties, one cannot be certain what someone is talking about when they use the
word “person”. If this is the problem, however, then it isn’t a consequence of Locke
divorcing the concept from the concept of any particular substance. If persons were
brains, bodies, psyches or pneuma, the problem of disagreement over properties would
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remain. It may have seemed easier before Locke, because it was assumed that mental
substance had certain essential properties which are characteristic of persons.
However, even if we accepted that, there could still be disagreement over what those
properties are.
Gordijn claims that due to the vagueness of the concept ‘person’, it can easily be
used as what he calls a “cover-up concept”. It will be useful to quote what he says here
at length:
Since there is no independent external criterion of demarcation of qualities
that are and those that are not necessary conditions for personhood, a
participant in an (sic) bioethical debate can simply choose a specific set of
properties as being necessary for personhood in order to corroborate his
own moral views. As it happens, his particular choice of certain qualities
as being necessary conditions for personhood cannot be decisively
criticized by his opponents, since there is no consensus on any ontology
or metaphysics of the person that could deliver the necessary tools for
such criticism. Through this circumstance, participants in bioethical
debates can use the concept of the person as a tactical instrument, for by
fixing a broader or a narrower concept of the person they can enlarge or
diminish the group of human beings that can be looked upon as
possessing moral status. In this way, they can morally justify their own
acts with respect to certain groups of human beings as well as condemn
certain other practices of which they, for some reason or another, do not
approve. In this way, arguments using the concept of the person are a
form of begging the question. (Gordijn 1999, 355)
The kind of question-begging Gordijn is worried about surely does take place. An
example would be defining persons as fully self-conscious beings, claiming that
therefore only fully self-conscious beings have a right to life, and then concluding that
since fetuses are not fully self-conscious they are not persons, and therefore do not
have a right to life. Another example would be to claim that anything that feels pleasure
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and pain is a person, all persons have a right to life, a fetus can feel pleasure and pain,
therefore all abortion is wrong.
Similarly, Ridley (1998) objects to philosophers employing personhood as “a
specifically ethical concept, intended to indicate the possession of whatever properties
are held to account for the ethical significance of adult human beings,” (Ridley 1998,
115), because the question of how to decide which properties are ethically significant is
usually left unanswered and the properties are pre-selected to fit the ethical views of
whichever philosopher is employing the term. By way of reductio, Ridley offers the
following example:
I might define person as ‘whatever has two legs and no feathers’ (these are
certainly properties enjoyed by most human adults); then go on to claim that
persons and persons alone have ethical value. But this would be purely arbitrary.
I have given you no reason to suppose that my definition of person captures
anything of ethical significance at all…. personhood theorists almost always end
up by choosing their technical definition of ‘person’ simply in order to get the
conclusion they want. If the conclusion they want is that it is justifiable to kill
fetuses, it is hardly surprising if they end up defining ‘person’ in terms that no
fetus could match. (Ridley 1998, 115)
However, the problem, as I see it, is not that there is no good way to decide
among competing accounts of personhood. The problem arises, rather, from trying to
make one’s metaphysical notion of personhood encompass the unique moral status one
thinks persons must have.36 Proceeding in that way will surely lead to circularity as far
as bioethical debates are concerned. The mistake is not in providing a definition of

36

Thomson (1971) seems to express a similar view when she grants for the sake of argument
that a fetus is a person but then raises doubts about whether that entails that the fetus has a
right to life and if it does, whether that right must always trump the right of the mother to
sovereignty over her body.
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“person” that other people might disagree with, but, first of all, in assuming that the sets
of morally relevant properties and person-constituting properties are identical. That
assumption requires argument and there is good reason to believe it is mistaken. For
one thing, it is not obvious that only persons deserve our moral attention and concern.
Animal rights advocates will certainly deny it. There may be morally relevant properties
that are not unique to persons, e.g. the desire to continue living, the capacity for
pleasure and pain, etc.37 Similarly, it is not obvious that fetuses and irreversible coma
victims, even if they are not persons, do not have a right to life, or are not deserving of
dignity and respect. To say they don’t requires further argument beyond saying that they
aren’t persons. (Not that such argument isn’t available, at least in some cases). We
might even think it right to treat some humans and non-human animals in the way we
normally think to treat persons even while recognizing that they are not strictly so. Also,
one might think that some persons are not deserving of some rights. For example,
supporters of capital punishment might think that murderers have given up their right to
life. Less radically, criminals in general often lose their right to move about
unconstrained in the world. Whatever one’s position is, this issue is not settled by
appeal to personhood.
Now, it should already be clear from what I have said in chapter one that I don’t
think the task of clarifying the concept of a person is hopeless. I have offered an
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Gordijn includes the capacity for pleasure and pain in his list of possible person-constituting
properties, but no serious account of the nature of personhood takes this capacity to be by itself
sufficient.
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account of the conditions necessary and sufficient for being a person, i.e. possession of
the capacities for self-consciousness and concern, but I have done so with no eye
toward solving ethical debates beyond the issue of responsibility. However, I have less
confidence that we can conclusively settle the question of which properties to count as
morally relevant and which properties a being must have in order to be the appropriate
bearer of rights. Gordijn suggests that to avoid the circularity engendered by the use of
“person”, we should abandon the term and instead direct our attention to the morally
relevant properties it is supposed to cover. Ridley, on the other hand thinks that “the
search for special properties that give people the value they have seems mistaken from
the start. I don’t value you for your autonomy or for your higher brain function. I value
you for being you, for being a person (whatever that involves).” However, neither
approach is very promising. It is not clear which properties get to count as morally
relevant and it’s also not clear that we only value individuals for being persons. I value
my cats, maybe for being cats, but mostly for being beautiful, sensitive, and fascinating
among other reasons, just as I value persons for many, though not all, of the same
reasons and other reasons besides. Arguments about which properties or beings have
greater value are unlikely to succeed because fundamentally our values are based on
our concerns which are not metaphysically grounded. Some theorists, however,
particularly the ones who think persons have a unique ethical status, take higher
cognitive capacities such as high intelligence, language or self-consciousness and
responsible agency to be of special ethical significance, often claiming that only
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responsible beings can the the bearers of rights, thinking that the two designations go
hand in hand.
The crucial difference between responsibility and rights, is that whether or not
someone is responsible for an action is an objective, metaphysically grounded fact,
whereas what rights an individual or type of individual has is not determined by the facts
alone, but requires an individual or collective attribution. Rights are conferred by
persons on persons and other beings, they do not, as R. Abelson (2014) puts it, “grow
on trees,” but, like our moral principles, duties and judgments (he thinks), are products
of our explicit and tacit commitments to one another. I agree with the general claim
about moral principles, duties and judgments, but will not argue for that more general
claim here. However, it is clear to me that, both legally and morally speaking, rights are
things that must be granted by a society. That does not mean that there aren’t better
and worse reasons why some beings have rights and others don’t, but those reasons
ultimately reflect our values and not objective facts about the world. That is why they
often must be fought and campaigned for, they cannot merely be pointed out or argued
for based on what is already known to be true. Arguments for rights can only proceed
based on already agreed upon values or inconsistencies in the way that already
recognized rights are conferred. For instance, if we already agree that causing
unnecessary suffering is wrong, then anything with the capacity for suffering should
have the right to live without being made to suffer unnecessarily (though of course what
counts as ‘unnecessary’ is a problem in itself), or if a right is given to some individuals
256

on the basis of their being members of the human species and some group of humans
is denied that right, then one can argue that the species membership of the latter group
makes the denial of that right in their case unjust. However, extending that right beyond
the human species cannot come merely from appeal to principle, but requires a change
in values.
Abelson, however, thinks that because rights are based on agreed upon
conventions, beings that cannot make agreements cannot have rights. All rights,
according to him, must be claimable, as well as respected in other individuals who are
granted the same rights, by the individuals who would have them. In other words, if one
is unable to claim one’s own rights or one is incapable of respecting the rights of others,
then one cannot have any rights of one’s own. Such criteria would entail that human
infants, the severely cognitively disabled, and non-human animals that lack speech and
theory of mind could not have rights.
Similarly, Hart (1955) holds that “animals and babies” are not appropriate bearers
of rights.38 For Hart, it is not sufficient for having a right that one is “capable of benefiting
from the performance of a duty.”(Hart 1955, 180) It is because that condition is
generally taken to be sufficient “that animals and babies who stand to benefit from our
performance of our ‘duty’ not to ill-treat them (which is to say only that ill-treating them
would be wrong) are said therefore to have rights to proper treatment.” (Hart 1955, 180)
It is not, however, sufficient, according to Hart, because one does not determine who
38

Though, unlike Abelson, he thinks there is one ‘natural right’, one “not created or conferred
by men’s voluntary action,” (Hart 1955, 175), namely, the right of all men to be free.
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has a right simply by determining who stands to benefit from the performance of a duty.
One must instead examine “the transaction or antecedent situation or relations of the
parties out of which the ‘duty’ arises.” (Hart 1955, 181) For instance, if a person X has
promised to look after another person Y’s infirm mother while Y is away, then while the
mother stands to benefit from X’s performance of his duty to look after her, it is not she,
but Y who has the right to compel X to perform that duty, because it is Y to whom X
made the promise and
so it is Y, not his mother, whose right X will disregard and to whom X will have
done wrong if he fails to keep his promise, though the mother may be physically
injured. And it is Y who has a moral claim upon X, who is entitled to have his
mother looked after, and who can waive the claim and release Y from the
obligation. Y is, in other words, morally in a position to determine by his choice
how X shall act and in this way to limit X’s freedom of choice; and it is this fact,
not the fact that he stands to benefit, that makes it appropriate to say that he has
a right. (Hart 1955, 180)
What having a right entails, for Hart, is having a moral justification for limiting
someone else’s freedom to act. Therefore, having a right means that the individual who
has it can appeal to that justification when compelling another individual to do other than
the second individual wants. Appealing to such a justification or stating that someone is
bound or held by a claim, along with the opposite actions of waiving a claim or releasing
someone from an obligation seem to be things that only persons can do, because they
require that one is self-consciously aware of one’s justification and can choose, in a
sense implying responsibility for that choice, whether or not to exercise one’s right by
holding another individual to an obligation.
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According to Hart:
[the above] considerations should incline us not to extend to animals and babies
whom it is wrong to ill-treat the notion of a right to proper treatment, for the moral
situation can simply and adequately described here by saying that it is wrong or
that we ought not to ill-treat them. If common usage sanctions talk of the rights of
animals or babies it makes an idle use of the expression ‘a right,’ which will
confuse the situation with other different moral situations where the expression ‘a
right’ has a specific force and cannot be replaced with the other moral
expressions which I have mentioned. (Hart 1955, 181)
However, it is not clear to me that the case of the ill-treatment of animals, babies,
as well as the severely mentally handicapped, differs substantially from the cases Hart
thinks require use of the expression ‘a right,’ in the way Hart thinks they do. This is
because we often do appeal to a moral justification for limiting individuals’ freedom to
harm babies and animals, and not always because doing so would be an infringement
of our rights. Rather, we may claim the right not to be ill-treated for the animals, etc. In
such a case, that it is their rights and not our own that are being appealed to follows
from the fact that we do not have the option of waiving them or releasing others from
their obligations to respect those rights. If the non-persons at issue could waive their
rights then ill-treating them would not be wrong, but the fact that they are incapable of
communicating that waiver does not mean that they don’t have the right. This is why
children who are neglected or abused can justifiably be taken away from their parents.
The parents have a duty to treat the child well, because the child has the right to be
well-treated. Having this right justifies us in limiting the parents’ freedom to treat the
child as they wish.
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While I agree that only persons can make moral commitments, we can make
those commitments to beings who are themselves unable to make them. We can
commit to protecting, caring for, and otherwise being concerned for the interests of our
pets or our cognitively disabled brothers, sisters and children, and on that basis confer
rights onto them. Having a right means that a society commits itself to protecting the
individual who has the right from being wronged in some particular way. Many creatures
that are not able to explicitly claim their rights can still behave in ways that demonstrate
that they have their own concerns, particularly that they not be caused suffering, and
that they continue to be alive and healthy, such that we can get a sense of their
interests and what constitutes a wrong done to them. Now, that doesn’t mean that all
beings are to be so protected from any sort of wrong being done to them, nor does it
mean that some beings’ rights and concerns might not trump those of others. This is an
extremely difficult and complicated issue that I can’t do justice to here, other than to
show just how difficult and complex it is. We claim rights for ourselves and others based
on which wrongs we take to be intolerable in our society, such as the infliction of
physical or psychological pain or the denial of the freedom to pursue happiness.
However, if someone’s pursuit of happiness requires them to hurt someone else, the
right not to be caused pain may trump the right to pursue happiness. On the other hand,
if pain must be inflicted on some beings in order to design medical technologies that will
reduce the chances of pain or death in many others, the rights of the many may
outweigh the rights of the few. In most cases, we won’t agree to force an unconsenting
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human to undergo a painful experiment no matter the possible benefits, whether that
human has the capacities of a person or not. Most of us are less inhibited when it
comes to non-human animals, though some of us draw a line where we think the cost in
suffering is not outweighed by the potential benefits. Testing a vaccine on an animal
which may prevent millions of humans from contracting a deadly disease may be worth
the animal’s suffering, while trying out a new cosmetic on an animal to figure out
whether or not it will irritate skin is not. Why we are more reluctant to sacrifice a human
non-person than we are an animal does not merely track the capacities of the beings
involved, but also various other factors including our emotional bonds and the roles that
the beings play in society. Decisions about which rights trump which others, then,
should not rest on a human/animal distinction nor a person/non-person distinction. In a
situation where there is a quickly spreading fatal disease that could wipe out all of
humanity, we might agree to ignore the rights of a few humans to save the rest.
Whatever decisions we make will involve a weighing of our values not an easy appeal to
metaphysical categories.
Anderson (2000) offers an example meant to show the difference between how
we treat persons, versus how we treat pets or property, with respect to rights. He says
that
Property is the kind of thing that can be bought and sold, something I can "use"
for my own interests. Of course, when it comes to animals there are serious
moral constraints on how we may treat them. But we do not, in fact, give animals
the same kind of autonomy that we accord persons. We buy and sell dogs and
cats. And if we live in the city, we keep our pets "locked up" in the house,
something that we would have no right to do to a person.
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And generally of persons, he holds that it is:
morally wrong to buy or sell them as property the way we do with dogs and cats
or to otherwise use them for our own interests without taking into account the fact
that they are moral agents with interests that deserve the same respect and
protection that ours do…. Many of us would be prepared to say, I think, that any
entity judged to be a person would be the kind of thing that would deserve
protection under the constitution of a just society. It might reasonably be argued
that any such being would have the right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness.” (Anderson 2000)
Anderson is correct that as a matter of fact we do sell pets and don’t sell people,
but the latter hasn’t been or isn’t always the case at all times or in all places and it is not
out of the question that we could come to consider the former morally wrong and
unacceptable. It is not inconceivable that dogs and cats could be granted the right to not
be bought and sold as property, but only adopted by their caretakers. We don’t give our
pets complete freedom of movement, but that need not be because we are possessive
of our property, but might be only because we think it is in the pet’s long term interests
to stay within certain bounds. In the same way, persons are restricted in their freedom
of movement, and not only when we commit crimes that provoke a suspension of our
rights, but we are not free to go into places that pose great hazards to our health or
would constitute an invasion of someone else’s privacy. While there might be some
rights, e.g. free speech, that non-persons are incapable of enjoying, that does not mean
they cannot have any rights. I see no reason why dogs and cats could not, and should
not, in principle, be granted the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness - all
things they are perfectly capable of enjoying.
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Furthermore, I see no reason to think that just because a being is incapable of
respecting the rights of others means that it cannot itself have rights. We respect some
of the rights of persons who do not in fact respect the rights of others. For instance,
freedom of speech is granted to fascists, racists, bigots, and psychopaths. Therefore,
there is no reason why a being completely incapable of respecting others’ rights, could
not itself have rights. We may reasonably regard it as our duty to protect the interests of
those who cannot protect themselves or claim their own rights, even though those
others do not and cannot reciprocate. After all, our very young children have a right to
our protection and care, but we have no right to their protection, nor could they offer it.
Rights aside, I see the general issue of which properties are morally relevant,
and therefore which beings deserve our moral consideration, as an issue of how far and
in what directions our concern extends. Different people, and therefore different
societies, have different degrees of concern for the interests of severely cognitively
disabled humans (such that they are incapable of self-consciousness), non-human
animal pets, and non-human wildlife. This seems to be a function of the degree to which
those people can empathize with those interests, which has to do with myriad properties
that such beings possess. Some people take intelligence, self-consciousness,
responsible agency, and species membership to be especially morally relevant, but I
see no reason why we necessarily should be concerned with them. First of all, even
among persons we do not usually take individuals with greater intelligence as deserving
of greater moral concern, so I don’t see why it should be relevant when comparing
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persons to non-persons. Secondly, animals, like children, are often loved particularly for
their supposed “innocence,” the fact that they can’t be responsible for their actions
(particularly the bad ones), due to their lack of self-consciousness. Individuals who are
weak, disabled, or unable to care for themselves require greater moral consideration to
protect their interests, not less. Therefore, having the capacities necessary and
sufficient for personhood does not put one in a special class, the members of which are
uniquely deserving of the highest moral consideration.
Singer (1975/2002) famously argues for equal consideration of the interests of
animals.39 He claims that this follows from the general moral idea of equal consideration
of the interests of all human beings. According to Singer, the equality asserted in such a
principle is not a statement of fact and so:
does not depend on intelligence, moral capacity, physical strength, or similar
matters of fact… There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a
factual difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the
amount of consideration we give to their needs and interests. The principle of
equality between human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality
among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat human beings…. our
concern for others and our readiness to consider their interests ought not to
depend on what they are like or on what abilities they might possess. (Singer
1975/2002, 4-5)
However, our concern for the interests of others does require that they be
capable of suffering or enjoyment of happiness, because “the capacity for suffering and
enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all.” (Singer 1975/2002, 7) In other
39

I am somewhat sympathetic to Singer’s view that “the language of rights is a convenient
political shorthand” (Singer 1975/2002, 8) for moral consideration, but I will not argue for that
view here and anyway think I have already refuted what I take to be the most compelling
argument for denying that non-persons can have rights.
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words, having interests requires that one is concerned. Suffering and enjoyment are
affective states tied to the satisfaction of one’s goals. As Singer, following Bentham
(1789/1907), argues, empathy and therefore consideration of interests is morally
relevant in a way that other characteristics are not, because our feeling empathy for
something depends upon the capacity of the being we feel empathy for (or at least our
belief that the being has such capacity40) to have such states.
However, while I agree that the capacity for suffering and enjoyment of
happiness is necessary (perhaps constitutive) of having concern, I understand the
possession of interests to be somewhat broader. Trees, rivers and robots incapable of
concern, might still have interests in the sense that they can be in better or worse
condition, whether or not such conditions can have any significance for them. If it is
appropriate to talk about the interests of these unconcerned beings, then there is no
reason, besides our lack of concern for their interests, why they too cannot be part of
our moral community, though they are not persons or even sentient beings.
Nevertheless, it seems that we are primarily concerned for other beings insofar as they
are themselves concerned.
If the primary morally significant property is the capacity to experience joy and
suffering, then many non-human animals and severely cognitively disabled humans
deserve as much moral consideration as persons. Being persons, with our capacities for
both concern and self-consciousness, we are in a better position than non-persons to
40

Or the relevant type of state necessary to feel for a fictional character, whether that is a real
belief or some kind of pretend belief.
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make choices that may benefit others, but that does not entail that we are deserving of
greater benefit than others, except perhaps in the utilitarian sense that preserving the
well-being of an individual who is in such a better position to help others, may allow for
more good to be done in the long run, than preserving the well-being of an individual
that is in a worse position to help others, that is, so long as one expects the former
individual to actually act altruistically. However, even in that case, it might be that some
animals, for instance a mother who must care for many of her young, may deserve
greater consideration than some persons. In general, as Singer himself grants, the
interests of persons may trump those of animals for various reasons. Perhaps, given
our capacity for self-consciousness, our capacity for joy and suffering is greater than
that of animals, or again we can potentially do more good for the world (though also
more evil) than an animal can. Still, that does not mean that animals’ and other
nonpersons’ interests should not be considered or that they cannot be part of our
primary moral constituency. The differences in interests are of degree, not kind. Finally,
some people might argue that we have special duties to members of our own species
because our genetic destiny is linked with theirs. That might be true, but then the issue
is not about persons versus non-persons, but about members of the human species
versus members of other species.
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IV.

Metaphysical and Moral Personhood reconsidered
Dennett (1978) claims that the metaphysical and moral conceptions of

personhood are inextricably connected, resting as unstable points on a continuum, and
that neither can be analyzed in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Scott
(1990), responding to Dennett, attempts to extricate the two sorts of personhood into
distinct concepts. Though I don’t think that aim is fully achievable I am in other ways
sympathetic to Scott’s view. He defines metaphysical persons as “malleable higher
order intentional systems.” Their malleability or flexibility in the kinds of intentional states
they are capable of having gives them the capacity for evil as well as good. (Scott 1990,
78) Therefore, he holds that:
whether we like it or not... it is entirely appropriate to say that being moral is not a
necessary condition of personhood. The figures we look upon as the most evil
and morally depraved in human history were, no less than those of us who today
consider ourselves to be persons, certainly persons. They possessed all the
features we have so far attributed to persons; it just happened that malleability, in
their cases, led to results of a horrifying nature. Whether we would really want to
say, as Dennett has suggested, that we all as persons and moral persons might
properly be said to be located on the same continuum, is, because of this, a
more troublesome claim… (Scott 1990, 78)
I have argued in support of the claim that persons aren’t necessarily moral and
have explained how that is so, by distinguishing between the general capacity for
concern, which is necessary for personhood, and the having of particular concerns for
the interests of others, which is not. Scott suggests that being a moral person might
essentially consist in having the capacity for “caring”, and so doesn’t distinguish that
general capacity from specifically caring for others. He holds generally that a moral
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person is one who chooses not to engage in actions that would interfere with or destroy
the capacities that make another person a person, but instead acts in such a way as to
contribute to the development and maintenance of those capacities in others. That’s not
far from the mark, I think, though I would add that a moral person should not interfere
with and should instead contribute to the general flourishing of all beings with the
capacity for joy, suffering and empathy, to the best of her ability insofar as that does not
interfere with her own flourishing. In any case, Scott’s definition of a moral person belies
his attempt to fully disentangle the metaphysical concept of a person from it. If a moral
person is a person who chooses to benefit other persons (and maybe non-persons as
well), then a person, in the first place, is a being with, in some sense, the capacity to
choose, i.e. with the capacity for responsible action. Therefore, as I have claimed
above, the metaphysical concept of a person is inextricably linked with one aspect of
the moral concept, responsibility, though not with all of them, i.e. moral goodness or
possession of rights. So instead of talking about the metaphysical concept of a person
versus the moral one, I propose that we just recognize one, metaphysical, concept,
which has some relation to morality, in that it is the concept of a being that can be
responsible for its actions, and from there just talk about morally good and morally bad
persons, or even better (since most persons do some good and some bad things),
morally good and bad actions performed by persons.
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